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EN
The work on translation of S. Pufendorf De rebus a Carolo Gustavo, Sueciae rege, gestis commentariorum libri septem [A monumental memorial for King Charles Gustav of Sweden] published in Nuremberg 1696 is near the end. This book, decorated with wonderful illustrations, drawings based on the E. Dahlberg is a mine of knowledge on the Great Northern War 1655-1660. Confrontation with the image of that era created by later historians is the basic research problem, both for Pufendorf’s text and Dahlberg’s illustrations. However, it is not only about an indication of errors, since errors occur always. Much more interesting is the reconstruction of the source workshop of both artists and their way of thinking. However, many researchers analyzed Dahlberg’s engravings in Polish historiography, there is no proper picture of the whole series of drawings on the Polish war.
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Přirozenoprávní omyl podle Hanse Kelsena

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EN
The article reconstructs Kelsen’s understanding of a fallacious reasoning known as “natural law fallacy” (Naturrechtlicher Trugschluss). Kelsen’s “natural law fallacy” pertains to a different kind of reasoning than the “is/ought fallacy”. In Kelsen’s view, this was a logical procedure, in which legal norms are derived from norms existing allegedly without human will (Sollen/Sollen Trugschluss, ought/ought fallacy). Our article shows, however, that this fallacy was not a part of an eternal “jusnaturalism”, which would have waged eternal war with “positivism”, nor is it a part of early modern natural law. It was a circumstantial reasoning applied ad hoc by 20th century lawyers without any relation to the earlier tradition.
CS
Studie rekonstruuje Kelsenovo pojetí chybného argumentačního postupu známého jako „přirozenoprávní omyl“ (naturrechtlicher Trugschluss). Kelsenův „přirozenoprávní omyl“ vystihuje jinou myšlenku než „is/ought fallacy“. Kelsen tím chápal argumentační postup, kdy jsou právní normy odvozovány z norem domněle vzniklých bez lidské vůle (Sollen/Sollen Trugschluss, ought/ought fallacy). Naše studie ukazuje, že tento omyl však nebyl rysem věčného jusnaturalismu, jenž by vedl odvěký zápas s pozitivismem, ani rysem raněnovověkého přirozeného práva, nýbrž účelovou argumentací uplatňovanou příležitostně právníky 20. století bez vztahu k předchozí tradici.
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