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EN
The paper is a draft of an answer to the question: Why did Tadeusz Kotarbinski's autonomous ethics, whose normative claims are close to the ideals of Christian mercy, become so popular and so widely discussed in Poland in the second half of the 20th century? The discussions concerned the essence and the degree of the autonomy of ethics in relation to other branches of philosophy and to the humanities. Other topics discussed included the interpretation of the ideal of the reliable guardian and his defining moral attitude called practical realism. The methodological problems of the autonomy of ethics were discussed by philosophers of the Christian orientation associated with the Catholic University of Lublin. These scholars were interested in the question of how ethics can become independent form any worldview. Although philosophers associated with the Lvov-Warsaw school supported Kotarbinski's ethics, they also made serious criticisms. Maria Ossowska voiced epistemological objections; Tadeusz Czezowski took Kotarbinski's side but he presented a more carefully formulated idea of empirical ethics and tried to show that such ethics can be an axiomatic-deductive rather than an inductive theory. Ija Lazari-Pawlowska and Marian Przelecki presented their approval for Kotarbinski's idea of an intuitionist foundation of ethics. The program of universal ethics, independent from any worldview and religious controversies, seems to have influenced also Marek Fritzhand's interpretation of Marxist ethics and corresponded with the attempts to build an ethics of dialog and responsibility.
EN
Practical realism is the ethical conception of Tadeusz Kotarbinski, which has met with serious criticism - first of all by Henryk Elzenberg. The author of the article considers some aspects of that criticism correct. He also tries to show how the criticism can be avoided by offering an interpretation of the postulate of practical realism suggested by some earlier texts of Kotarbinski. So understood, the postulate is not seen as the main ideal of life, but as a moral condition which our striving for that ideal should satisfy. The condition requires us to care for others, especially by 'defending them against misfortune'.
EN
In this article the authoress discusses the influence of Tadeusz Kotarbinski's work on the academic achievements of Maria Ossowska. Her analysis is based on the polemic between the two scholars. She begins by pointing out considerable differences between the two scholars. They have different views on both the subject of ethics and its methodological requirements, and on what moral standard of evaluation is. However, both academics have much in common. In particular, there is a significant agreement between their views on moral values and their shared belief that it is necessary to develop a 'moral backbone' or a stable hierarchy of values to which one should remain faithful whatever the circumstances. Other common aspects of the ethical views of Tadeusz Kotarbinski and Maria Ossowska include their attitudes to the ethics of struggle, their understanding of the idea of honour and its derivative relation to other values, their perceptions of conscience as a form of shame or contempt, and their views on the role and nature of virtues.
EN
The article presents a schematic reconstruction of Tadeusz Kotarbinski's ethical views. An analysis of Kotarbinski's ethical writings (which, unfortunately, are far from the ideal of precision) shows that the following theses constitute his ethical system. The basic negative moral norm is 'You should do wrong to nobody beyond necessary need', and the basic positive norm is 'You should do good to somebody'. Thus Kotarbinski's ethics can be called 'local altruism'. For Kotarbinski the main virtue is protectiveness and for this reason his system is called 'the ethics of a reliable guardian'. The reliable guardian's goal should be prevention and elimination of unhappiness; thus Kotarbinski's ethical system can be called 'ethical minimalism'. Ethical norms are justified by induction supplemented by moral intuition. First, we recognize intuitively acts which are evidently good and those which are evidently evil; next, we abstract from them the essence of the honorable and of the dishonorable. Kotarbinski's ethical system was intended to be independent from philosophical and religious doctrines, however, it's content is very close to the evangelical ethics.
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