Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 4

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  PROPOSITIONS
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

CAUSAL-MENTALIST VIEW OF PROPOSITIONS

100%
Joaquin J., Franklin J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2022
|
vol. 29
|
issue 1
47 - 77
EN
In order to fulfil their essential roles as the bearers of truth and the relater of logical relations, propositions must be public and shareable. That requirement has favoured Platonist and other non-mental views of them, despite the well-known problems of Platonism in general. Views that propositions are mental entities have correspondingly fallen out of favour, as they have difficulty in explaining how propositions could have shareable, objective properties. We revive a mentalist view of propositions, inspired by Artificial Intelligence work on perceptual algorithms, which shows how perception causes persistent mental entities with shareable properties that allow them to fulfil the traditional roles of (one core kind of) propositions. The clustering algorithms implemented in perception produce outputs which are (implicit) atomic propositions in different minds. Coordination of them across minds proceeds by game-theoretic processes of communication. The account does not rely on any unexplained notions such as mental content, representation, or correspondence (although those notions are applicable in philosophical analysis of the result).
2

EXPLIKÁCIA MODÁLNYCH POJMOV

88%
Glavaničová D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 7
557 – 566
EN
Possible worlds and propositions are the most fundamental building blocks of intentional semantics, as well as the most fundamental building blocks of modal logic. Within the standard possible-world semantics there are two prevailing approaches to the explication of possible worlds and propositions. The first approach treats possible worlds as primitive and specifies propositions in terms of them (propositions as sets of primitive possible worlds in which they hold). The second approach treats propositions as primitive and specifies possible worlds in terms of them (possible worlds as maximal consistent sets of primitive propositions). Supposing we wish to stay within the standard possible-world setting, the aim of this paper will be to compare these two approaches: Which arguments have been (can be) listed in their favour? Can these arguments help us to decide between them? It should be clear that the present paper is not going to explicate any modal notions (such as necessity, obligation, belief, and so on); its perspective will not be semantic or logical, but rather methodological.
3

AN APPROACH TO INDEXICAL BELIEFS

75%
Ciecierski T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2020
|
vol. 27
|
issue 3
346 – 376
EN
An approach to indexical beliefs is presented and defended in the paper. The account is inspired by David Kaplan’s representationalist analysis of de re belief reports. I argue that imposing additional constraints on the Kaplanian notion of representation results in an elegant theory of indexical beliefs. The theory is committed to representations of limited accessibility but is not committed to relativized proposition, special de se contents or propositions of limited accessibility.
4

WHAT WE KNOW ABOUT NUMBERS AND PROPOSITIONS AND HOW WE KNOW IT

75%
Soames S.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2020
|
vol. 27
|
issue 3
282 - 301
EN
The paper sketches and defends two instances of the strategy Let N’s be whatever they have to be to explain our knowledge of them—one in which N’s are natural numbers and one in which N’s are propositions. The former, which makes heavy use of Hume’s principle and plural quantification, grounds our initial knowledge of number in (a) our identification of objects as falling under various types, (b) our ability to count (i.e. to pair memorized numerals with individuated objects of one’s attention), (c) our (initially perceptual) recognition of plural properties (e.g. being three in number), and (d) our predication of those properties of pluralities that possess them (even though no individuals in the pluralities do). Given this foundation, one can use Fregean techniques to non-paradoxically generate more extensive arithmetical knowledge. The second instance of my metaphysics-in-the-service-of-epistemology identifies propositions (i.e. semantic contents of some sentences, objects of the attitudes, and bearers of truth, falsity, necessity, contingency, and apriority) with certain kinds of purely representational cognitive acts, operations, or states. In addition to providing natural solutions to traditionally unaddressed epistemic problems involving linguistic cognition and language use, I argue that this metaphysical conception of propositions expands the solution spaces of many of the most recalcitrant and long-standing problems in natural-language semantics and the philosophy of language.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.