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PL
This paper is to present the notion of man as the keyword in the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, which can be referred to as philosophical anthropology. The article is based on an analysis of three conceptual metaphors chosen in Le volontaire et l’involontaire. The author applies the theory of the linguistic picture of the world and some issues of cognitive linguistics. She uses primarily the concept of conceptual metaphors by George Lakoff and Mark Johnson, in particular the metaphor of a container (MAN AS A CONTAINER). The discussion centres on three metaphors MAN AS A DECISION, MAN AS AN ACTION and MAN AS A CONSENT defining in part the notion of man in Le volontaire et l’involontaire.
EN
Léopold Sédar Senghor was a thinker and poet of Négritude, and also a politician, a member of the French National Assembly in the context where decolonization was inevitable. With the theoretical support of Paul Ricœur, this article explores Senghor's utopia in order to reflect on the function of these unreal places in his thought and to restore his vision of the future. Both the Kingdom of the Sine and Confederate France - the figures of his eutopia - were presented as harmonious communities by which to imagine the future. If Senghor does not challenge colonial ideology with a conservative utopia, where the Kingdom of the Sine would regain its ancient form, but with that of a federal thus decolonized France, where equality of political, civic and social rights between members of a plurinational state would obtain, the question of knowing if he was a utopian remains.
FR
Léopold Sédar Senghor était un penseur et poète de la Négritude, et il était aussi un homme politique, député à l’Assemblée nationale française dans un contexte où la décolonisation était inéluctable. Avec le soutien théorique de Paul Ricœur, cet article explore l’utopie chez Senghor pour réfléchir à la fonction qu’occupent ces lieux irréels dans sa pensée et restaurer la vision de l’avenir qui était la sienne. Figures de son eutopia, tant le Royaume du Sine que la France Confédérée se proposaient comme communautés harmonieuses à l’aune desquelles imaginer l’avenir. Si Senghor ne défie pas l’idéologie coloniale avec une utopie conservatrice, où le Royaume du Sine retrouverait sa forme ancienne, mais bien avec celle d’une France décolonisée parce que fédérale, où il existerait une égalité de droits politiques, civiques et sociaux entre membres de cet État plurinational, la question de savoir s’il était utopiste demeure.
Roczniki Filozoficzne
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2017
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vol. 65
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issue 3
173-189
PL
Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie wybranych wątków myśli Paula Ricœura, szczególnie jego rozważań dotyczących niewolnej woli. Po pierwsze, zaprezentowana zostaje Ricœurowska filozofia woli (w kontekście fenomenologii tego, co wolne, i tego, co mimowolne) oraz kon­cepcja ludzkiej ułomności. Następnie omówiona jest reinterpretacja (rozszerzenie) fenomenologii Husserla, której dokonuje Ricœur, co prowadzi go do wypracowania hermeneutycznej formuły, wskazującej, że symbol daje do myślenia. Ostatecznie twierdzę, że fenomenologia hermeneu­tyczna Ricœura tworzy określoną wizję antropologiczną i rozumienie ludzkiej kondycji, które później stanie się częścią „hermeneutyki siebie”.
EN
The aim of the article is to present some aspects of Paul Ricœur’s thought, especially his reflection on the servile will. Firstly I present Ricœur’s philosophy of will (in the context of phenomenology of the voluntary and involuntary) and the concept of fallibility. Then I demon­strate the main aspects of Ricœurian rethinking and enlarging of Husserl’s phenomenology what leads to hermeneutic formula: the symbol gives rise to thought. Eventually, I argue that Ricœur’s hermeneutic phenomenology creates a specified anthropological view and understanding of the human condition. This understanding will later become a part of the ‘hermeneutics of the self.’
EN
The subject of the article is to show the contribution of the two thinkers of the time of the Second Vatican Council Marie-Dominique Chenu and Paul Ricœur in the debate concerning the methodological status and tasks of the social doctrine of the Church. The period of direct reception of Vatican II is seen as a time of disclosure to the crisis of the social doctrine of the Church and its setbacks. Presentation of the contribution of the above researchers of the social doctrine of the Church will be made on the background of the process of the development of new forms of presence and the relationship of the Church to the modern world.
PL
Przedmiotem artykułu jest ukazanie wkładu dwóch myślicieli czasu Soboru Watykańskiego II Marie-Dominique Chenu oraz Paula Ricœura w debatę dotyczącą statusu metodologicznego i zadań nauki społecznej Kościoła. Okres bezpośredniej recepcji soborowej jawi się jako czas ujawnienia się kryzysu nauki społecznej Kościoła i jej regresu. Prezentacja wkładu powyższych badaczy nauki społecznej Kościoła została dokonana na tle procesu kształtowania się nowej formy obecności i relacji Kościoła do świata współczesnego.
