Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 8

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  RICOEUR PAUL
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
100%
EN
According to the analysis presented in this article, in Paul Ricoeur's works there is an evident evolution of views on the existential conception of the eternal present. The direction of this evolution is not accidental. Its stages are marked out by acceptance, expressed in the early Ricoeur's works (monographs about Jaspers and Marcel), and then more and more evident distancing from this conception. The change in Ricoeur's view is related to his indirectly demonstrated conviction that the existential conception of the eternal present and the future-centered philosophy of hope are reconcilable. This statement becomes clearly evident in the light of the Ricoeur's considerations on personal identity in his later works. The existential conception of the eternal present merely indicates a momentary 'point' identity, reduced to individual 'atoms of eternity'. Based on this conception, it is difficult to develop a principle that binds together these individual 'atoms of eternity' into the perspective of a uniform 'self'. However, the philosophy of hope may be easily correlated with the concept of the personal identity based on the fidelity to established commitments that guarantee the quality personal endurance despite the physical changes.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2006
|
vol. 61
|
issue 1
30 - 45
EN
The paper gives an overview of the life and work of a world-known French philosopher, written on the occasion of his recent death. Ricour was a follower of the traditions of existentialism and personalism. Later he accepted the phenomenological method which he applied first on the acts of will and later also on the acts of apprehension and speech. This leads phenomenology as far as to hermeneutics. Only a man or woman of parts, who were forgiven, are really acting persons. The phenomenology of a guilty person becomes the phenomenology of a person in parts, culminating in the ontology of action which is the core of Ricoeur's philosophy of life and his personal engagement.
EN
The article attempts to bring together Ricoeur's theory of narrative identity and Aristotelian theory of happiness as a whole of life. Narrative identity finds its fulfilment in the sphere of ethics, 'praxis'. Thus the importance of Aristotelian 'phronesis'.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 4
307 – 320
EN
„Procope“, a series of the Parisien publishing house Cerf, is designed to elicit critical discussions about selected authors, writings or issues. The first in this series has been Ricoeur’s Time and narrative in discussion published in 1989. Included in it are seven critiques or responses to Ricoeur’s Time and narrative written by philosophers, poets, and linguists, as well as the author’s replies.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2017
|
vol. 72
|
issue 3
204 – 214
EN
The author intends to show how, in Ricoeur’s work, the idea of Justice plays a central role in the semantical displacements concerning theological, political, anthropological, ethical and metaphysical discourses. In order to fulfil this task, he will examine closely the bond between Justice and Law, Justice being an operational concept that is effective only in the writing of the Law. At the same time, Law intends to reach the margins of the political by the exigence of Justice. However, only the dialectic between Love and Justice will open Law definitely to the Other, in order to aim eschatologically towards a state of peace.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 4
282 – 294
EN
Danica Seleskovitch and Marianne Lederer, the translation scholars of the Paris School who invented the Interpretive Theory of Translation (ITT), were intrigued by the use of the same notion of interpretation in hermeneutics, especially that by Paul Ricœur. Unfortunately, although an invitation was extended by the Paris School, an encounter between the two parties never came to fruition during Ricœur’s lifetime. In this paper, we attempt to imagine this unfulfilled encounter between Ricœur and the Paris School, and reflect on the convergence and divergence of their views on interpretation as applied in hermeneutics and Translation Studies. This paper shows the shared convictions and divergence between Ricœur and the Paris School, and focuses in particular on their opposing stands through several keywords: the object of interpretation, the scope of interpretation, ambiguity, communicator versus interpreter, and the hermeneutical circle. Finally, this paper attempts to situate the ITT within the history of hermeneutics.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 9
845-859
EN
The essay compares Ricour's and Levinas's conceptions of the constitution of conscience in the sense of German Gewissen. Beginning with Ricour's basic distinction between 'identity-idem' and 'identity-ipse' it shows the proper place of conscience in his conception. For Ricour conscience is a finite category of otherness as related to the self, i.e. its most interior, intrinsic otherness. For Levinas, on the other hand, conscience - the other in the same - is an initiatory category, which is described in terms of absolute passivity, persecution and substitution. In conclusion Ricour´s critique of Levinas' category of 'the Other' is examined on the background of Levinas' conception of subjectivity as a vocation for Good.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
|
vol. 70
|
issue 4
295 – 306
EN
The article deals with Ricoeurʼs idea of how we use reason in our praxis, i.e. with what in Kantian vocabulary is referred to as practical reason and in Aristotelian terminology as practical wisdom (phronesis). The question is whether this mode of reason, as incommensurable with the rigorous theoretical reason as it is, can be taken as valid. Can Ricoeurʼs approach, trying to reconcile the two incompatible conceptions mentioned above, be of help in resolving this question? Here we have to test the arguments in support of two Ricoeur’s ideas: 1) Practical reason is to be preserved as a specific mode of reason, which is irreducible to any other one. 2) The role of practical reason is not implemented by keeping its distance from practical experience (as demanded by Kant), but rather by being a prudent moral judgement in a particular situation. This, however, does not mean disregarding the morality of duty.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.