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1

ARE POSSIBLE WORLDS POSSIBLE ?

100%
Hess L.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2008
|
vol. 36
|
issue 1
49-67
EN
David Lewis' modal realism is, in the author's opinion, one of the simplest and most useful theories of possible worlds. Nevertheless, it is not free of serious problems. In particular, important arguments against it have been endorsed by Forrest, Armstrong, and King. The answers to these arguments that were proposed either by Lewis himself or by other philosophers are not entirely satisfactory. Therefore, the aim of the present paper is to find better solutions. To provide them, an 'extension' of genuine modal realism is proposed. The crux of the 'extension' is to introduce higher-level modal operators, which can be used to incorporate into the theory provisos that make it possible to solve the apparent problems indicated by Forrest, Armstrong, and King. A semantical analysis of these 'meta-modalities' requires us to accept the existence of higher-level possible worlds. Apparently, this is in contradiction with one of the fundamental theses of Lewis' modal realism: all possible worlds are of the same kind as ours. But this is not so: higher-level possible worlds are just sets of zero-level worlds; ergo, there is no reason for not being able to talk about them.
2

TIL AND ESSENTIALISM

80%
Sebela K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2008
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vol. 15
|
issue 3
358-368
EN
The paper focuses on the relation of the so-called 'Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL)' and 'Aristotelian Essentialism'. TIL is presented here as an antiessentialist system. The author analyses the reasons of TIL's anti-essentialism, and he sees the main reasons in the very conception of the possible worlds, which is preferred by TIL, as well as in the ontological status of the properties and secondarily in the relation between the individuals and properties, as TIL conceives it. He asserts that even within the frame of TIL it is possible to formulate a certain version of the Aristotelian Essentialism and he points out the intuitions that are connected with the concept of essence and preserved by the formulated conception, contrary to TIL and other systems of modern logic.
3

Critical Remarks about Modal Realism of David Lewis

80%
Filipczyk H.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2(66)
193-210
EN
David Lewis believes that possible worlds are spatiotemporal entities, maximal and causally isolated. They exist in the very same sense as 'our' world does. The article critically discusses his 'extreme modal realism', propounded mainly in his book 'On the Plurality of Worlds'. Having outlined the main features of this doctrine, the authoress raises several objections to it. 'Modal realism' is neither modal nor realistic. First, contrary to what Lewis declares, his theory does not analyze modality in terms of more basis entities in a theoretically defensible way. Secondly, it contains incredible existential claims whose ludicrousness is not justified by the presumed theoretical benefits it offers (in particular, by its 'economy'). Finally, it assumes that 'anything can co-exist with anything else'. This postulation, however, is controversial: it is implausible and it deprives the theory of possible worlds of its foremost motivation. Moreover it is at variance with ontological rationality. In sum, the doctrine in question, though designed with care and courage, sounds unconvincing.
4

TICHÝ´S POSSIBLE WORLDS

80%
Raclavský J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
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vol. 21
|
issue 4
471 – 491
EN
Pavel Tichý originally published his interesting conception of possible worlds in 1968. Even though he modified it over the following twenty five years, its core remained unchanged. None of his thirty journal papers or books containing the notion of possible worlds was a study in metaphysics. Tichý (and most of his followers) always introduced the notion in the context of other investigations where he applied his Transparent Intensional Logic either to the semantic analysis of natural language or to the explications of other notions. Tichý presented his conceptions using rather short descriptions occurring on a number of places; his proposal appears not only fragmentary but also somehow incoherent. The main contribution of this paper is thus not only a complete survey of Tichý’s development of his conception but also a certain completion of the very proposal.
5

Why Don't I Like Possible Worlds

80%
Talasiewicz M.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2(66)
211-218
EN
The author argues that possible worlds semantics is counterintuitive and fails to achieve its goals. The definition of the meaning of a sentence as the set of possible worlds in which the sentence is true is criticized as inadequate; the semantics of modal expressions is claimed uninformative. Truth-conditions of counterfactuals on one hand, and definitions of law-like expressions (or statements expressing causal connection) on the other hand, are regarded as circular. A further development of indexical semantics - a more fine-grained one, involving interdisciplinary research into the relations among the indices - is advocated as an alternative.
6

