Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Refine search results

Journals help

  1. 1 Filo-Sofija

Authors help

  1. 1 Orlewski B.

Years help

  1. 1 2007

Results found: 1

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  RESCHER
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Prawda, schemat pojęciowy i świat

100%
Orlewski B.
Filo-Sofija
|
2007
|
vol. 7
|
issue 7
181-205
EN
In my article I criticize the conception which says that the conceptual character of human cognition makes false the theory of truth understood as a kind of correspondence between truth-bearer and truth-maker. Arguing against the conceptions of Donald Davidson, Richard Rorty and Andrzej Szahaj, I defend the claim that the conceptual character of human cognition is irrelevant to the critique of correspondence theories of truth. I justify this claim with the example of Nicholas Rescher’s conception of conceptual idealism, which is similar to the internal realism of Hilary Putnam but does not rule out the truth as a kind of correspondence.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.