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THE PHENOMENON OF LIE IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF NEUROSCIENCE AND EVOLUTIONARY SCIENCES (Zjawisko klamstwa w perspektywie nauk neurokognitywnych i ewolucyjnych)

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Hohol M.
Semina Scientiarum
|
2009
|
vol. 8
91-109
EN
The present paper deals with the phenomenon of lies and lying from the point of view of the theory of evolution and contemporary cognitive science. In order to investigate these relationships, the following steps are taken: firstly, differences between classical theories of lie are presented (including those created by Aristotele, Thomas Aquinas and Machiavelli) followed by their juxtaposition with the contemporary sciences. It is shown that not only human beings lie, deceive and manipulate. Secondly, the Machiavellian Intelligence Hypothesis in primathology is analysed (Byrne, Whiten, de Waal). Moreover, the neuroscientific approach to the act of lie exposure is discussed (e.g. Brain fingerprinting), along with the issues of neuroethics. Finally, self-deception is presented in the context of the theory of evolution.
2

O NEÚPRIMNOSTI A SEBAKLAMANÍ

100%
Smreková D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
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vol. 66
|
issue 9
856 – 867
EN
The key issue of the contemporary discourse on self-deception is the necessity to explain the inner structure of consciousness or the state of mind which enable us to tell lies to ourselves or to be fooled by one’s own tricks. Two different approaches to the problem are analyzed: Sartre’s concept of bad faith as well as Davidson’s concept of self-deception. What these divergent conceptions have in common is their intentional approach. However, Sartre’s conception deriving from his ontological considerations (conceiving the consciousness in its unity) is seen as substantially different from Davidsonian rationalizing the phenomenon in question by claiming the division of mind. For Sartre a person of a bad faith is one disguising his or her freedom, i.e. the non-coincidence, which defines her or his being.
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