5
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Odpustenie ako recipročný vzťah

88%
EN
This paper is a defence of the conception of forgiveness as a reciprocal action. This claim, though often taken for granted, deserves close examination. For J. Derrida, for instance, true forgiveness follows hyperbolic ethics, i.e. the ethics of “abundance” or “over-abundance” in which forgiveness is conferred unconditionally, regardless of the offender’s acknowledgement of his/her guilt. Contrary to this standpoint, and drawing on V. Jankélévitch and P. Ricœur, as well as on current debates on forgiveness, the paper tries to show that although guilt is transcended infinitely by forgiveness and its generosity, the forgiveness itself still must have a sense. And the latter is depen­dent on a personal face-to-face relationship between the one conferring forgiveness and the offender.
DE
Gegenstand des Aufsatzes ist die Verteidigung der These, dass die Vergebung ein auf Reziprozität beruhender Akt ist. Diese Behauptung ist nicht so selbstverständlich, wie es scheinen könnte. In den Intentionen der Überlegungen z. B. von J. Derrida wird die wahre Vergebung von der hyperbolischen Ethik geleitet, d.h. von der Ethik „des Überflusses“, des Übermaßes, die unbedingt verzeiht und zwar ungeachtet dessen, ob der Schuldige seine Schuld bekannte oder nicht bekannte. Im Gegensatz zu dieser Ansicht und ausgehend von Ansätzen von V. Jankélévitch, P. Ricœur, aber auch von aktuellen Diskussionen über die Vergebung soll mit dem vorliegenden Beitrag aufgezeigt werden, dass die Vergebung mit ihrer Großzügigkeit zwar die Schuld unendlich überschreitet, dabei aber Sinn haben muss. Und dieser Sinn ist bedingt durch die persönliche Beziehung „von Angesicht zu Angesicht“ zwischen dem Vergebenden und dem Schuldigen.
EN
This article addresses Pamela Sue Anderson’s philosophy of capability and vulnerability as an important contribution to the advancement of today’s feminist ethics. Following Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics of l’homme capable, Anderson extends the phenomenological perspective of the capable human subject to embrace the distinctly feminine capability. She advocates for women’s recognizing and re-inventing of themselves as capable subjects, and claims that the perturbing initial loss of confidence in their reflective capacities can be redeemed via the transformations in women’s emotional and religious lives, as well as through their creative impulse. Locating in hermeneutics’ openness to ambiguity, incompleteness and insecurity a potential to unveil the non-transparent aspects of the assumed male-female equality, Anderson focuses on the interlocking aspect of human capability and vulnerability. She calls for transforming an ignorance of vulnerability into an ethical avowal of it. In reconfiguring patriarchal culture myths, Anderson sees the possibility of re-shaping our approach to vulnerability and capability, especially the human capacity for love.
7
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Režim pamäti a spravodlivá spoločnosť

75%
DE
During the transition from totalitarian regimes to democracy, new political systems have had to deal with the shadow of the past, with a wide choice of institutional mechanisms at their disposal. Too much, as well as too little, “memory” has long-term negative consequences for the quality of democracy. This study starts from Paul Ricœur‘s assumption about the role of balance between memory, responsibility and forgiveness, and truth, when building a democratic society. Ricœur’s conception of a just society and its narrative construction, which changes in time, serves as the framework for grasping the regime of memory and its tasks in the formation of such a society. The processes of transitional justice often focus on one of the key elements at the expense of another (for example, on the psychological help to victims at the expense of criminal law). The regime of memory is established in the first stages of the transition by the narrative agents of that time – it is formed by their values and strategic choices. In contemporary times it is interpreted and reconfigured by the emerging generation, whose priorities and values are formed by a different social context and who move and change it. Generational distance allows for a reconfiguration of the regime of memory and space and the possibility of approaching the ideal of the just society.
FR
Au moment du passage du régime totalitaire à la démocratie les nouveaux systèmes politiques doivent affronter l’ombre du passé – ils peuvent choisir dans une large palette de mécanismes institutionnels. Trop de mémoire tout comme trop de mémoire a, à long terme, des conséquences négatives pour la qualité de la démocratie. Ce travail part des considérations de paul Ricœur sur le rôle de l’équilibre entre la mémoire, la responsabilité, le pardon et la vérité dans la construction d’une société démocratique. La conception ricœurienne de la société de justice et de sa construction narrative qui varie dans le temps sert de cadre pour saisir le régime de mémoire et son rôle dans la fromation d’une nouvelle société. Les processus de la justice temporaire mettent souvent en avant un élément clé au détriment des autres (par exemple l’aide psychologique aux victimes au détriment de la responsabilité légale). Le régime de mémoire est établi narrativement au début de la transition par des acteurs d’une époque donnée, et il est formé par leurs valeurs et choix stratégiques. Actuellement il est interprété et refiguré par la génération suivante dont les priorités et les valeurs sont formées par un autre contexte social et qui le transforme. La distance générationnelle permet une refiguration du régime de mémoire et l’espace ou l’occasion de se rapprocher de l’idéal de la société de justice.
