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Relativismus ve světle nejnovější filosofie přírodních věd

100%

Cvek B.

Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

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2011

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vol. 59

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issue 2

269-276

EN

The idea that man first knows and, if he knows correctly, then conducts himself successfully, is a form of atavism which stands in the way of reflection on the fact that the history of crafts is, to begin with, the testing of various approaches, and only subsequently the ascertaining of what is, and what is not, the means to a goal. In the relativity of intelligence it is thus possible to invent and put forward any number of things, but not all are realisable in the practice of crafts, and here relativity ends. The fact that something is actually reproducibly possible for us to make in the surrounding world is not relative, and it is precisely in this way that technology spreads so successfully at the multi-cultural level why it even erases the original diversities of culture. In contrast, the explanatory function of the natural sciences is relative, making sense only in the context of what is already known and accepted. New theories tend to be unintuitive and even though they function better than the old ones, they seem to make our world much less comprehensible than it was from the viewpoint of the old theories. Natural science is so successful because it experiments and only then takes agreement with experimental practice as the criterion of acceptability. Scientific theory is therefore only our way of setting up experiment in a reproducible way (and of using it in technology).

2

Pragmatism and Science

61%

Marsonet M.

Academicus. International Scientific Journal

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2013

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issue 08

101-109

EN

Logical empiricism gave rise to a powerful paradigm and it took some decades to overthrow it, even though it should be judged respectfully since, after all, philosophy of science and logic as we know them stemmed from that ground. The basic assumptions on which the paradigm of the “received view” rested are essentially the following. In the first place, verificationism seemed almost a truth of faith. Secondly, logical empiricists never offered good arguments in support of their thesis that assertive discourse must be preferred to more pragmatic forms of language. Thirdly, they too easily assumed that something like “objective truth” really exists. Last but certainly not least, the logical empiricists did not fully recognize the historical dimension of the scientific enterprise, which subsequently turned to be something different from the “universal science” they were talking about. In the paper it is argued that scientific realism (and the nature of scientific knowledge at large) is a theme where the originality of pragmatist positions clearly emerge. Nicholas Rescher, for example, claims - against any form of instrumentalism and many postmodern authors as well - that natural science can indeed validate a plausible commitment to the actual existence of its theoretical entities. Scientific conceptions aim at what really exists in the world, but only hit it imperfectly and “well off the mark”. What we can get is, at most, a rough consonance between our scientific ideas and reality itself. This means that the scientific knowledge at our disposal in any particular moment of the history of mankind must be held to be “putative”, while its relations to the truth (i.e. how things really stand in the world) should be conceived in terms of tentative and provisional estimation. Even the optimistic visions that see science as growingly approaching the “real” truth have, at this point, to be rejected on pragmatic grounds.

3

„Zniewolona” wolność

51%

Kiwak W.

Studia Ekonomiczne

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2018

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vol. 349

86-96

PL

Wolność jest wartością przynależną człowiekowi i łączącą się z uprawnieniami. Ograniczają ją obowiązki, zobowiązania oraz odpowiedzialność. Wolność absolutna jest ideą, typem idealnym, którym posługuje się nauka. Utylitarystyczne ujęcie wolności zmienia jej sens i zniewala człowieka.

EN

Freedom is the value that belongs to man, connects with his rights. It is limited by duties, obligations and responsibility. Absolute freedom is an idea, an ideal type, which is used by science. The utilitarian approach of freedom is changing its sense and enslaves man.

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1 Academicus. International Scientific Journal

1 Filosofický časopis (Philosophical Journal)

1 Studia Ekonomiczne

1 Cvek B.

1 Kiwak W.

1 Marsonet M.

1 2018

1 2013

1 2011

Relativismus ve světle nejnovější filosofie přírodních věd

Pragmatism and Science

„Zniewolona” wolność