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EN
In the Balkans, apart from NATO and the UN, the European Union has become the subject of security and building, maintaining and enforcing peace. The EU’s goals are taken through two instruments: military and civilian crisis management missions under the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) and enlargement policy. The issue of this article is centered around EUFOR Althea’s operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which undoubtedly belongs to the peacebuilding catalogue. The authors analyzed the conditions of the operation, the legal basis, the objectives, the tasks, the funding and the composition of the mission. It was also important to indicate successes and failures, and to outline the prospects for the crisis management mission development.
EN
The security situation in the world is not stabilized and many operations related to creating a safe and secure environment did not achieve desired end state. The situation in Iraqi, Afghanistan or Libya after years of military operations or short interventions proved not to be effective leading to further struggle and continuous chaos. There are a few instruments of power used including military one but those must be used in a synchronized way to use those capabilities fully. The Three-Pillar Framework (3PF) model that encompasses a great number of peacebuilding theories intending to provide a gateway for planners on how to approach peacebuilding is studied. The first pillar contains the conflict environment, the second contains conflict causes and the third contains the methods of conflict intervention.
EN
Intrastate peace agreements tend to be drafted in situations of political chaos, multiple combatants and shifting allegiances within and between state and non-state actors. Despite this, such agreements continue to reflect a bilateral understanding of conflict, with the state on one side and the non-state on the other. Such an understanding was employed in the largely unsuccessful 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord in Bangladesh. This article argues that the failure of the Accord to secure a durable and lasting peace is due to the mistaken belief by the Bangladeshi government that the conflict was a ‘two sides’ war between the modern Bengali-Muslim state and it’s ‘primitive’ and ‘savage’ periphery. Soon after the Peace Accord was signed it became apparent that the Government of Bangladesh had made a fatal error in assuming that the communities in question were a simple, homogenous and unified group. Rather, the communities of the CHT are a collection of ethnically and ideologically distinct groups. This failure has led to division and competition of local politics in the CHT today, and continued warfare within and between many CHT communities. Violent actors have been polarized by the terms of the peace agreement and jungle warfare continues at great risk and cost to communities.1
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