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EN
As far as people organize information on the self in a coherent system, self-esteem may be changed from within by enhancing the salience of information already present in the self-system without getting new information from outside sources. The present theorizing based on a finding that retrieval of a generalization from semantic memory results in a heightened accessibility of episodic memories inconsistent with the generalization (Klein at al., 2002) and on the positive-negative asymmetry between the morality and competence domain (Reeder & Coovert, 1986). It was hypothesized that self-relevant thoughts following self-ascription of positive moral traits would lead to rumination and decreases in self-esteem while the opposite was expected for the self-ascription of positive traits related to competence. Results of 2 experiments supported these predictions and showed that changes in self-esteem resulting from self-ascription of positive traits were fully mediated by the intensity of rumination which followed the self-ascriptions.
EN
People tend to ascribe secondary (specifically human) emotions to ingroup members more than to outgroup members, whereas no such tendency is observed for primary (basic) emotions (the phenomenon of infrahumanization). In our study we compared J.P. Leyens’ essentialistic explanation (humanity as an essence of ingroup category) to the generalization-of-the-self explanation (the model suggested by research on the self as a source of ingroup image) of the phenomenon. Participants ascribed personality traits and emotions to the self. Then, in the minimal group paradigm, they made the same ascriptions, this time to the (minimal) ingroup and outgroup. No general infrahumanization effect emerged, whereas strong ingroup bias was found. In line with generalization-of-the-self approach, participants from the subgroup with stronger self-ascriptions of secondary than primary emotions showed the classical infrahumanization effect, whereas participants from subgroup with stronger self-ascriptions of primary than secondary emotions tended to infrahumanize the ingroup. In conclusion, when secondary emotions dominate over primary emotions in the representation of the self, the projection of one’s own emotions to the ingroup might be responsible for the humanization of the ingroup and the infrahumanization of outgroups.
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