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EN
The paper deals with the problem of social contexts of knowledge. The description of social reality should take into account the fact that anyone who is trying to describe it is the part of that reality him- or herself. The cognition of the social world in the objective categories - effected by the tendency to generalization - loses the normative sense of a theory as such and neglects the role of the particular cases. Regarding the notion of the collective intentionality (John Searle) the author sketches two concepts of it: the Habermas' proceduralistic idea and R. Rorty's idea of the contingency. In reference to the first one the aim is to establish a communicative community, in which all people have the same rights in the argumentation and the final purpose would be the agreement based on the best one. The second idea emphasises the word 'we' as not being the collection of the abstract terms like 'human being', 'humanity' etc., but it should be more modest and more local. Both theories - J. Habermas' and R. Rorty's - can be recognized as legitimate, if they develop in the solidarity with other people.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 10
971 - 980
EN
The paper deal with possible future images of philosophy as a specific theoretical discipline. Being inspired by the philosophy of R. Rorty and his discussion of the philosophies of the past (especially those of Wittgenstein, Dewey and Heidegger), it tries to answer the question: What could philosophy be today?
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 6
433 – 441
EN
There has been a myth about Richard Rorty circulated within analytic philosophy for long, which is now being dismantled. The myth casts him as a capricious thinker: someone who betrayed his analytic past by conjuring up a foggy form of pragmatism. The author discusses a possibility that does not yet blend in easily with the on-going story of that myth dismantling, namely that Rorty took analytic philosophy too seriously. Rorty’s energies would have been better expended on fleshing out the conception of the post-philosophical culture advertised in his Contingency, irony, and solidarity.
EN
In his book 'Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature' Richard Rorty claims that some projects of philosophy or philosophy -as theory of knowledge, as he calls it, are optional and contingent. In the first place, the author tries to show Rorty's strategy which leads him to that thesis. Secondly, he attempts to critically investigate his 'crucial premise' according to which the adequate model of knowledge is not a model of 'confrontation' but of 'conversation'. In the end he also considers a perspective in which both models do not rule out each other, but become two equally important aspects of knowledge.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 6
450 – 459
EN
The paper discusses Richard Rorty’s views on intercultural hermeneutics as presented in his essay “Heidegger, Kundera, and Dickens” and in his correspondence with the Indian philosopher Anindita Niyogi Balslev. The focus is primarily on Rorty’s presumption that instead of providing an “authentic” picture of another culture, the goal of intercultural studies or hermeneutics should be to look if there is anything “of use” in a given culture what is not offered by ours.
EN
Richard Rorty gives credit to Quine for demolishing the myth that linguistic phrases have well determined reference. If Quine truly intended to discredit such beliefs he would have argued differently from what he actually said. He would have to realize that he adopts the anti-realist position and consequently he would have to modify his behaviorist conception of language. He would have had to admit that we could perceive, identify and name various objects before we were able to make use of highly advanced linguistic instruments such as personal pronouns and the plural form of nouns. Such assumptions cannot be found, however, in Quine's writings.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 10
963 – 970
EN
The author´s aim in these remarks is to sketch a way of approaching the thought of Richard Rorty that he will call reading Rorty politically. He argues that reading Rorty politically is not only the most fruitful way to read Rorty, it is necessary to understand the full force of his challenge to philosophy. After sketching Rorty’s important early meta-philosophical work, the author outlines the fundamental shift from epistemology and meta-philosophy to the moral and political that drives the development of his thought, culminating in his notion of philosophy as cultural politics.
EN
The paper tries to shed light on an almost unknown attitude of the American pragmatist Richard Rorty towards the problem of religion. Biographical researches enable to the author to concentrate on Rorty's philosophy of religion and to offer an analysis of its stages of development. The author's conclusion is that even though the philosophy of Richard Rorty has passed a long way, through transcendentalism, analytic philosophy, anti-metaphysics, atheism, anticlericalism, romantic polytheism, to civil religion, he never stopped to yearn for unchangeable and strong fundaments of a liberal society (equality, solidarity, fraternity, love and reduction of cruelty) based on Christianity.
EN
At the beginning the author tries to specify the place to which Rorty belongs in the tradition of American pragmatism, where the towering figure was John Dewey. Then he goes on to present Rorty's main ideas about education in two contexts. He discusses Rorty's contribution to the debate on the condition of American schools and the philosophy of teaching that dominated in the US at the time, and here Rorty's response to criticisms made by E.D. Hirsch and A. Bloom are particularly important. Secondly, he tries to make clear what was the role of specific proposals that Rorty offered as part of the program based on neopragmatic principles.
EN
The paper tries to explain an interesting shift in the philosophy of Richard Rorty, which took place after he started to pay attention to the renewal of the idea of American exceptionalism. Suddenly he stopped talking about destructing 'the old ladders' and focused on the reconstruction and revision on the basis of religion and American Enlightenment which are the sources of American exceptionalism and civic religion. Actually he abandoned his atheist position and called for the diversity of the religious experience ('romantic polytheism') as a clue to liberal and democratic morality.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 10
981 – 991
EN
The paper focuses on the disproportion the author sees in Rorty’s work. While the author prices highly Rorty’s anti-representationalism, he criticizes Rorty’s social and political philosophy, which, in his opinion, is rooted in early modern philosophy. The latter, he argues, emphasizes the dichotomy between subject and object – an approach characteristic for that period. In support of his claiming a big difference between full-fledge pragmatism and purely pragmatic eclecticism, the author compares Rorty’s and Dewey’s works to show that those of Dewey are considerably promising as for as the resolution of the problems of our society and politics.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 6
442 – 449
EN
The paper describes the key points of Rorty’s non-foundationalist, non-universalist conception of ethics. Rorty was a successful analytic philosopher before he became a neo-pragmatist thinker. Gradually he came to the conclusion that if philosophy is to be useful at all, it must be socially useful, weaving the fabric of a freer, better and just society. First Rorty assumed the position of a „liberal ironist” for whom cruelty is the worst thing we do. The other aspect of his social ethics is „solidarity”, but both of them (liberal irony as well as solidarity) are in line with historical contingency rather than necessity.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 2
104 – 111
EN
The aim of the paper is to shed light on several aspects of the neo-pragmatist conception of R. Rorty, which are related to the problem of morality. The anti-dualistic position, adopted by R. Rorty, opens the way to overcoming the traditional philosophical reasoning of metaphysical normative and principles. This is why the possibility of moral progress is not connected to the reasoning of abstract principles, but perceived as a possibility of increased sensitivity, as the capability of tolerance, empathy to the opinion of the others, willingness to listen, relying on argumentation rather than force. Rorty’s position represents an important inspiration for the reconstruction of the place and possibility of morality in our human condition today.
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