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The conviction that particularly political sphere abounds in permanent paradoxes, that they constitute its inherent attributes, was already familiar to political philosophy classics, although they expressed them in different ways. “The paradoxical mix of order and chaos compelled the Greeks to seek out more creative, inclusive and reflexive modes of thought and action”. One of them, Socrates, talked about “the true political craft”, that is a rejection of politics, and at the same time, its admission. The paradoxical features of politics that arise from human nature were examined by Thomas Hobbes. Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed the paradoxes that underlie the act of free will declaration. Carl Schmitt paid attention to the internal paradox of democracy, pointing out that despite the conditions of declared citizens equality, the policy is dominated by inequalities deriving from other spheres, particularly economy.
EN
Introductorily, it should be observed that the discussed problem’s significance is increasingly pressing as our interest drifts towards societies dominated by great, universalizing religions Islam being only one of them. From the above, a question arises of whether the notions of religion and democracy, as mentioned in the title, are reconcilable within a single order in the first place. In his deliberations, Bohdan Chwedeńczyk inclines to the view that three types of relations may be distinguished in this respect: religion favours democracy; is indifferent to democracy; or is harmful to democracy. The discussion of the above opinion has, respectively, developed threefold. In one point of view, religion is by nature contradictory to the democratic order, it is in a sense its direct opposite. In other words, we face a choice of opting either for religion or democracy. Supporters of an alternative viewpoint claim that in the long run, a democratic system is not viable without the basis of notions such as religion, and therefore religion does play a vital part in the social order. It serves members of the public by satisfying those of their needs that do not belong to the scope of duties performed by the state and its institutions. Finally, the third approach basically acknowledges the fact that no definitive claims can be made as to the possibility of agreement between religion and democracy. I must admit that the latter is closest to my personal stance in this respect. Naturally, through careful selection of examples, arguments to support the first or the second of the mentioned opinions can be easily produced. There have been numerous examples of academic and journalistic articles advocating one of the clear-cut standpoints, which seem not to leave much room for discussion. However, the issue becomes far more multifarious when taking into account the complexity of religious and political issues analysed in both theoretical and practical perspective.
EN
The aim of the article is to present and criticise the political thought of Alasdair MacIntyre, one of the most renowned contemporary moral philosophers. This eminent representative of the Aristotelian‑Thomistic tradition is a strong opponent of the modern state, which he does not consider to be an appropriate place for his favoured politics of the common good. He proposes the politics of local communities as his alternative. The article criticises his alternative by focusing on the premises of his understanding of the concept of the common good. In several steps, there is an attempt to deminstrate how his conceptualisation is not completely faithful to his own Aristotelian‑Thomistic tradition. Moreover, his politics of local communities remains deeply vulnerable to the liberal politics of the modern state. As a matter of fact, despite his scorching criticism of liberalism, MacIntyrean politics is in its consequences paradoxically liberal.
EN
This article is a contribution to the recurrent debates on the (in)compatibility between Catholic and liberal tradition. It focuses on the differences between these traditions concerning their conceptual foundations: liberty and, more extensively, social order. In the first part, the article characterizes the most important doctrinal elements of liberal and Catholic political theory. In liberal tradition, the emphasis is upon normative and ontological individualism and the primacy of individual liberty. Catholic social ontology offers a rich understanding of social order where it differentiates between partnerships and communities. This is linked to the specific conceptualization of the common good which is more robustly conceived than in its liberal counterparts. In the second part, the article delineates the different meanings of liberty in contemporary liberal political theory. It demonstrates that the Catholic tradition unambiguously prefers the positive concept of liberty. Next, it dialectically moves to the concept of autonomy. Some versions of autonomy are closer to the Catholic tradition than others, but overall, the Catholic conception is based on a richer metaphysical foundation that links liberty with participation in the common good. The article culminates with D. C. Schindler’s metaphysical criticism of the basic building blocks of liberal thought, which explains the reasons why the liberal conception of the common good cannot accommodate its Catholic counterpart.
EN
The aim of this article is to present and contrast various competing concepts of the common good. In the first part of the article, I critically discuss the minimalistic concept, which can be found in the celebrated book A Theory of Justice written by the American philosopher John Rawls. I subsequently deal with the instrumentalist concept, which brought fame to John Finnis, the most prominent representative of the so-called new natural law theory. According to Finnis, the common good serves as an instrument regarding the basic human goods of marriage and family life. In the third part, the instrumentalist concept is the target of my criticism, which leads me to a defense of a more robust concept of the common good. In three steps, I demonstrate that Finnis misunderstands the order of goods, elevates the common good of family and other private associations without appropriate reasons, and diminishes the common good of the political community. Because of this, the common good is not able to offer appropriate normative reasons for the exercise of such risky professions as soldiers and police officers. In contrast, the robust concept of the common good, as recently advocated most prominently by the Australian philosopher George Duke, enables one to solve these problems. It also provides a better solution to the delicate question of obedience to political authority.
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