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Reprezentacja, milczenie, inny. Od samowiedzy przedmiotowej do samoświadomości transcendentalnej w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany

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Moroz K.

Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

2013

vol. 41

issue 2

5 - 23

In this paper I use the distinction between self-consciousness as an object of expe-rience and self-consciousness as the subject of experience proposed in Peter-Rudolf Horstmann's article „The Limited Significance of Self-Consciousness" in order to analyse Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology. The result of this analysis can be expressed in three theses: 1) Every self-consciousness is the consciousness of another self-consciousness. If there is self-consciousness, we have the essential conditions for it to know another self-consciousness. 2) Every self-knowledge is knowledge about another self-knowledge. I cannot know anything about myself which could not lead to knowledge about another. Even if the self-knowledge is not propositional, it is not an exclusive and unique fact. 3) Every objective self-knowledge is also non-objective self-knowledge. Selfconsciousness cannot be reduced to empirically tested features because it is always something more.

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1 Kwartalnik Filozoficzny

1 Moroz K.

1 2013

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Reprezentacja, milczenie, inny. Od samowiedzy przedmiotowej do samoświadomości transcendentalnej w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany