Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  POLISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
EN
The activity of the Polish military Intelligence in Eastern Prussia in the years 1981-939 should be assessed by taking into consideration the following issues: the participation of the Second Department in the plebiscite campaign, the Intelligence work conducted by local branches of the Second Department, and the construction and support of Polish minority organisations envisaged as a foundation for diversion structures. The Polish military did not remain passive towards the plebiscites conducted in Warmia, Mazuria and the Powisle region (part of Gdansk Pomerania). Nonetheless, the undertakings were initiated too late, insufficiently vigorously and without a clear programme. The subsequent efforts of the Second Department in relation to the population of Mazuria, aimed at awakening national consciousness and the creation of diversion measures, ended with a fiasco. On the other hand, one of the successes of Intelligence reconnaissance in Eastern Prussia, i. a. on the eve of the Second World War, included the establishment of the dislocation of an overwhelming majority of the German units.
EN
The inter-war period witnessed the development of two basic forms of co-operation between the consular service and Polish military Intelligence. The first consisted of entrusting espionage to consular officials, who carried them out on the margin of their work in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, conducting 'white Intelligence' and realizing the simplest counter-Intelligence tasks.The second, more advanced and intensive form of co-operation exploited the official structures of the consulates for concealing full-time Intelligence officers. it appears that the Intelligence of the Second Republic - both shallow and strategic - benefited to a considerable degree from the support rendered by the consular service. In the basic trends of the reconnaissance performed by the Second Department of the Supreme Staff, i. e. in Germany and the Soviet Union, the participation of consulates in the organisation of Intelligence was so extensive that we may speak about a certain norm and a fragment of official pragmatic. During the 1930s Polish Intelligence networks in those countries were based on consular outposts and in order to avoid conflicts several conventions signed at the beginning of the 1920s regulated the co-operation between the consulates and the Intelligence employees. The fundamental convention, completed in January 1922, remained in force until the end of the 1930s. After the May 1926 coup d'etat that swerved Poland onto a path of building an authoritarian system of power dominated by the military, the heads of Polish Intelligence paid increasingly less attention to the opinions of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a stand rendered possible by the influx of officers into the Ministry. In 1931 the Consular Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs found itself in the hands of former Intelligence officers. As a consequence, the significance of Intelligence officers working in consulates increased: they exerted a large impact upon the personnel policy, enjoyed independence, and to a certain extent controlled the work carried out by the consulates. This situation produced multiple conflicts, ultimately eliminated by the encroaching war.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.