The Possible and Other Kinds of World

80%
Pasniczek J.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2008
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2(66)
17-27
EN
The author argues that possible worlds semantics is counterintuitive and does not to achieve its goals. The definition of the meaning of a sentence as the set of all possible worlds in which the sentence is true is criticized as inadequate; the semantics of modal expressions is shown to be uninformative. Truth-conditions of counterfactuals on one hand, and definitions of law-like expressions (or statements expressing causal connection) on the other hand, are exposed as circular. A further development of indexical semantics - more fine-grained and involving interdisciplinary research into the relationships among the indices - is advocated as an alternative.
7

BETWEEN THE ACTUAL AND THE TRIVIAL WORLD

70%
Sendłak M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2016
|
vol. 23
|
issue 2
162 – 176
EN
The subject of this paper is the notion of similarity between the actual and impossible worlds. Many believe that this notion is governed by two rules. According to the first rule, every non-trivial world is more similar to the actual world than the trivial world is. The second rule states that every possible world is more similar to the actual world than any impossible world is. The aim of this paper is to challenge both of these rules. We argue that acceptance of the first rule leads to the claim that the rule ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet is invalid in classical logic. The second rule does not recognize the fact that objects might be similar to one another due to various features.
8

NEURČITOSŤ REFERENCIE A PRETRVÁVANIE V ČASE

70%
Schmidt M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2016
|
vol. 71
|
issue 8
656 – 668
EN
According to the inscrutability of reference principle, there are source language sentences that have exact counterparts in the target language, yet some of their sentence-parts may refer to different things. One word sentence “Gavagai“ means “There is a rabbit“ though ‘rabbit’ may have different referents, among them the temporal stage of four-dimensional rabbit, or three-dimensional rabbit as a whole. It follows that ‘rabbit’ reference may be bound to either three- or four-dimensional ontologies yet the sentence where it occurs doesn’t shift its stimulus meaning. However, there are recent proposals in meta-ontology that consider the dispute between three- and four-dimensional views of particulars verbal. If that is the case, then one of the Quine’s principal examples of inscrutability of reference (and ontological relativity as well) fails. The aim of the paper is to demonstrate that the difference between the rival theories of particulars is not verbal and becomes evident mainly in the context of possible worlds.
9

COMBINATORIAL THEORIES OF POSSIBLE WORLDS AND THEIR PERSPECTIVES

70%
Tomala O.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2007
|
vol. 14
|
issue 2
148-176
EN
Analysis of alethic modality and the related notion of possible world have played important if not crucial role in the analytic philosophy of the 20th century. The mainstream in the theories of possible worlds, so called Actualism, is currently predominated by the theories, which define possible worlds as set-theoretical objects composed of propositions. Other theories are usually being dismissed by a set of rather standard criticisms. The aim of this paper is to show the problems that the propositional theories have to face and to argue that one of the alternative theories, namely Combinatorialism, provides much better basis for analysis of alethic modality than it is usually thought.
10

EVERYTHING FOR NOTHING

70%
Simionato M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2014
|
vol. 21
|
issue 4
458 – 470
EN
In this paper the author argues that the acceptance of an absolutely unrestricted quantification implies the existence of an absolutely empty possible world. This result could be relevant because David Lewis both admits an absolutely unrestricted quantification (for example in Parts of Classes) and rejects the existence of an absolutely empty possible world (in On the Plurality of Worlds). In order to vindicate his thesis, the author proposes two strategies. The first is based on the assumption that the phrase ‘nothing’ cannot be always reduced to a quantifier phrase, as Graham Priest and Alex Oliver with Timothy Smiley have argued. This strategy consists in a paraphrase of the notion of everything that constrains us to admit an empty possible world. The second strategy mainly consists in the use of an “idealistic” principle (say «every determination is negation») and its consequences.
11

