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1

Zbrojny konflikt rosyjsko-gruziński (2008) w świetle prawa międzynarodowego

100%
Kranz J.
Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne
|
2011
|
vol. 2
60-84
EN
Since the early 1990s Georgia has attempted to regain control of its separatist regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia while Russia adopted the divide et impera policy. The content of armistice agreements (1992, 1994) reflects Georgia’s military defeats. On the former Soviet Union territory, peacekeeping forces are tolerated by Moscow only when composed of Russian troops or of parties involved in the conflict. Both sides considered the military option. Moscow was waiting for an occasion to lure Georgia into a trap. If South Ossetia were recognized as a de facto regime, it could claim its right to self-defence and call upon Russia for help. Russia invoked this claim only incidentally. If, however, South Ossetia was not a de facto regime, Georgia’s use of force against irregular groups cannot be considered as aggression and does not fall under the self-defence concept of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The Russian operation had no legal grounds in the UN Security Council decision and did not meet the conditions for humanitarian intervention, nor those for a pre-emptive operation. Russia’s only plea was the defence of its armed forces attacked in South Ossetia (self-defence, Art. 51 UN Charter) but the scale and the territorial reach of Moscow’s reaction was excessive. It is meaningful that Russian troops also entered Abkhazia. Russia called upon the protection of its citizens abroad and invoked its Constitution as well as the concept of ‘responsibility to protect’. This last argument cannot be accepted because it refers to the state’s obligation to protect its citizens within its territory. Recognizing South Ossetia and Abkhazia by other states will be hard given the universal disapproval of Moscow’s decision. The contemporary international practice is reluctant to recognize a seceding entity against the wishes of the state from which it has purported to secede. The presence of Russian troops in South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the basis of agreements made by Russia with these entities contravene earlier armistice agreements (August 12th and September 8th 2008).
2

Metody i środki walki podczas rosyjsko-gruzińskiego konfliktu zbrojnego w 2008 roku w świetle międzynarodowego prawa humanitarnego

80%
Karski K.
Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne
|
2011
|
vol. 2
105-123
EN
During the armed conflict between Russia and Georgia in 2008 there were cases of violations of international humanitarian law. On the Georgian side such cases were incidental, while on the Russian side, including Abkhazian and South Ossetian paramilitary forces, we face violations on a huge scale. The attacks were directed with violation of principles of proportionality and distinction between civilian and military targets. Occupation forces are also responsible for serious violations of international criminal law, including ethnic cleansings.
3

Agresja czy samoobrona? Prawo Gruzji do użycia siły w sierpniu 2008 roku

61%
Marcinko M.
Międzynarodowe Prawo Humanitarne
|
2011
|
vol. 2
85-104
EN
According to the commonly shared opinion and experts’ views contained in various reports prepared by intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations (inter alia OSCE, EU and Amnesty International) an incident that triggered the so-called five-day war in August 2008 was the artillery fire aimed at Tskhinvali, the capital city of the breakaway region of South Ossetia, launched by the Georgian armed forces during the night of 7 to 8 August, 2008 in an attempt to “restore constitutional order” in South Ossetia by Georgia. It was, doubtless, the climax of the tensions that escalated in the region over the years, caused by mutual instigations and incidents often involving the use of military force. However, taking into consideration the stipulations of international law, we must ask a question whether Georgia was right to launch a military action in order to solve the Ossetic problem. The launch of the military action in South Ossetia is recognized by some politicians and lawyers preoccupied with international law as an act of aggression, whereas according to others it was an intervention aimed at the protection of Georgian civilians inhabiting the region of South Ossetia. Moreover, questions are being asked concerning the legitimacy of the Georgian army’s hostilities against the Russian troops that stationed in the aforementioned republic. Finally, actions in Abkhazia, in particular, in view of the legitimacy of the right to self-defence as quoted by Georgia, deserve a separate analysis.
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