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EN
In order to understand the essence of the crime, two issues have to be taken into account: not only do we analyse features of the perpetrator, but also the victim’s behaviour. Both measures have to be recognised in the light of their mutual relations. In such a case, victimology is instrumental for criminology. It answers the fundamental question: who and why becomes a victim of a crime? It is victimology that draws our attention to a post-crime victimisation problem in the psychological, social and legal aspects. These issues are particularly vital in the case of human trafficking. First, the victim of the crime has to be defined. Over the centuries, the word ‘victim’ came to have an additional meaning. Nowadays, the legal definition of a victim in many countries typically includes the following: it is a person who suffered direct or threatened physical, emotional or pecuniary harm as a result of the commission of a crime. In the Polish legal system, a legal definition of a victim is given in the Polish Charter of Victims’ Rights, whereas the Polish penal law speaks of an aggrieved party and defines it in Article 49 of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, one fact draws our attention. The aggrieved or those objectively recognised as aggrieved do not agree with such a qualification. Let us take a closer look at the reasons why they see themselves in a different role. There is no doubt that one of the reasons is the fact that victims are often qualified as persons offending the law, as criminals. Another problem, is the victims’ return to their previous life situation, which had led them to being recruited by a human trafficker. We also need to point out that the relations between human traffickers and their victims are extremely complex. However, the key issue is that there is an agreement for a crime. The decision-making processes have to be analysed. The victims of human trafficking find themselves in a situation where they have a considerable limitation of free decision making. One of the major examples reflecting these problems that always takes place in a compulsory situation in the wide sense of this expression is job undertaking which leads to the abuse of the potential worker’s situation. A very specific example is a job agency. The question that appears is when we should speak of an unlawfully acting job agent, and when we can start calling this human trafficking? Is every illegal job agency dealing with human trafficking? What is the difference between these two? And finally when does a worker become a victim and an aggrieved party? What types of slavery and slaves exist today? bounded labour affects at least 20 milion people around the world. People become bounded labourers by taking or being tricked into taking a loan for as little as the cost of medicines for a sick child. To repay the debt, many are forced to work overtime, seven days a week, up to 365 days a year. They receive basic food and shelter as ‘payment’ for their work, but may never pay off the loan, which can be passed down for another generation; eaily and forced marriage affects women and girls who are married without choice and are forced into lives of servitude often accompanied by physical violence; forced labour affects people who are illegally recruited by individuals, governments or political parties and forced to work usually under threat of violence or other penalties; slavery by descent is where people are either born into a slave class or are from a group that the society views as suited to be used as slave labour; trafficking involves the transport and/or trade of people: ‘woman, children and men’, from one area to another for the purpose of forcing them into slavery conditions; worst forms of child labour affects an estimated 179 million children around the world in work that is harmful to their health and welfare. Children work on the land, in households as domestic workers, in factories making products such as matches, fireworks and glassware, on the streets as beggars, in the outdoor industry, brick kilns, mines, construction sector, in bars, restaurants and tourist establishments, in sexual exploitation, as soldiers. It seems that pursuant to the Employment and Unemployment Countering Act (Ustawa o zatrudnieniu i przeciwdziałaniu bezrobociu) a model contrary to the one in the act can create a criminological model of modern human trafficking. It would be then running a business to gain financial benefits in the way that the businessperson exploits the position of the aggrieved party and provides the future employer with employees. The latter group, however, even if agreeing to move abroad, becomes completely dependant on the employer which is often combined with a deprivation of liberty, because they have no possibility to choose their place of staying or withdraw from the previous agreement. A number of international regulations, e.g. the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children which supplements the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography of 2000, the Slavery Convention of 1926 together with a Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery dated l956 show, that the issue under discussion still remains a contemporary problem, and needs regulations aiming at finding relevant solutions. There can be no doubts in the light of the nullum crimen sine lege certa that a precise description of the crime is essential. Only a precise definition of a separate crime of human trafficking will enable to recognise the scope of the problem and will create internationally accepted circumstances to overcome it. Such a definition must include at least: acts: recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a person; means: threat to use or the use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or a position of vulnerability; purposes: forced labour or services, slavery slavery-like practices or servitude. Everyone, government and non-governmental organisations, must focus on the crime which must be precisely described including a detailed description of a victim. It is highly urgent and important to harmonise all legislative measures in order to prevent human trafficking, which would guarantee an effective protection of victims and prosecution of criminals.
EN
The present study constitutes an attempt to analyze the essence of homicides of the qualified type against its legal regulation both in Polish and Russian Penal Code, as well as a modest reflection on the feasibility of the expansion of its typology. A homicide of the qualified type, as a particularly reprehensible case of intentional killing of another human, does not constitute a monolith in Criminal Code; rather it forms a set of acts, at times significantly different in spite of the identity of consequences, which, in the context of its unlawfulness and highly detrimental impact on society deserves a particularly harsh response and punishment from the penal law. Therefore, a more severe legal penalty compared to a common corpus delicti is imposed on the offender. Aggravation of a penalty for homicide of the qualified type, as sentencing in Russia reveals, is carried out by increasing both lower and upper thresholds. The expansion the types of homicide in polish penal code of 1997 for homicide of the qualified type was met with criticism, not only due to its too casuistic engrossment, but also the lack of any difference in punishment for common corpus delicti in its upper threshold.
