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EN
The relation of alternativeness (accessibility) between elements of the set of possible worlds is the key concept of relational semantics. The model frame of this semantics has a large applicability in many kinds of non-classical logics. The paper analyses the concept of alternativeness in order to offer its philosophical elucidating. At the beginning an explanation of alternativeness in epistemic and temporal systems is presented. Then some positions on the question of ontological status of possible worlds are compared. In conclusion it is pointed out that the concept of alternativeness is a different way of formulating the idea of possibility.
EN
The notion of possible mathematical world is discussed. The problem is analyzed from the point of view of two classical realistic stances in the philosophy of mathematics (Quine's realism and Gödel's Platonism), and from the point of view of Balaguer's full-blooded Platonism. Balauger's stance seems to be compatible with the use of the notion of a possible mathematical world (a universe), but as a matter of fact it is not. If one adopts such a notion, several profound philosophical problems arise, concerning e.g. the criterion of identity, the problem of the 'borders of mathematicity', the problem of singling out the actual world from a possible one. In conclusion the author claims that the notion of possible world is not clear enough to be used in ontological discussions concerning mathematics.
EN
Different systems of modal logic are possible. Consequently, the question arises, whether any one of them is more credible than others, and what kind of arguments can be adduced in its defense. In the article the author discusses the assumption that the possible world is a maximal situation (in the sense of situation ontology).
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 6
523 – 529
EN
The paper deals with such a modification of genuine modal realism as to accommodate impossible worlds into its ontology. First of all, the theory of modal realism is presented. Next, several motivations for the acceptance of impossible worlds are adduced. Further, Lewis’s argument against impossible worlds is presented. It is argued that the argument can be weakened by rejection of one of its premises. Finally, two objections against the proposal are countered. Although my strategy accounts for the Opinion concerning the impossible, it allegedly violates another Opinion which conceives the reality classical. It seems, however, that there is no no-question-begging reason to think that reality is classical. How can we know, after all, which logic describes reality? Without a definite answer to the question, the incredibility objection then simply collapses into a statement of a possibility dogma.
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