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1

K INTERPRETÁCII MOOROVEJ PROTISKEPTICKEJ FILOZOFIE

100%
Nuhlíček M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 1
74-82
EN
G. E. Moore replies to scepticism by using propositions which are trivially true from the common sense perspective. However, it seems that his replies are not effective, because the sceptic's doubts concern precisely the common sense truths. This problem became the subject of various interpretations. N. Malcolm and B. Stroud suggest that Moore is not trying to refute scepticism directly (he would not have been successful and it is not probable that he would have overlooked such a 'fatal' error). Therefore, they look for an alternative interpretation of Moore's replies. They find the ground of their effectiveness in his pointing to the use of words, as well as in the illegitimacy of the sceptic's position. The author offers an interpretation in the terms of reliabilism, which avoids the defects of the previous ones and does not require an alternative understanding of Moore's propositions: Moore insists on the reliability of perception what enables him to yield effective replies to scepticism in agreement with common sense.
2

KNOWING OUR OWN CONCEPTS: THE ROLE OF INTUITIUONS IN PHILOSOPHY

75%
Hartl P.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2011
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vol. 18
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issue 4
488 – 498
EN
Empirical examinations about cross-cultural variability of intuitions, the well-known publication of Stich and his colleagues criticizing thought-experiments and intuitions in philosophical debates, is still a challenge that faces analytical philosophers, as any systematic investigation of the methodology of philosophy must give answers to these basic questions: What is an intuition? What role should intuitions play in philosophy? The author presents and examines the sceptical argument of experimental philosophers, and claims that experimental philosophers misunderstand the role of evidence in philosophy. His argument will utilize Goldman’s view, according to which intuitions give reliable (though not infallible) evidence about a person’s Concepts, and this knowledge is valuable for further philosophical research as well. The author will argue that the sceptical conclusions of experimental philosophers are harmless against this conception of philosophy, because even from a naturalist perspective certain kind of intuitive judgments about our concepts can be warranted, and this grants the specific epistemic status of intuitions. Of course, the reliability of introspection can be challenged. However, denying self-knowledge about his internal mental states is disputable – as he will show – both from a philosophical and a scientific point of view.
3

RELIABILISM, INTUITION, AND MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE

75%
Mulnix J. W.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2008
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vol. 63
|
issue 8
715-723
EN
It is alleged that the causal inertness of abstract objects and the causal conditions of certain naturalized epistemologies precludes the possibility of mathematical knowledge. This paper rejects this alleged incompatibility, while also maintaining that the objects of mathematical beliefs are abstract objects, by incorporating a naturalistically acceptable account of 'rational intuition'. On this view, rational intuition consists in a non-inferential belief-forming process where the entertaining of propositions or certain contemplations results in true beliefs. This view is free of any conditions incompatible with abstract objects, for the reason that it is not necessary that S stand in some causal relation to the entities in virtue of which p is true. Mathematical intuition is simply one kind of reliable process type, whose inputs are not abstract numbers, but rather, contemplations of abstract numbers.
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