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1

WRITING DIARY AS TECHNIQUE FOR BUILDING SELF-KNOWLEDGE (Pisanie pamietnika jako technika budowania samowiedzy)

100%
Stelmaszczyk J.
Dyskursy Młodych Andragogów / Adult Education Discourses
|
2011
|
vol. 12
83-89
EN
Using Jozef Kozielecki's theory, the authoress explains her understanding of the term self-knowledge and shows how writing a diary can become a useful instrument on the way to building an adequate knowledge about oneself. The paper presents the results of pilot studies on using diary-writing as the technique useful in self-educational work. The analysis was based on twenty essays (each 3-4 pages long) written by first year pedagogy students from the University of Lodz. The aim of the research was to name the pros and cons of writing a diary. The authoress believes that the pros include: systematic nature of note-writing, sincerity, reflective character of the notes and a chance to observe changes that the author is undergoing. The 'traps', on the other hand, are: a possibility of idealizing oneself and a danger of replacing the real world with the one created in the diary. The theses presented in the article are illustrated with quotations coming from the students.
2

ON THE IMPLICATIONS OF γνῶθι σαυτόν

80%
Haas A.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
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vol. 70
|
issue 3
202 – 214
EN
The call to “know thyself” is neither a matter of presence and absence to self, nor the necessary or unnecessary possibility or impossibility of self-knowledge ‒ rather it is a problem. And the oracle gives a sign of this problem by implying that which is neither spoken nor concealed. But if implication is the problem of the sign, it is because it suspends the self and the very possibility of self-knowledge.
3

Reprezentacja, milczenie, inny. Od samowiedzy przedmiotowej do samoświadomości transcendentalnej w psychologii opisowej Franza Brentany

80%
Moroz K.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2013
|
vol. 41
|
issue 2
5 - 23
EN
In this paper I use the distinction between self-consciousness as an object of expe-rience and self-consciousness as the subject of experience proposed in Peter-Rudolf Horstmann's article „The Limited Significance of Self-Consciousness" in order to analyse Franz Brentano's descriptive psychology. The result of this analysis can be expressed in three theses: 1) Every self-consciousness is the consciousness of another self-consciousness. If there is self-consciousness, we have the essential conditions for it to know another self-consciousness. 2) Every self-knowledge is knowledge about another self-knowledge. I cannot know anything about myself which could not lead to knowledge about another. Even if the self-knowledge is not propositional, it is not an exclusive and unique fact. 3) Every objective self-knowledge is also non-objective self-knowledge. Selfconsciousness cannot be reduced to empirically tested features because it is always something more.
4

SELF-KNOWLEDGE, DISCRIMINABILITY, AND DEMONSTRATIVE THOUGHTS

80%
Yi H.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2020
|
vol. 27
|
issue 1
106 – 128
EN
According to content externalism, the content of our thought is partly determined by the linguistic environment responsible for it. However, there is growing scepticism about the compatibility of content externalism and self-knowledge. The sceptical position holds that, if content externalism is true, then we cannot know our own thought content because we would not be able to discriminate it from relevant alternative thought contents. This argument rests on the proposition that knowledge requires some type of discriminability. In this paper, I argue that this requirement does not apply to a particular type of demonstrative thoughts, more specifically, that in a typical case where we demonstratively denote an object without taking it as anything in particular, our second-order judgment about our own thinking, whose content includes this use of a demonstrative, constitutes knowledge without due discriminability.
5

INFALLIBILITY ABOUT THE SELF

80%
Hoffman G.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2013
|
vol. 20
|
issue 3
341 – 354
EN
On a common formulation, rationalist infallibilism is committed to two main theses: (i) ‘analytic a priori infallibilism’ and (ii) ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. According to thesis (i), a relatively wide range of analytic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. According to thesis (ii), a relatively wide range of synthetic a priori propositions can be infallibly justified. In this paper, the author focuses on rationalist infallibilism’s second main thesis, what is being called ‘synthetic a priori infallibilism’. He argues that synthetic a priori infallibilism, and by extension rationalist infallibilism, is untenable. In particular, exploring what seems to be the only potentially plausible species of synthetic a priori infallibility, he rejects the infallible justification of propositions about the self.
6

The significance of knowledge and self-knowledge in the decision making processes of adolescents and adults (The review of Polish research)

