The text tries to answer the question of the sources of misunderstandings connected with the reception of Spinoza’s philosophy, especially with his understanding of the substance, attributes, modifications and infinity in Ethics. Assumptions made by Spinoza, for instance the postulate of describing the human being as a „state in a state” of Nature during a research procedure comply with the rules of model of the modern science. In Ethics, based on The Elements by Euclid, the author presents the attempt to define the basic terms used by the philosophers and scholars of the XVIIth century, and, on this basis and taking axioms into account, he works out a number of theorems concerning Nature, including the nature of a human being. Euclid’s Elements served as a template of the construction of a theory, which in a logically necessary manner, precisely and at the same time „suspending” the interference of destructive human emotions, proves the properties of the objects of geometry. Spinoza tried to establish a theory which would examine the properties of human mind and body treated as a subject of science (geometry and physics as far as body is concerned, psychology and ethics in case of the mind) in an equally rational, precise and motionless matter, starting from the basic definitions. Its basics became, among others, definitions of substance, attribute and modification, inspired by the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition. Those terms, interpreted in Christian Europe through the teachings of the Old and New Testament, have taken a completely different character and meaning in Ethics. Upon encountering the text of definitions and theorems the readers were unable and, quite often, unwilling to resist the temptation of adding their own beliefs to the contents. This article treats of this conflict of language and beliefs.
The article explains the meaning of the cause and effect relation in Hegel’s thought. It explains what Hegel understands by freedom and what it has to do with causality. Hegel is trying convince us that this issue is insufficient to grasp the absolute with one’s mind, which, in Hegel’s opinion, is the one and only task of philosophy as a whole.
The life path, research and teaching effort of Julius Planer has been by far overlooked by researchers in Ukraine. Therefore, the article represents an attempt to fill this 'blank spot', and to change the conventional view on the pioneering status of botanist Friedrich Reinitzer and crystal physicist Otto Lehmann in the discovery of liquid crystals. Also, the light is shed on important details in the biography of Julius Planer, with emphasis on his coming to Lviv (Lemberg) and work as a professor of Lviv University. It's shown that the historical truth is that Julius Planer, a professor of the Lviv University, as early as in 1861, long before Reinitzer and Lehmann, observed and gave scientific description of an optical phenomenon that later became an explicit classical feature of the liquid crystal condition of a substance. Detailed information is provided of what exactly was observed and described by Planer in his scientific paper 'Notiz uber das Cholesterin'.
The author critically presents the concept of God's substantiality, given by Fonseca and Suarez, showing its historical context. The issue of God's substantiality discussed by Jesuits comes down to the statement that God is an individual, substantial and concrete entity, yet they posed some objections to that opinion and gave extra explanations. All in all, such conclusions are close to nominalists. Although the Jesuits verbally opposed nominalism, they remained under its influence. It proves that nominalism - in spite of being completely discredited - was still appreciated.
Spinoza searched for a language that could help him to create a monistic system of ethics. Latin was in the 17th century a fairly malleable medium of communication. In its philosophical use it was largely a creation of Descartes. Spinoza wanted to use it in a way that would resemble Euclid's treatment of geometry. He needed a language that would clearly and precisely describe the process by which a man could liberate himself from the power of passions that hamper natural propensity for social peace and mental equanimity. He decided to begin by describing nature, which was responsible for man's proclivities and abilities. Consequently he needed a new concept of substance which on the one hand could be defined by some initial axioms, and on the other hand would be sufficiently flexible to include various aspects of human thought. It is interesting that when Spinoza had to make a choice between flexibility and content, he resolved to adopt a strict method of reasoning at the cost of the received understanding of substance. It is possible that these linguistic considerations led him to adopt the view that substance is identical with God and as such encompasses all principles of operation of the human mind and premises for the deriving of all fundamental concepts popular in his times.
Abstract In this paper I analyze Spinozian ontological arguments for God’s existence from Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata. I argue that the first proof suffers from circulus vitiosus, whereas the others have at least one non-obvious premise. I also consider P. Gut’s modification of the first proof, reported to me during the conference “The Philosophy of the 17th Century—Its Origins and Continuations” (Gdańsk, 16.06.2011). Meanwhile, I address D. Chlastawa’s remark that theorem 7 and 14 from Ethica… makes Spinoza’s theory inconsistent.
John Paul II's encyclical 'Fides et ratio' recognizes the possibility of the existence of different Catholic metaphysical conceptions. Using the issue of transubstantiation as the central expression of the Catholic faith as an example, the suitability of current systems of analytic metaphysics is examined for their use within Catholic philosophy. Those that enable such a use are labeled as suitable in a broad sense for Catholic theology. Moreover, using the example of a truth of faith concerning the relationship between soul and body, an examination was undertaken which showed that, even within the framework of metaphysical conceptions which are suitable in a broad sense, they must remain open for this particular truth of faith if they are to be suitable, not only in a broad, but also in a narrow sense, for their use in Catholic theology.
The present article attempts to explain what Aristotle’s prime matter of the material substances is. On the basis of the analysis several parts chosen from Metaphysics, Physics, On the Generation of Animals and On the Generation and Corruption the author comes to the conclusion that the prime matter in the sense of the universal material is the abstract. However, the analogue of the prime matter in ontological order is the proper (oikeia) matter of the particular material substance that is the proximate (engytaton) material cause of such substance. An example of such a matter is the bronze. But not any bronze is the analogue of the prime matter, but only that which actually manifests potentiality as potentiality that is the bronze which participates in the process of casting and forming of the particular bronze substance, e.g. the statue of the Discobolus. Therefore, in the first place among the material principles Aristotle does not mention the prime matter in the sense of the universal material opened to the generation of any body falling under the senses, but the body falling under the senses in the mode of the potentiality.
Averroes and Aquinas have different manners to solve the question of subject. For Averroes the subject is a particular 'carrier' of universal nature. For Aquinas it is an essential subject for accidental features. Both metaphysics are based on Aristotle's texts. Averroes preferred the latest stage of Stagirite's thought, from 'Metaphysica Z', with forma-quidditas as 'prima substantia'. However Aquinas preferred early Aristotle from 'Cathegoriae', with individual being as primary substance.
The following publication: Tadeusz Slipko's Polemics with the Materialist Ideology presents an outstanding Polish ethicist, the author of Zarys etyki ogolnej i szczegolowej (Eng. An Outline of General and Detailed Ethics). Presenting his own perspective on Christian ethics, he belongs to those who undertake polemics with the materialist ideology on the basis of philosophy. The author reveals here his critical references to the ideas of Hegel or Marx, probably made so as to express - through a kind of acceptance of the phenomena observed and analysed by Marxism - a critical stand both when it comes to the assumptions of materialism and atheism as well as the conclusions at which the thinkers of this orientation arrive. Professor Slipko is absolutely critical of the ideological basis of materialist philosophy, seeking in this reductionism attempts to bring the man-person to some dependent being, social being, strictly determined by the absolute bio-economic laws of nature. Slipko, in the name of Thomistic realism, perceives man as the basis of 'fundamental resolutions', and that is on the basis of ontology, anthropology as well as detailed personal ethics. Within social ethics, supported with Thomistic anthropology, he sums up his principal theses and assumptions with reference to the conception of man. It is not the unnecessary reminding of the facts already known, but rather realizing the close relationship between categories characterizing human being such as action, choice, purpose - which, in turn, determine the course of our personal life. And this, in turn, determines human being, nature and essence.
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