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1

ZDRAVÝ ROZUM VO FILOZOFII THOMASA REIDA

100%
Nuhliček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 5
449-460
EN
The paper offers a discussion of the concept of common sense in T. Reid's philosophy. Reid criticizes Hume's scepticism, which is in conflict with common sense, as a 'deadlock of philosophy'. Reid's criticism thus might be seen as naive and 'un-philosophical', and therefore missing the point. The author argues, however, that common sense, as used by Reid, is a metaphysical concept. In his view common sense and its principles delimit all plausible philosophizing. He also sees a remarkable affinity between Reid's philosophy and later Wittgenstein's considerations of 'the image of the world'. Reid's philosophy of common sense is an original philosophical resolution of the problem, which the philosophy 'in a deadlock' is facing, as well as an effective criticism of scepticism.
2

PŘIPOMÍNKY THOMASE REIDA PROTI MATERIALISMU JOSEPHA PRIESTLEYHO

86%
Peterková E.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2020
|
vol. 75
|
issue 4
294 – 308
EN
The paper deals with Thomas Reid’s comments against Joseph Priestley’s materialism. Priestley’s mechanical materialism is based on the philosophy of Isaac Newton, especially Newton’s rules of reasoning. Priestley rejected substantive dualism and arguments in favour of a single material substance on the basis of these rules. The paper first presents the form of Priestley’s materialism and then analyses the individual remarks of Reid. The emphasis is on the notions of truth and causality, which both philosophers interpret differently. The last part of the article analyses whether Reid’s remarks are relevant or not.
3

Sceptycyzm i dyskusja z nim w filozofii George'a Berkeleya i Thomasa Reida

86%
Kucharski D.
Studia Philosophiae Christianae
|
2010
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vol. 46
|
issue 2
25-47
EN
The main aim of the paper is an attempt to characterize two different approaches to refute skepticism, namely, that of George Berkeley and Thomas Reid. The reason to choose these thinkers is twofold. First, the Berkeley's system (among other systems labeled by Reid as 'theory of ideas') was an object of a very serious and even fierce critique by T. Reid. That critique was meant as a first step for creating his own system known as the Scottish School of Common Sense. Second, despite of that critique, in many respects the philosophical views of Reid strikingly resemble these of Berkeley. And among the resemblances, the opinions of the two about the nature of perception of external objects play a very important role. Both philosophers take presentationalism as their own position. Both of them maintain that the other possible view, representationalism, leads inevitably to skepticism. And, last but not least, one should remember that for G. Berkeley and equally T. Reid the refutation of skepticism was one of the most important reasons for building their own systems. However, the similarities mentioned above prove to be rather superficial. It is common knowledge how much differ the outcomes of the attempts taken by Berkeley and Reid to refute skepticism. So similar assumptions and goals do not bring similar answers at all. The paper attempts to show how Berkeley and Reid dealt with the problem of skepticism. Namely, what they meant by skepticism, how they understood an object of perception, and how they defined the reality of an object. And what solution against skepticism they offered. As we know Berkeley came to the conclusion that immaterialism is the best remedy against skeptical doubts about perceiving the real world. The concept of material substance and the mediate perception of things were the main sources of skepticism. Reid, however, defended the material nature of objects of perception - that belief was an intrinsic part of common sense. He maintained that any discussion with that sort of beliefs is impossible, they lay the foundations of any other knowledge. Consequently Reid builds such a philosophical system that would justify and prove right the beliefs of common sense.
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