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EN
The European Union (EU) has faced not only the international financial crisis, but also the European banking and the sovereign debt crisis. A lack of efficient regulations and supervision were a serious cause of recent developments. As a reaction, the EU finally implemented a framework covering both micro- and macro-prudential policies. Measures such as the new capital requirements, the deposit guarantee schemes, the green paper on shadow banking and, most importantly, the new approach for a macro-prudential supervision are headed towards crisis prevention. However, the challenge is to define regulations enhancing financial stability, which, at the same time, do not prevent institutions from generating reasonable financial risks and do not reduce growth. In that regard, the presented measures still have deficits which have to be faced. Furthermore, coordination between various authorities and the European Commission remains another challenge.
EN
The arrticle talks about reforms conducxted within EMU their contents and scope what is followed by discussion the reforms caused. EMU was launched without carrying through integration within the internal market. That could have been approved as a starting point for a new, higher level of integration in 1992. Nevertheless, it is difficult to accept such a situation to start further deepening of integration after over a quarter of century. Introduced reforms can be seen as solution gluing together states which are in EMU but at the same time it introduces a divide among them as well as among the outsiders. It is clear that the introduced solutions bring more stability and security to the capital and banking markets with introduction of new requirements but at the same time they do not eliminate possibilities to rise budget deficits or radical limitation of public debt in states, which at the starting point to EMU had surpassed approved convergence criteria. Despite some positive symptoms resulting from EMU reforms, economists evaluate the introduced changes with relatively limited enthusiasm. In general, the reforms were supposed to integrate closer the European states by closer convergence of the macro-parameters. It was also seen as a tool changing the value of dollar exchange rate and the role of dollar in international relations. Only part of the external goals was reached.  
PL
W artykule omawia się przeprowadzone w Unii Gospodarczo-Walutowej (UGiW) reformy, ich zakres oraz dyskusję, jaką problem ten wywołał. UGiW jest przede wszystkim realizowana bez dokończenia procesu w integracji na etapie rynku wewnętrznego. Można to było przyjąć jako punkt wyjściowy dla nowego, wyższego etapu integracji w 1992 r. Trudno jednak uznać za dobry start do pogłębiania UGiW, ponad ćwierć wieku później. Wprowadzone reformy mogą być uznane za rozwiązanie cementujące państwa uczestniczące w UGiW jednak wprowadza podziały między nimi, jak i między państwami uczestniczącymi w UGiW oraz w niej nieuczestniczącymi. Z pewnością wprowadzone rozwiązania zwiększają bezpieczeństwo rynku kapitałowego i bankowego przez zastosowanie nowych wymogów, jednak nie eliminują możliwości podnoszenia deficytu budżetowego czy radykalnego ograniczenia długu publicznego w krajach, w których od powstania UGiW przekracza on dopuszczalne przez kryteria konwergencji - wskaźniki. Mimo pewnych pozytywnych symptomów wynikających z reform UGiW, ekonomiści oceniają wprowadzone zmiany z ograniczonym entuzjazmem. Ogólnie reformy miały za cel bliżej zintegrować państwa europejskie przez pogłębienie konwergencji ich makro-parametrów. Widziano w UGiW także sposób na zmianę kursu dolara oraz zmianę jego pozycji międzynarodowej. Tylko część z tych celów udało się osiągnąć.
Bezpieczny Bank
|
2019
|
vol. 77
|
issue 4
23-49
EN
A common theme in recent public European Union (EU) policy debates is improving integration of the EU financial sector. The suggestion is that the Euro area should be treated as if it were a single jurisdiction, across which banks should be able to centralise management of capital and liquidity. Financial fragmentation is said to trap capital and liquidity in local subsidiaries in Host countries which is suboptimal, hindering the cross-border provision of credit, and resulting in an inefficient economic allocation, with higher costs for customers, and lower profitability for the industry in the EU. The proposed policy involves measures to counteract ring-fencing of subsidiaries by Member States (MS), curtailing national options and discretions that limit the harmonization effects of the EU’s Single Rulebook, and other regulations and supervisory practices that reduce banking groups’ cross-border freedom. However, some of the national options affecting banks in the EU are still supported by MS as needed due to local risks, financial stability concerns. Cross-border banking, often used as a yardstick to gauge the level of financial integration in the EU, can currently be realized in the EU in three basic forms: via subsidiaries, via passported branches or via cross-border provision of services. Among the solutions to fragmentation that many EU policy makers and governments focus on, at least in the Eurozone (EZ), are: completion of the Banking Union (BU), adopting regulations allowing capital, liquidity and MREL waivers in subsidiaries across borders, and the reduction of national options. In November 2016, the European Commission (EC) proposed changes to Capital Requirements Regulation (CRR), Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV) and Bank Resolution and Recovery Directive (BRRD) which would have allowed, under certain conditions (e.g. subject to guarantees), the application of capital, liquidity and MREL (Minimum Required Eligible Liabilities) waivers in the subsidiaries of EU banks operating in EU MS. These propositions faced strong opposition and were not ultimately adopted in the recently published CRR 2.0, CRD V and revised BRRD, due to lack of consensus among MS. But the arguments in favour of change have not disappeared. In this paper, we start with a look at the current state of financial integration in Europe. We then examine the arguments for and against the use of waivers. Building on these arguments, we subsequently explain sensible preconditions that should be put in place – in addition to completing the BU – to allow the prudent use of such waivers. We also discuss alternatives to the use of waivers, based on expanding the use of branches and indicate incentives which can play a role in shaping the quality of cooperation between Home and Host supervisors.
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