80%
Czerwinska-Jasiewicz M.
Polish Psychological Bulletin
|
2005
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vol. 36
|
issue 3
144-148
EN
This paper presents the issue of significance of knowledge and self-knowledge in the decision making processes of adults and adolescents. Knowledge is the foundation of every decision a person takes. It may be called the 'building material' which decisions are made from (Bross 1965). Knowledge has a regulatory role in decision making processes, influencing a persons actions. This study presented the following issues: 1) Knowledge as a reproductive and generative system (Tomaszewski 1976), 2) The significance of knowledge in decision making processes, mostly in theory discourse concerning the role of information in decision making processes (Bross 1965, Kozielecki 1975, 1992, Tyszka 1986), 3) Analysis of sample research on the significance of knowledge and self-knowledge of a person in decision making processes (Kozielecki 1975, Tyszka 1986, Walesa 1977, Biela 1976, Goszczynska 1977, 1997, Czerwinska-Jasiewicz 1977, 1997). On the basis of the theory presented as well as a detailed analysis of the test results, one can confirm the significance of knowledge and self-knowledge in the process of decision making by a person. Both knowledge of the world and self-knowledge has a regulatory function in this process, influencing a person's actions (their functioning and concrete actions).
7
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THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CONCEPTS FOR SELF-KNOWLEDGE IN CHRISTOPHER PEACOCKE'S THEORY. (Znaczenie pojec dla samowiedzy wedlug Christophera Peacocke'a)

70%
Pacholik-Zuromska A.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 7
53-70
EN
Christopher Peacocke is supporter of the standpoint, which claims, that the connection between the content of mental states and concepts, which are constituents of the content, has implications for self-knowledge. Without an answer to the question, 'What is it for a subject to posses a concept?' we cannot answer the question, 'How does a subject acquire self-knowledge?'. The connection between a concept, its possession conditions, and semantic value Peacocke explains in Fregean way. This connection leads also to the specific model of self-knowledge constructed by Peacocke
8
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KINDS OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS (Rodzaje samoswiadomosci)

70%
Poczobut R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 7
5-31
EN
The notion of self-consciousness (self-awareness) has been the subject of a reach and complex analysis in the phenomenological and analytic tradition. On the phenomenological view, a minimal form of self-consciousness is a constant structural feature of conscious experience. For the phenomenologists, self-consciousness is not something that comes about the moment one reflectively introspects one's experiences. In the most basic sense of the term, self-consciousness is pre-reflective or implicit self-awareness. The notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is related to the idea that conscious experiences have a subjective feel to them or phenomenal quality of what it is like to have them. In the article the author attempts to show that if phenomenal character of conscious experience can be explained in terms of implicit self-awareness, then the problem of phenomenal character (what-it-is-like dimension of conscious experience) just is the problem of implicit or pre-reflective self-awareness. His conclusion is that phenomenology, neuroscience, and analytic philosophy would profit from a more open exchange.
9

STAROSŤ O SEBA V PLATÓNOVOM DIALÓGU GORGIAS

70%
Wollner U.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
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vol. 65
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issue 3
227-238
EN
The paper offers an analysis of Plato's conception of the care of the self in his 'Gorgias'. There are two components of the self-care: self-knowledge and self-control. The first part deals with self-knowledge. The second part asks the question, whether can be there a fixed model of the individual soul's order. The third part of the paper deals with Plato's conception of self-control. The last part is concerned with the problem of self-control training.
10

PROBLÉM SEBAPOZNANIA V XENOFÓNTOVOM DIELE MEMORABILIA

70%
Wollner U.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2010
|
vol. 65
|
issue 7
622-630
EN
Many scholars suggest that one of the main differences between Xenophon's and Plato's portrayals of Socrates is in their emphases on the self-control or self-knowledge respectively. The aim of the paper is to examine the role the self-knowledge plays in Xenophon's Memorabilia. In its first part Xenophon's conception of the self-knowledge is analysed. Then it tries to answer the question whether the self-knowledge requires any preconditions. The last part is focused on the possible obstacles precluding the self-knowledge.
11

CAVELLOVA REVÍZIA NESKORÉHO WITTGENSTEINA

61%
Kekeli V.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2011
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vol. 66
|
issue 5
463-468
EN
The paper discusses the philosophical vision of language of the American philosopher S. Cavell (1926). This vision is based on Wittgenstein's idea of 'forms of life'. Human speech and activity, sanity and community all rest upon nothing more and nothing less than these forms. By learning the words we initiate the beginners into the relevant forms of life held in language and gathered around the objects and persons of our world. According to Cavell the procedures of the philosophy of ordinary language lead to the real self-knowledge.
12

STAROSTLIVOSŤ O SEBA PROSTREDNÍCTVOM POZNANIA SAMÉHO SEBA V PLATÓNOVOM DIALÓGU CHARMIDÉS

61%
Jánošová K.
Motus in verbo: časopis mladej vedeckej generácie
|
2014
|
vol. 3
|
issue 2
17 – 23
EN
The paper deals with the way how Plato uses the phrase doing one’s own in searching for the definition of sôphrosunê in the Charmides. Although the main theme of this dialogue is sôphrosunê, the consequence of the Critias’ concept of sôphrosunê, namely that sôphrosunê does not bring the community any advantage, also concerns the benefit of the community. The paper deals with the aporia of possibility and usefulness of self-knowledge in the dialogue. The text intends to show that the source of these aporia is Critias’ strict separation of three kinds of knowledge (“the knowledge of knowledge”, the “knowledge of good and evil” and “technical knowledge”). This separation is based on Critias’ potentially tyrannical “self-consciousness“ freed from all content determinations and governing the knowledge of good and evil. The unity between them has to the form of a complex structure the bearer of which is the soul and which is dominated by the knowledge of good and evil.
13

Samowiedza i bycie sobą

61%
Workowski A.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
|
2014
|
vol. 42
|
issue 3
63-87
EN
Classical Greece invested the maxim gnothi seathon with both cognitive and spiritual meaning. ‘Knowing thyself’ required an inner transformation and led to the attainment of real existence. Today, ‘being yourself’ and ‘self-knowledge’ describe totally different phenomena. ‘Knowing thyself’ means the examination of the content of one’s mind by introspection, whereas the concept of ‘being yourself’ is understood as spontaneous self-expression.The present paper discusses the specificity of ‘self-knowledge’, claiming that we can authoritatively explore our experiences. An analysis of Richard Moran’s theory shows that ‘self-knowledge’ is both dynamic and normative. There is a correspondence between the structure of ‘self-knowledge’ and the structure of ‘being yourself’ as it is described in Charles Taylor’s well-known notion of authenticity. The close similarity between these structures is a step towards showing that ‘self-knowledge’ is a way toward ‘being yourself’, which means the return to the classical Greek interconnection between ‘knowing thyself’ and existence.
14

STRAWSON AND KANT ON BEING 'I'

61%
Kunes J.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2009
|
vol. 16
|
issue 4
493-509
EN
Strawson developed his descriptive metaphysics in close relation to Kant's metaphysics of experience which can be understood as a particular version of descriptive metaphysics. At the same time, Strawson rejected the foundations of Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics which, according to him, is a sort of psychology. His argument against Kant's conception of subject, or of the 'I', can be found in his conception of a person. However, a closer investigation of this Strawson's conception can reveal that it is not enough comprehensive compared with that of Kant. Speaking with Kant, Strawson understood the part of being 'I' which can be known via self-knowledge but he failed to appreciate the second part of being 'I', namely self-consciousness. A comparison of Strawson's conception with Kant's conception of being 'I' reveals its systematic shortcomings that rather support, against Strawson's purpose, Kant's version of descriptive metaphysics as a theory of subjectivity.
15
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SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE. EPISTEMOLOGICAL POINT OF VIEW. (Samoswiadomosc i samowiedza z punktu widzenia epistemologii)

61%
Zieminska R.
Analiza i Egzystencja. Czasopismo Filozoficzne
|
2008
|
issue 7
33-51
EN
Self-consciousness is the source or set of information about our own present mental states. My self-knowledge is the set of all my information about myself, not only about my present mental states, but also my past mental states, my personality, my body or even my unconsciousness. Many philosophers thought that self-consciousness data are certain knowledge (Brentano, Husserl, Ingarden) but many contemporary philosophers claim that the first-person knowledge does not exist (Wittgenstein, Ryle, Dennett). Davidson refutes both behaviorism and subjectivity myth and takes some moderate position: first-person knowledge is dependent on third-person knowledge but third-person knowledge is dependent on first-person knowledge. There are some problems to reduce consciousness to physical states and to know about it. So, first-person knowledge is not certain and autonomous but it does exist and play important role. The two interdependent kinds of knowledge are two pillars of human knowledge. According to Davidson there is also some third pillar and it is the second-person knowledge.
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