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Is normal science good science?

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EN
“Normal science” is a concept introduced by Thomas Kuhn in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). In Kuhn’s view, normal science means “puzzle solving”, solving problems within the paradigm-framework most successful in solving current major scientific problems-rather than producing major novelties. This paper examines Kuhnian and Popperian accounts of normal science and their criticisms to assess if normal science is good. The advantage of normal science according to Kuhn was “psychological”: subjective satisfaction from successful “puzzle solving”. Popper argues for an “intellectual” science, one that consistently refutes conjectures (hypotheses) and offers new ideas rather than focus on personal advantages. His account is criticized as too impersonal and idealistic. Feyerabend’s perspective seems more balanced; he argues for a community that would introduce new ideas, defend old ones, and enable scientists to develop in line with their subjective preferences. The paper concludes that normal science has no one clear-cut set of criteria encompassing its meaning and enabling clear assessment.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest zagadnienie wielości teoretycznych ujęć w nauce (w refleksji przed­miotowej, jak i metaprzedmiotowej) oraz mnogość perspektyw w ramach filozofii nauki. Za­gad­nienie pluralizmu omówiono w odniesieniu do stanowiska lubelskiego filozofa nauki, ks. prof. Zyg­munta Hajduka. Twierdzi się, że swoiste pluralistyczne podejście do nauki oraz proble­mów z za­kresu filozofii nauki zajmowało istotne miejsce w jego filozoficznej refleksji. Celem artykułu jest próba scharakteryzowania i interpretacji jego podejścia. Cel ten realizowany jest w kilku etapach. Zarysowano historyczne tło omawianej problematyki. W oparciu o literaturę przedmiotu zostały wyróżnione rodzaje pluralizmów, a następnie przedstawiono własną propozycję ich odróż­nia­nia (w nawiązaniu do prac ks. Hajduka). Jest to model trzech płaszczyzn analizy nauki: przed­miotowej, metodologicznej oraz metametodologicznej. Na każdej z tych płaszczyzn można stwier­dzić pluralizm ujęć. Model ten zastosowano do studium stanowiska ks. Hajduka w kwestii plu­raliz­mu w nauce i metanauce. Nawiązując do filozofii nauki Paula Feyerabenda, zaproponowano inter­pretację filozoficznego dorobku ks. Hajduka i określono jego stanowisko mianem „dobry empirysta”.
EN
This article studies an issue of multiplicity of theoretical approaches in science as well as multitude of perspectives in philosophy of science. The issue of pluralism has been considered in relation to the position of Lublin’s philosopher of science, Zygmunt Hajduk. It is argued that a pluralistic approach to science and philosophy of science has been quite prominent in his reflec­tion since the beginning of his career. The aim of the article is an attempt to characterize and interpret Hajduk’s position on pluralism. This aim has been carried out in several stages. Firstly, the historical background of the problem field has been sketched. Then a number of kinds of pluralism has been distinguished and own proposal of typology has been put forward (in refe­rence to Hajduk’s works). This proposal presents a model of three levels of analysis of science: level of scientific theories, methodological and meta-methodological level. On every of these levels pluralism plays an important role. Thirdly, this model has been applied to the analysis of Hajduk’s position in regard to pluralism in science and metascience. Lastly, referring to the work and ideas of Paul Feyerabend, an interpretation of Hajduk’s position has been presented and designated as “good empiricist.”
EN
Using Feyerabend's argumentation, and rephrasing of the problem in terms of the Model of Levels of Analysis, I show that a good empiricist need not be a (metaphysical or methodological) naturalist. I characterize the ideas of Alvin Plantinga and Jitse M. van der Meer as being representative of two different varieties of theistic response to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and contemporary science. Against van der Meer, I argue for Plantinga's conclusion about the value of theism-based science. Against both approaches, I point to situations where theistic assumptions do indeed influence the contents of observation.
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