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Assessments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal performance: effects of the survey administration method

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Joński K., Rogowski W.

Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny

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2023

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vol. 85

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issue 3

259-278

EN

‘Legitimacy’, ‘reputation’ or ‘institutional trust’ inspired by judicial institutions constitutes an important aspect of the rule of law. Consequently, scholars developed survey-based methods to quantify ‘legitimacy’ as understood in the Weberian sense. Thereby, the survey response quality can meaningfully impact the obtained results. Moreover, one can expect, that sharpening political polarization observed in various countries could amplify such measurement problems. The goal of this paper is to examine the assessments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal (CT) using two distinct surveys carried out in March 2022 by CBOS (Public Opinion Research Center). Both asked about the overall assessment of the CT performance, as well as electoral preferences (voting intent and preferred political party), frequency of religious practices, self-assessment of economic conditions and included a battery of standard demographic controls. Both overall assessment levels as well as individual-level determinants of the CT assessment (using probit models) had been compared. The findings document that, regardless of the survey data collection mode, controlled for demographic factors, the assessment of CT depends upon variables representing political polarization. This finding can be interpreted as an indication of its political de-legitimization. Moreover, five years after the constitutional crisis, and nearly one and a half years since the abortion verdict, over 40 per cent of respondents of the Allerhand Institute Survey admitted they ‘don’t know precisely’ the task of the CT or even ‘haven’t heard’ about it, indicating a substantial lack of knowledge. The second group of findings documents differences between CAPI and CAWI polls. According to the authors’ knowledge, it is the first attempt to examine respondent-level determinants of CT assessment, and test their sensitivity to the survey data collection mode, thereby contributing to our understanding of the Polish CT legitimacy five years after the constitutional crisis, and methodological aspects of such measurements in general.

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The ‘Verdict Paradox’ and the Liar Paradox: How Logic Can Defend the Rule of Law. A Study of the Polish Constitutional Crisis

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Mazurkiewicz S.

Avant

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2019

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vol. 10

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issue 1

173-187

EN

This paper aims to present how logic may undermine a parliamentary assault on democratic institutions (representing legal guarantees of the rule of law and political freedom) based on the analysis conducted with reference to the so-called Polish constitutional crisis. I analyse whether a law can be reviewed on the basis of this law itself. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal faced such a problem while passing the verdict of 9th March, 2016, regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 22nd December, 2015. This problem, called a ‘verdict paradox’, was claimed to be a type of the Liar paradox. I argue that, contrary to the common view, the problem of the verdict paradox is not based on the Liar paradox; for this purpose, a logical analysis is applied to four variants of a reasoning with regard to the constitutionality of the said amendment. The distinction between two levels of analysis concerning emerging reasonings, namely an abstract (logical) level and a concrete level placed in the context of the legal system, is also introduced. This paper demonstrates that although only two variants of the reasoning concerning a law’s judicial review based on the law itself involve logical contradiction, the possibility of employing reasonings from other variants must be excluded, albeit due to alternative reasons. Therefore, the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to avoid the verdict paradox by passing over the reviewed provisions in the review process was correct and might be perceived as an example of how logic and reason can defend the institutional guarantees of political freedom.

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Sąd rozjemczy – triumf i kryzys Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z perspektywy ekonomii politycznej

63%

Joński K.

Głos Prawa. Przegląd Prawniczy Allerhanda

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2020

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vol. 3

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issue 1(5)

70-102

PL

Pozycja ustrojowa TK była najwyższa (w kategoriach aktywizmu i legitymizacji) w pierwszych latach transformacji, kiedy wydawał się najbardziej zagrożony. Z kolei istotny kryzys sądownictwa konstytucyjnego nastąpił ćwierć wieku od przemian ustrojowych, gdy demokracja konstytucyjna wydawała się silna i dobrze zakorzeniona. Aby wyjaśnić tę sprzeczność, w tekście zaproponowano trzy modele pozycji ustrojowej sądu konstytucyjnego, uwzględniające perspektywę ekonomii politycznej. Pierwszy, „sądu rozjemczego”, zakłada polityczną selekcję sędziów w celu zapewnienia reprezentacji różnych wrażliwości ideologicznych oraz konsensualny styl orzekania. Drugi, „Izby Konstytucyjnej SN”, zakłada odpolityczniony system nominacji, neguje znaczenie wrażliwości ideologicznych i zachęca do zgłaszania zdań odrębnych. Trzeci, „Trzeciej Izby Parlamentu”, oznacza rozmontowanie sądownictwa konstytucyjnego, gdyż polityczna selekcja sędziów przekształca sąd w kolejną instytucję większościową realizującą cele partyjne. Negocjowana natura polskiej transformacji ustrojowej stworzyła zapotrzebowanie na instytucje pełniącą funkcje „sądu rozjemczego”, tym samym wzmacniając legitymizację TK wśród polityków i zniechęcając ich od ataków na jego niezależność. Fundamentalne zmiany na scenie politycznej obserwowane po 2005 r. – osłabienie formacji postkomunistycznej i podział sceny między dwa ugrupowania postsolidarnościowe, kierowane przez nową generację liderów – zburzyły ten konsensus i zaowocowały erozją pozycji ustrojowej do „Trzeciej Izby Parlamentu”.

EN

The Constitutional Court was at its strongest (in terms of activism and legitimacy) at the early stages of democratic transition, at the very moment when it was expected to be the most vulnerable. An effective end of the constitutional adjudication came quarter a century after the regime change, when constitutional democracy appeared strong and well-entrenched. To explain this puzzle, this paper proposes three political-economy models of the Constitutional Court’s position. First – ‘the court of peers’ – assumes political selection of constitutional judges to provide representation of ideological sensitivities, and largely consensual decision-making inside the Court. Second – ‘the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court’ – assumes de-politicized selection procedures, downplays ideological sensitivities and encourages dissent. Third – called the ‘Third Chamber of the Parliament’ – amounts to the dismantling of the constitutional adjudication, as political selection of constitutional judges transforms the Court in yet another majoritarian institution pursuing party goals. It is argued, that the negotiated nature of the Polish transition created demand for ‘the court of peers’ type of an institution, thereby fostering Constitutional Court legitimacy among politicians and restraining them from assaults on its independence. However, a fundamental shift in the political landscape observed in 2005 – diminishing of the post-communist formation and the ascent of two post-Solidarity parties led by the new generation of leaders – shattered this consensus and resulted in the Constitutional Court’s erosion towards the ‘Third Chamber of the Parliament’.

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1 Avant

1 Głos Prawa. Przegląd Prawniczy Allerhanda

1 Ruch Prawniczy, Ekonomiczny i Socjologiczny

2 Joński K.

1 Mazurkiewicz S.

1 Rogowski W.

1 2023

1 2020

1 2019

Assessments of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal performance: effects of the survey administration method

The ‘Verdict Paradox’ and the Liar Paradox: How Logic Can Defend the Rule of Law. A Study of the Polish Constitutional Crisis

Sąd rozjemczy – triumf i kryzys Trybunału Konstytucyjnego z perspektywy ekonomii politycznej