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PL
Gwarantowana prawem międzynarodowym i Konstytucją Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej wolność sumienia i wyznania jest chroniona również zapisami rozdziału XXIV polskiego kodeksu karnego (1997) zatytułowanego „Przestępstwa przeciwko wolności sumienia i wyznania”. Kodeks karny przewiduje trzy rodzaje przestępstw godzących w wolność sumienia i wyznania. Są nimi: dyskryminacja wyznaniowa (art. 194), przeszkadzanie w wykonywaniu obrzędów religijnych lub pogrzebowych (art. 195) oraz obraza uczuć religijnych (art. 196). Wybór tych przypadków jako czynów zabronionych wskazuje, że ustawodawca uznał je za szczególnie drastyczne formy zamachu na wolność sumienia i wyznania. Chociaż treść artykułów ujętych w kodeksie karnym nawiązuje do wcześniej obowiązujących w Polsce regulacji prawnych, ich praktyczne stosowanie napotyka szereg trudności. Pomocą w rozstrzyganiu wątpliwości interpretacyjnych są orzecznictwo i komentarze. Poza podstawową analizą odnoszą się one także do kwestii najbardziej spornych, którymi są: obecność symboli religijnych w miejscach sprawowania władzy publicznej czy wytyczenie granicy pomiędzy przestępstwem obrazy uczuć religijnych a działalnością artystyczną i wolnością słowa. Źródeł wciąż powracających publicznych dyskusji na temat rozumienia granic wolności religijnej czy znamion przestępstw przeciwko wolności sumienia i wyznania na pewno nie należy upatrywać w nieprecyzyjności zapisów prawnych, lecz raczej w sferze światopoglądowej
EN
Guaranteed by international law and the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, freedom of conscience and religion is also protected by the regulations of Chapter XXIV of the Polish Penal Code (1997) entitled "Crimes against Freedom of Conscience and Religion". The Penal Code specifies three types of crime against the freedom of conscience and religion. These include: religious discrimination (Article 194), interfering with the performance of religious rites or burial (Article 195) and insulting religious feelings (Article 196). The selection of these cases as criminal offenses indicates that the legislature considered it to be a particularly drastic form of crime against the freedom of conscience and religion. Although the content of the articles of the Penal Code refers to the legal regulations, which were previously in force in Poland, their practical application faces a number of difficulties. The jurisdiction and comments help in solving any doubts of interpretation. In addition to fundamental analysis, it also relates to the most controversial issues, which are: the presence of religious symbols in public offices or the distinction between the crime of insulting religious feelings and artistic activities and freedom of speech. Recurrent public discussions on understanding the limits of religious freedom or the constituent elements of crimes against freedom of conscience and religion is definitely not caused by the imprecision of legal provisions, but rather as an ideological discourse.
DE
Die durch das internationale Recht sowie das Grundgesetz der Republik Polen garantierte Gewissens- und Bekenntnisfreiheit wird ebenfalls durch einige Bestimmungen im Kapitel XXIV des polnischen Strafgesetzbuches (1997) unter dem Titel "Straftaten gegen die Gewissens- und Bekenntnisfreiheit" geschützt,. Das Strafgesetz formuliert drei Arten der Straftaten, die gegen die Gewissens- und Bekenntnisfreiheit gerichtet sind: die mit dem Bekenntnis verbundene Diskriminierung (Art. 194), die Störung bei der Durchführung der Religions- und Bestattungszeremonien (Art. 195) sowie die Verletzung der religiösen Gefühle. Die Auswahl dieser Fälle als verbotene Taten verweist darauf, dass sie vom Gesetzgeber als besonders drastische Formen des Angriffs auf die Gewissens- und Bekenntnisfreiheit verstanden werden. Obwohl der Inhalt des im Strafgesetzbuch genannten Artikels mit den früher in Polen geltenden Rechtsbestimmungen zusammenhängt, stößt ihre praktische Umsetzung auf zahlreiche Schwierigkeiten. Bei der Lösung der Interpretationsprobleme sind die Rechtsprechung sowie die Kommentare behilflich. Neben der grundsätzlichen Analyse verweisen sie auch auf die am meisten strittigen Fragen: das Vorhandensein der religiösen Symbole an Orten der Handhabung der öffentlichen Gewalt oder die Grenzziehung zwischen der Verletzung der religiösen Gefühle, der künstlerischen Betätigung und der Meinungsfreiheit. Die Quellen der ständig wiederkehrenden Diskussionen über das Verständnis der Grenzen der religiösen Freiheit oder der Merkmale der Strafftaten gegen die Gewissens- und Bekenntnisfreiheit liegen sicher nicht in der mangelnden Präzision der Rechtsbestimmungen, sondern in der weltanschaulichen Sphäre.
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