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1

THE DETERMINANTS OF THE PROCESS OF TRANSFORMATION OF STATE OWNED INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS IN POLAND

100%
Bobinska K.
Studia Ekonomiczne (Economic Studies)
|
2007
|
issue 3-4(54-55)
169-192
EN
The main purpose of this paper is to undertake the attempt to prove that during the process transformation of the infrastructure sectors in Poland, there is the possibility (greater then average in the economy) of rent seeking, due to specific economic characteristics of those sectors, and this possibility was discounted to the very end, hampering the process of demonopolisation of each sector with all the economic negative consequences. The methods used is the double comparative analysis of the governments strategies of the chosen two sectors (railway and electricity). First comparison has been made between subsequent strategies within each sector, second between the two final strategies of chosen sectors. Results are as follow: these final comparison of the two sectors of which one (electricity) had initially the competitive organizational structure and the other (railway) was the full organizational monopoly - has shown that the two sectors have achieved during the process of adjusting the strategies to the proper interests of the engaged parties organizational structure guaranteeing monopolistic position and nearly identical model of privatization, which leaves all the privileges being in disposition initially by the rent seeking groups and permits at the same time to discount the profits of privatization. The solutions accepted by all the interested parties are against the interest of firms and individual consumers because of the monopolistic prices for the services of these sectors. That makes the firms less competitive on the foreign market and lowers the level of living of the individual consumers. One may say that these this solutions are against the common interest.
2

HOW DOES CORRUPTION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE HURT ECONOMIC GROWTH? GRANGER TEST OF CAUSALITY

88%
Grochová L., Otáhal T.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
|
2013
|
vol. 61
|
issue 6
563 – 577
EN
The paper explains theoretical framework of how corruption hurts economic growth and reveals its application difficulties. Comparing views on corruption in terms of the problem of agency and the problem of rent-seeking we argue that corruption in general is the problem of legal setting and its enforcement and, if badly established, it does not promote economic growth. To verify the theoretical argument we present empirical Granger causality test to demonstrate that corruption precedes economic growth in Central and Eastern Europe. This means that legal setting and its enforcement rather allow for rent-seeking than promote economic growth. As a consequence we emphasize the necessity to focus on institutional framework to fight corruption and support economic growth.
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