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EN
Hungary, once the best-performing socialist country and a leader in the 1990s, now has a rate of economic growth slower than that of the other countries in the region. The present overweight, overspending state and the returning disequilibria derive from the softer dictatorship of the Kádár period, which instated a 'quasi-welfare state' to boost its legitimacy. Maintaining this on a macro level has softened the country's budget constraint and led to indebtedness. This uncovered 'welfare policy' has survived in a mutant form under democratic conditions and become one of the main causes of today's woes. While the micro-level budget constraints of companies have hardened, soft democracy has allowed the macroeconomic budget constraint on the state to remain soft. The two Hungarian characteristics of a state overweight for decades and the continuity of the process of systemic change have between them turned Hungary into a textbook example of the decline of a society ruled by Olson interest groups.
EN
A faulty sphere of systems developed in Hungary under socialism and after the change of system, not irrespectively of each other. The socialism imposed by the Hungarian state was too 'market', too 'capitalist', but Hungarian capitalism has proved too 'state', too 'socialist' in the criteria of the ruling system. Instead of spontaneous order, as outlined by Hayek, the essence of Hungary's new system has become 'bureaucratic disorder'. As institutions developed and influenced each other, the leading 'mutant' mix was a self-generating process that prevents the advantages of the new system from developing. The situation is similar in the relation between rapidly developed formal institutions and social awareness, which is rapidly become paternalistic. The informal institutions often impede operation of the formal ones.
EN
The paper examines the validity of Gibrat's law - the Law of Proportionate Effects - to Hungarian agriculture. Using a battery of specifications (OLS, FGLS, WLS, two-step Heckmann selection models, and quintile regression) and four size measures (labour, land, capital and total return), the results strongly reject Gibrat's Law for the full sample. Thus they suggest smaller farms grow faster than large. Chow-type tests reject the null of structural break between the evolution of family and corporate farms, suggesting a common growth path.
EN
The article seeks to discover what causes can be traced for the economic and social differences that have become permanent or a trend after two decades. Secondly, it analyses what importance this model-like categorization of manifold differences bears. Thirdly and lastly, it examines the sphere of questions to do with the consequences of these differences. The main conclusion is that the community choices are significant, but their role is much less, by comparison with career dependence, than most theories assume. Achievement, to quote Hayek (1995) is borne of human endeavour, not human planning.
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