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EN
In this essay I scrutinize importance of Principles of Double Effect and MoralSymmetry in regard to the question of moral acceptance of euthanasia legalization.My conclusion is that although there is no substantially moral difference betweenpassive and active euthanasia, the problem of morally justifiable legalization ofeuthanasia is still not resolved. That is because some reasons suggest the possibilityof special discrepancy between moral acceptability of euthanasia in certain cases andmoral demand to preserve legal prohibition of euthanasia in general. In the paperI criticize the popular opinion that utilitarianism cannot account of why we giveweight to the question of moral permissibility of intentions. I claim that contraryto this false platitude utilitarianism can even accommodate practical relevance ofPrinciple of Double Effect, but not as a valid per se principle.
EN
In this paper I consider the puzzling question of moral responsibility of some quite specific terrorist acts. One distinguishable, but highly controversial, example of such a case may be the allied terror-bombing of German cities by English and American forces during the end of World War II, with so many civilian victims. I propose strict definition of terrorism, and after that, go on with the question: Is it really so obvious and certain that all acts of terrorism are impermissible on moral grounds? Then I investigate the relevance of intention for moral evaluation of any case of terrorism. In these matters I get involved in dispute with Jeff McMahan’s thesis that all acts of terrorism are inherently morally wrong and impermissible, and criticize his employment of the Principle of Double Effect.
PL
W artykule rozważam intrygującą kwestię odpowiedzialności moralnej za pewne specyficzne akty terrorystyczne. Wyjątkowym przykładem są bombardowania miast niemieckich przez siły alianckie pod koniec II Wojny Światowej. Podaję najbardziej trafną moim zdaniem definicję terroryzmu. Następnie rozpatruję kontrowersyjne zagadnienie: Czy jest naprawdę pewne, że wszystkie akty terrorystyczne są moralnie absolutnie niedopuszczalne? Biorę przy tym pod uwagę wagę intencji przy osądzaniu takich czynów i wchodzę w polemikę z Jeffem McMahanem na temat stosowania w tym zakresie Zasady Podwójnego Skutku.
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