EXPLIKÁCIA MODÁLNYCH POJMOV

70%
Glavaničová D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 7
557 – 566
EN
Possible worlds and propositions are the most fundamental building blocks of intentional semantics, as well as the most fundamental building blocks of modal logic. Within the standard possible-world semantics there are two prevailing approaches to the explication of possible worlds and propositions. The first approach treats possible worlds as primitive and specifies propositions in terms of them (propositions as sets of primitive possible worlds in which they hold). The second approach treats propositions as primitive and specifies possible worlds in terms of them (possible worlds as maximal consistent sets of primitive propositions). Supposing we wish to stay within the standard possible-world setting, the aim of this paper will be to compare these two approaches: Which arguments have been (can be) listed in their favour? Can these arguments help us to decide between them? It should be clear that the present paper is not going to explicate any modal notions (such as necessity, obligation, belief, and so on); its perspective will not be semantic or logical, but rather methodological.
12

OD DESKRIPCII K ICH REFERENTOM

70%
Cmorej P.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2013
|
vol. 68
|
issue 10
825 – 848
EN
The paper deals with the logical analysis of empirical descriptions from the perspective of temporal modal semantics. After general introductory remarks concerning the structure of descriptions and temporally conceived possible worlds, the author’s attention turns to the reference of descriptions and the properties ascribed to individuals by descriptions. A reference is an empirical relation between a description (ιx)Φ(x) and its referent relative to possible world w and time t. A description (ιx)Φ(x) refers to an object O in world w at time t (at world-time couple (w, t)) if O has the property (λx)Φ(x) at (w, t). The core of the article is investigating non-standard descriptions containing the so-called closure. The purpose of the closure is restricting the set of properties ascribed to an individual by description either to those that are explicitly ascribed or to those that are entailed by explicitly ascribed ones. It is argued that if a description (ιx)Φ(x) refers to an individual O at (w, t) then (ιx)(Φ(x)  Cl(x)), where Cl(x) is a closure, cannot have a referent. It is suggested that the closure descriptions can be used in the analysis of Meinongian and fictitious objects.
13

ON TICHÝ’S ATTEMPT TO EXPLICATE SENSE IN TERMS OF TURING MACHINES

70%
Materna P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2018
|
vol. 25
|
issue 1
41 – 52
EN
In Tichý (1969), it is shown that semantics of natural language can be pursued procedurally. Tichý supported his argument by defining elementary functions of logic (truth functions, quantifiers) using Turing machines and attempting to define the sense of empirical expressions using a simple semantic version of oracle. From the way how Turing machines and later constructions are defined it follows that even the sense of empirical expressions can be successfully handled but that the sense and denotation can be in principle effectively obtained while the actual value at the actual world can be, of course, never computed. The present paper comments on this attempt and it compares the Turing machines argument with the possibilities given by TIL constructions. Turing machines guarantee the effective character of computing while the constructions do not, but expressive power of constructions is incomparably stronger, not only because Tichý’s possible worlds from 1969 are a temporal: they define essentially 1st order operations and can be reinterpreted as one possible world enjoying (discrete) temporal changes. Both the TM conception and the “constructivist” one know that the question “which possible world is the actual one” cannot be ever answered by effective (computational) methods and their analyses of empirical expressions are therefore compatible.
14

CARNAP´S MODAL LOGIC 'C' (Carnapova modalni logika 'C')

61%
Puncochar V.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2010
|
vol. 17
|
issue 2
163-184
EN
In this paper, author presents Carnap's modal logic C, which is one of the first attempts to use the concept of possible world (that of state description in the Carnapian original terminology) in shaping the semantics for modalities. Some older technical results, which concern the logic C, are summarized, namely two different kinds of axiomatization of C, one unusual characterization of C as the only set of formulae having one special property, and semantic and syntactical relations of C to S5. The fact that C is not closed under the universal substitution is shortly discussed. Finally, the predicate version of C, which is not axiomatizable, is defined.
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