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Filo-Sofija
|
2009
|
vol. 9
|
issue 9
115-132
EN
Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology could be pointed as a source of a long-term tradition of considering the question of God. Such thinkers as: Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Gabriel Marcel, Emmanuel Lévinas, Jean-Luc Marion, Robert Sokolowski, Henry Duméry, or Gerardus van der Leeuw used the phenomenological method to investigate the problem of God. Although all of them were connected with the phenomenological movement, none of them posed the question about the notion of God in Husserl’s phenomenology itself. This article aims at fulfilling the mentioned lack. Additionally, the article discusses the relation between Husserl – a Christian and Husserl – a philosopher. Furthermore, after introducing the phenomenological idea of reduction, three notions of God are indicated within Husserl’s phenomenology. Firstly, an operative notion of God as the model for a perfect cognition is analyzed. Secondly, Husserl uses a descriptive notion where God is equal to the moral order of the society. Thirdly, a transcendental notion of God is understood as teleology. The three notions present phenomenology as a way leading from methodological atheism to the anticipation of the ultimate God.
EN
In this paper significant challenges are raised with respect to the view that explanation essentially involves unification. These objections are raised specifically with respect to the well-known versions of unificationism developed and defended by Michael Friedman and Philip Kitcher. The objections involve the explanatory regress argument and the concepts of reduction and scientific understanding. Essentially, the contention made here is that these versions of unificationism wrongly assume that reduction secures understanding.
EN
The leading idea of the article is defined by a quotation from Fichte concerning the opposition between idealism and 'dogmatism', or naturalism. That opposition is interpreted as a result of two alternative 'reductions of consciousness': according to the first, or the idealistic one, it is possible to reduce the world to consciousness (or to its 'constituted correlate', to a pure phenomenon), while according to the second, the naturalistic one, it is possible to reduce consciousness to the world conceived as a material whole of particles and physical laws. The logics of the idealistic reduction is developed on the example of Husserlian 'pure phenomenology'; this of the naturalistic one is illustrated by the proposals of Paul Churchland and John Searle. The reconstruction of the two alternative modes of reductions aims at revealing their symmetry and, also, the insufficiency of either of them. In the last paragraph, the possibility of a 'third way' between idealism and naturalism is briefly examined (on the examples of several, both classical and contemporary, 'continental' and 'analytical' ideas), but the conclusions are skeptical.
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