Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 2

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  RULE FOLLOWING
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1

Peter Winch a idea socialni vedy

100%
Dvorak T.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
|
2007
|
vol. 16/29
|
issue 3-4
157-168
EN
Firstly, this article outlines the main points made by Peter Winch in his breakthrough book The Idea of a Social Science. Its Fundamentals thesis, inspired by Wittgenstein and his accounts on the relation between language and reality, is the assumption that social sciences engage in philosophical endeavor, because the problems they deal with are not empirical, but conceptual. Following Wittgensteinian line of thought he comes up with the idea that all social action can be explained as rule following and therefore it should be approached by conceptual means other than those used by natural sciences. Secondly, this article explores the impact that The Idea of a Social Science had on the discussion about the nature of social sciences. It outlines it's main critiques which deal with (1) Winch's conception of philosophy (2) the notion of rule following and (3) descriptive nature of Winch's approach. Finally, Winch's critique of positivism in social sciences is identified as his main and lasting contribution to social thought.
2

'GRAMMAR RULE' IN LATER WITTGENSTEIN

88%
Cana T.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2006
|
vol. 13
|
issue 3
349-360
EN
The paper deals with Ludwig Wittgenstein's approach to the 'rule following activities'. Wittgenstein made many profound remarks, especially on the nature of the rules determining our communication in an everyday language. Some of these remarks are in the center of a current philosophical controversy known as 'rule following considerations'. Among many contributors the most important one is probably Saul Kripke. The aim of this paper is to refute Kripke's interpretation of Wittgenstein's approach to these activities, which Kripke developes in his book 'Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language'. According to Kripke, the central argument of 'Philosophische Untersuchungen' - the private language argument - leads us to so-called sceptical conclusion. From this conclusion it follows that in the everyday language there is no clear meaning of the term 'following a rule'. The paper is an attempt to reconsider this approach and to demonstrate that this sceptical interpretation of the private language argument is misleading.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.