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On the Motivations of a Skeptic, and Her Practice

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Maddox B.

Peitho. Examina Antiqua

2016

vol. 7

issue 1

229-248

The aim of Pyrrhonism is deceptively simple: to achieve a state of ataraxia, of tranquility and relief from perturbation. But what is the extent of the ataraxia envisioned? Must the Skeptic admit a hard distinction between disturbances apparently related to belief and therefore subject to suspension of judgement, and extra-doxastic disturbances (e.g. everyday anxiety and frustration, or even hunger and fear) that are beyond the scope of the Skeptical method? In this paper I examine passages from Sextus’s Outlines of Pyrrhonism that indicate that such a distinction may not stand up to Skeptical scrutiny and that the Skeptical method does not only apply to “philosophical” speculative dogma or to “intellectual” perturbation, contra Barnes’s claim that the person who perceives the fewest anomalies may make “the perfect Pyrrhonist”. But I also, following Massie’s critique of unwarranted causal inferences regarding the relation between equipollence and ataraxia, distinguish cases where tarache (disturbance) presents itself as anomalous and thus lends itself to inquiry from cases where it presents itself with an apparent cause and does not provoke inquiry. Thus, though an apparently extra-doxastic disturbance may actually be rooted in unconsciously-held dogma, the Skeptic cannot demarcate a special class of potentially doxastic disturbances without employing a dogmatic psychology of her own. She must instead suspend judgment regarding the entire scope of her method, entertaining the possibility that any disturbance could be relieved through the Skeptical method. In the process, ataraxia is divested of definite parameters and the Skeptical method becomes effectively endless.

O skepticismu a filosofii u Davida Huma:

63%

Janoušek H.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

2020

vol. 68

issue 4

623-633

The study examines Zuzana Parusniková’s book David Hume, Sceptic. It first examines how the book situates Hume’s philosophy in between radical scepticism resulting from the scrutiny of human knowledge and natural belief that cannot be shaken by sceptical doubts. Hume accepts radical scepticism and the limits it sets for human understanding. However, a practicable philosophy must submit itself to belief in the common world and offer a useful examination into the principles of moral and social behavior and common life. This finally results in philosophy becoming a guide for a happy life. In the second part, the study employs Hume’s concept of the love of truth to show a deeper link between several functions of philosophy, and, by interpreting Hume’s view of the relation between abstruse and easy philosophy, it criticizes Parusnikova’s interpretation of abstruse philosophy.

Text studie analyzuje knihu Zuzany Parsunikové David Hume, Sceptic, jež klade filosofii Davida Huma do rozporu mezi radikální skepsí plynoucí z reflexe lidského poznání a přirozenou vírou, jejíž genezi nedokáží skeptické pochybnosti narušit. Hume přijímá radikální skepsi i meze, které stanovuje lidskému rozumu. Praktikovatelná filosofie se však musí podřídit víře ve společný svět a prospěšně zkoumat principy lidského jednání a soužití ve společensko-morální oblasti. Vposledu se filosofie stává návodem ke šťastnému životu. Ve své druhé části zde předkládaná studie využívá Humovu koncepci lásky k pravdě, aby ukázala hlubší souvislost mezi funkcemi filosofie u Huma, a na základě výkladu Humova pojetí vztahu obtížné a snadné filosofie kritizuje autorčin výklad epistemologické funkce obtížné filosofie.

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1 Peitho. Examina Antiqua

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On the Motivations of a Skeptic, and Her Practice

O skepticismu a filosofii u Davida Huma: