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  1. 2 Filozofia (Philosophy)

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  1. 1 Gahér F.

  2. 1 Sedová T.

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  1. 1 2024

  2. 1 2009

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NORMATÍVNE KONATÍVNE FAKTY

100%
Gahér F.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2024
|
vol. 79
|
issue 2
133 – 149
EN
In the field of scientific debate on normativity today we can find two extreme positions of naturalists and normativists. For pure naturalists, there is no such thing as a normative fact. In this article, we analyse the bifurcated anatomy of the application of the perfect legal norm provision to demonstrate the nature of normative conative facts and to provide examples of such facts. The main hypothesis is the idea that by redefining logically possible worlds by enriching them with new types of fundamental facts, such as institutional social facts and normative conative facts, we will form the foundations for explaining the effective applicability of "classical" logic to the field of normativity and special law. In the conclusion of the study, we put forward a conceptual framework for such a redefinition of logically possible worlds for the system of Transparent Intensional Logic.
2

K PREDPOKLADOM A SÚVISLOSTIAM FAKTU V SOCIÁLNOM POZNANÍ

63%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2009
|
vol. 64
|
issue 7
613-624
EN
The paper examines the nature of the social fact in social knowledge on the background of the differences between sciences and social sciences. The applied approach is historical (E. Durkheim, M. Weber, M. Mauss, J. Searle), as well as one based on differentiation between Humean conception of fact and the conceptions, in which facts are seen as determining the truth values of our propositions. Intentionality and the structure of social facts in terms of Searle's construction of the social are underlined as well as the weakness of his conception. In conclusion it is asserted that the construction of facts in social sciences is impossible without psychological vocabulary and concepts, which contents are conceived - contrary to Searle's internalism - in terms of externalism.
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