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PL
Unlike in the classical regime, the measurement performed on a quantum system perturbs the state of the system and its properties remain unknown between measurements. Several early interpretations of quantum mechanics suggested that the reduction of the wave vector that occurs in a measurement is effected by a conscious act of an observer. For example, London and Bauer fostered the conviction that it is the act of observation that decides on the fate of the Schrodinger cat. Later developments of quantum mechanical formalism, e.g., decoherence, indicated that there was no need to causally link the mental states of an observer with the purely physical process of a quantum measurement. In particular, the novel quantum models of human brain put forward by Roger Penrose suggest that it is the reduction of the wave vector that causes conscious act of the observer. Although this reversal does not clarify the specifics of the quantum measurement process directly, it illustrates the principle of methodological naturalism whereby externally introduced heuristic postulates are replaced by well justified scientific explanations.
EN
The aim of the presented article is to provide an in-depth analysis of the adequacy of designating Penrose as a complex Pythagorean in view of his much more common designation as a Platonist. Firstly, the original doctrine of the Pythagoreans will be briefly surveyed with the special emphasis on the relation between the doctrine of this school and the teachings of the late Platonic School as well as its further modifications. These modifications serve as the prototype of the contemporary claims of the mathematicity of the Universe. Secondly, two lines of Penrose’s arguments in support of his unique position on the ontology of the mathematical structures will be presented: (1) their existence independent of the physical world in the atemporal Platonic realm of pure mathematics and (2) the mathematical structures as the patterns governing the workings of the physical Universe. In the third step, a separate line of arguments will be surveyed that Penrose advances in support of the thesis that the complex numbers seem to suit these patterns with exceptional adequacy. Finally, the appropriateness of designation Penrose as a complex Pythagorean will be assessed with the special emphasis on the suddle threshold between his unique position and that of the adherents of the mathematicity of the Universe.
PL
Recenzja książki Wojciecha P. Grygiela, Stephena Hawkinga i Rogera Penrose’a spór o rzeczywistość, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014, ss. 412.
EN
The unusual applicability of mathematics to the description of the physical reality still remains a major investigative task for philosophers, physicists, mathematicians and cognitive scientists. The presented article offers a critical analysis of the philosophical motivations and development of a major attempt to resolve this task put forward by two prominent Polish philosophers: Józef Życiński and Michał Heller. In order to explain this particular property of mathematics Życiński has first introduced the concept of the field of rationality together with the field of potentiality to be followed by Heller’s formal field and the field of categories. It turns out that these concepts are fully intelligible once located within philosophical stances on the relations between mathematics and physical reality. It will be argued that in order to achieve more extended conceptual clarification of the precise meaning of the field of rationality, further advancements in the understanding of the nature of the human mind are required.
PL
The common sense conviction that rationality is based on the classical logic requires major revision since the essential assumption of many standpoints in the cognitive science, concerning the non-contradictory character of mind, seems to be no longer tenable. Firstly, the non-algorithmic models of mind proposed by John Lucas and Roger Penrose are presented. In the context of these models, the importance of the Gödel incompleteness theorems for the philosophy of mind and artificial intelligence is debated. Secondly, several specific difficulties in applying the ‘Gödelian arguments’ in the modeling of mind are pointed out. As the main thesis of the article, it is stipulated that mind operates according to a wrong algorithm that is functionally equivalent to a contradictory formal system. The examples of the contradictory contents of mental states, evidenced in the phenomenon of self-deception and the mediaeval double truth theory in science, are discussed. Some consequences of the model of an inconsistent mind, based on the revision of the classical logic, are surveyed.
Teologia w Polsce
|
2016
|
vol. 10
|
issue 1
81-93
EN
Contemporary developments in science challenge philosophy and theology much more deeply than it was in the past. Scientific research on artificial intelligence has brought us the new problems to be solved. So then the question arises: can the computer have a mind like a human? In this interdisciplinary article the author deals with the question of the limits of the rationality. He analyses the range of problems discussed in the field of science, philosophy and theology. He presents Roger Penrose’s idea of a non-computable (non-algorithmic) character of the human consciousness. Because of this basic feature humans are not reducible to the computer. The author takes into consideration the mystery of world and shows its relevance for the theology. Finally, he draws attention to the necessity to develop science-theology dialogue and to elaborate a new discipline called theology of science.
PL
Teza Rogera Penrose’a o nieobliczalnym (niealgorytmicznym) charakterze ludzkiej świadomości (umysłu), będąca argumentem przeciwko możliwości stworzenia sztucznej inteligencji, może przyczynić się do wzmocnienia poczucia tajemniczości świata. Niezależnie od naszego stosunku do platonizmu matematycznego (zakładającego istnienie obiektywnych pozaczasowych bytów matematycznych) filozoficzna refleksja brytyjskiego kosmologa stanowi impuls do rozwijania współczesnej teologii w twórczym dialogu z naukami, kierującym się zasadą krytycznej otwartości i wzajemnej dynamicznej wymiany osiągnięć poznawczych.
Teologia w Polsce
|
2016
|
vol. 10
|
issue 1
81-93
PL
Teza Rogera Penrose’a o nieobliczalnym (niealgorytmicznym) charakterze ludzkiej świadomości (umysłu), będąca argumentem przeciwko możliwości stworzenia sztucznej inteligencji, może przyczynić się do wzmocnienia poczucia tajemniczości świata. Niezależnie od naszego stosunku do platonizmu matematycznego (zakładającego istnienie obiektywnych pozaczasowych bytów matematycznych) filozofi czna refl eksja brytyjskiego kosmologa stanowi impuls do rozwijania współczesnej teologii w twórczym dialogu z naukami, kierującym się zasadą krytycznej otwartości i wzajemnej dynamicznej wymiany osiągnięć poznawczych.
EN
Contemporary developments in science challenge philosophy and theology much more deeply than it was in the past. Scientifi c research on artifi cial intelligence has brought us the new problems to be solved. So then the question arises: can the computer have a mind like a human? In this interdisciplinary article the author deals with the question of the limits of the rationality. He analyses the range of problems discussed in the fi eld of science, philosophy and theology. He presents Roger Penrose’s idea of a non-computable (non-algorithmic) character of the human consciousness. Because of this basic feature humans are not reducible to the computer. The author takes into consideration the mystery of world and shows its relevance for the theology. Finally, he draws attention to the necessity to develop science-theology dialogue and to elaborate a new discipline called theology of science.
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PL
Recenzja książki: Wojciech Grygiel, Stephena Hawkinga i Rogera Penrose’a spór o rzeczywistość, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014, s. 412.
EN
Review of: Wojciech Grygiel, Stephena Hawkinga i Rogera Penrose’a spór o rzeczywistość, Copernicus Center Press, Kraków 2014, s. 412.
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