DE
Der Begriff der Geschichte und das Erzählen von Geschichten über eigenes Leben sind die Hauptfragen der Poetik von Peter Bichsel. Der Autor versteht die Geschichte als Reflexion des Menschen über sich selbst und als Versuch subjektiver Deutung der Ereignisse in Erzählungen über eigenes Leben, was seiner Ansicht nach zum besseren Selbstverständnis führt. So begriffene Geschichte avanciert zu einer anthropologischen Konstante, was ihre Deutung aus der psychologischen und philosophischen Perspektive zulässt. Die Erzählpoetik von Bichsel wurde im vorliegenden Beitrag in Anlehnung an Erkenntnisse der sich in den letzten Jahren dynamisch entwickelnden narrativen Psychologie erklärt, die Erzählung als Mittel zum Verständnis der Wirklichkeit betrachtet und den Erzählungen über eigenes Leben eine therapeutische Funktion zuschreibt. Aus den philosophischen Perspektive dagegen in Anlehnung an Behauptungen der Geschichtenphilosophie von Wilhelm Schapp, die den Menschen als (Mit)Verstrickten in eigene Geschichten und in Geschichten anderer Menschen auffasst. Und in Anlehnung an die Theorie der narrativen Identität von Paul Ricœur, nach der der Mensch durch Erzählungen über eigenes Leben eigene Identität konstruiert.
EN
The concept of story and storytelling about own life are the main issues of Peter Bichsel’s poetics. Story in his depiction is defined as a reflection of the man himself and the subjective test to clarify events from his own life trough individually formulated stories, which approximate better understanding oneself. So understood stories rise to the rank of anthropological standard which enables its interpretation from the perspective of both psychological and philosophical prospect. Bichsel’s literary schedule was explained in this article on the basic of dynamically prospering in the last several years narrative psychology. It treats narration as a way of understanding reality and assigns therapeutic function to the stories. However from the philosophical perspective based on Wilhelm Schapp’s philosophy of stories expressing the human entangled in his own stories and based on Paul Ricœur’s narrative identity theory assuming that human is constructing his own identity by creating stories about his own life.
PL
Pojęcie historii i opowiadanie historii o własnym życiu stanowią centralne zagadnienia poetyki Petera Bichsla. Historia w jego ujęciu rozumiana jest jako refleksja człowieka o nim samym oraz próba subiektywnego wyjaśnienia zdarzeń z własnego życia poprzez samodzielnie konstruowane opowiadania, które zbliżają człowieka do lepszego zrozumienia siebie. Tak rozumiana historia urasta do rangi antropologicznej konstanty, co umożliwia jej interpretację z perspektywy zarówno psychologicznej, jak i filozoficznej. Literacki program Bichsla został w niniejszym artykule wyjaśniony w oparciu o założenia dynamicznie rozwijającej się w ostatnich kilkunastu latach psychologii narracyjnej, która narrację traktuje jako sposób rozumienia rzeczywistości, a opowiadaniom o własnym życiu przypisuje funkcję terapeutyczną, z perspektywy filozoficznej natomiast w oparciu o twierdzenia filozofii historii Wilhelma Schappa, ujmującej człowieka jako uwikłanego w historie własne oraz innych ludzi, i w oparciu o teorię tożsamości narracyjnej Paula Ricœura, zakładającej, że człowiek konstruuje własną tożsamość poprzez tworzenie opowiadań o własnym życiu.
Avant
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2018
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vol. 9
|
issue 2
87-105
EN
This paper shows how persecution is a condition that binds each in an ethical obligation. Persecution is functionally defined here as an impinging, affective relation, one that is neither mediated by reason nor open to apology. The works of Sigmund Freud help illuminate the psychological mechanism responsible for impeding rational transparency in delusions of persecution and super-egoical moral demands. Similar to Freud who employs what Paul Ricœur has called a “hermeneutics of suspicion” to interrogate the status of a fully knowing subject, I contend that Emmanuel Lévinas’s work on the ethical subject is useful for developing a “hermeneutics of trust” in an ambivalent ontological condition that is unavoidably ethical. By thinking Freud and Lévinas together, I show how the commitment to total mastery of an unknowable ego leads to a persecutory relation, yielding moralities that are unconcerned with injuring the other in the name of that which is judged as good. In answer to this ethical dilemma, I propose that a turn toward relational ethics and an intentionality of search offers traces of a morality where differences are preserved and thus prevent the persecution of the other for one’s own moral fulfillment.
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