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EN
The article is an example of the so-called existentialist psychoanalisis. Sartre’s work is still an inspiring and the valid interpretation
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Sartre a Merleau-Ponty tváří v tvář totalitarismu

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EN
An example of how difficult it was for some left-orientated French intellectuals to come to terms with information about the real situation in the Soviet Union is provided by the conflict between M. Merleau-Ponty and J.-P. Sartre in 1953, which led to Merleau-Ponty’s departure from the editorship of the review journal Temps modernes. Prior to this, in 1950, Sartre had lent his signature to an article in which Merleau-Ponty reacted to information coming out about the Soviet punitive and prison system by calling into question the very socialist character of the Soviet regime. After the outbreak of the Korean war, however, Sartre adopted an unequivally pro-Soviet and pro-communist standpoint and did not wish to see Temps modernes give space to the opinions of this opposing viewpoint. In this article we provide an analysis of the letters which the two philosophers exchanged on this matter
EN
The legendary relation between Simone de Beauvoir and Jean-Paul Sartre was based on a specific communion of the two existentialists’ souls and bodies. It is Sartre that is generally considered to be the spiritual guide of this duo and that is why his role should be approached with caution in order to show that Beauvoir was by no means an epigone of her master. A contrario, it is the inspiration stemming from her literary output that can be found in a handful of works authored by the founder of Les Temps modernes (Modern Times). This impact is particularly conspicuous in the play entitled Dirty Hands, referring to The Second Sex, in which the author reflects on the concept of myth and shows his interest in women’s authorship. Thus, the literary output of Beauvoir and Sartre, two strong personalities of uncommon talent characterised by sameness and dissimilarity, proves their mutual admiration for their partner’s achievements and their acceptance of the other. Taking this aspect into account, reading their works from an intertextual point of view appears to be extremely fascinating.
FR
Le pacte légendaire de Simone de Beauvoir et Jean-Paul Sartre se fondait sur une connivence intellectuelle et affective entre eux deux. Étant donné que d’habitude Sartre était considéré comme le guide spirituel de ce duo, cela vaut la peine de relativiser le rôle du philosophe pour montrer que Beauvoir n’était aucunement au miroir de son maître. A contrario, ce sont les traces de son inspiration que l’on retrouve dans certains textes du fondateur de la revue Les Temps modernes. Cette influence se fait ressentir avant tout dans la pièce Les Mains sales, se référant au Deuxième Sexe, où l’auteur se rapporte à la notion de mythe, tout en manifestant son intérêt pour, et par, l’écriture au féminin. Ainsi, l’œuvre de Beauvoir et Sartre, deux personnalités fortes, d’un talent inédit, des consciences, à la fois, jumelles et différentes, prouve non seulement leur admiration réciproque pour leur travail respectif, mais aussi l’acceptation de l’autre. En témoignent leurs ouvrages, lus dans la perspective intertextuelle.
DE
Der Band enthält die Abstracts ausschließlich in englischer Sprache.
EN
Two characters, Franz Gerlach in Jean-Paul Sartre’s The Condemned of Altona (Les sequestrés d’Altona, 1959) and Théo Steiner in Toujours l’orage (1997) by Enzo Cormann, are influenced by their traumatic experience of the war that makes them evade reality and leads them to self-exclusion. Talking to other people provokes questions concerning their identity, family, human development and destiny. Both of the characters are concerned by the feeling of guilt for being alive; this shows how sinuously destiny works in particularly difficult situations while one’s behaviour and actions, once they are recorded by one's conscience, do not let you live anymore because the responsibility becomes too heavy
FR
Le numéro contient uniquement les résumés en anglais.
PL
Tom zawiera abstrakty tylko w języku angielskim.
RU
Том не содержит аннотаций на английской языке.
EN
The purpose of this article is to reconstruct Sartre’s critique of selected elements of Freud’s psychoanalysis as far as the emotions theory is concerned. I am analysing those assumptions of Freud’s teachings which became subjected to Sartre’s critique and why. I also point out the fact that some of the elements of psychoanalysis where emphasised by Sartre as important for the development of the emotions theory. My deliberations are based largely on Sartre’s Sketch for a Theory of the Emotion.
EN
Nothingness is a multifaceted problem. The basic difficulty connected with it emerges in the philosophy of language, as it hardly possible to name and find an appropriate term for that which does not exist. The problem proper arises when we are to justify nothingness, to support its fact in a rational, and at least partly, also in a scientific mode. Reflection on nothingness is taken up today in six cultures: in the philosophical thought of the West (Heidegger, Sartre, Welte, Neher), in Jewish theology, in Christian theology, and in Hinduistic, Buddhist and Taoistic thought. In each of those traditions the issue of nothingness is associated with a different context. In the West it is considered philosophically in ontology, where it serves to explain the problem of being (Heidegger) or to contradict what is considered as being (Nietzsche). In theology nothingness manifests itself in several contexts: in connection with the doctrine of creation out of nothingness (creatio ex nihilo), where it appears as that which did not exist previously or as that which might have existed but from a later perspective is defined as nothingness “with respect to what is at present” and when God is considered to be Nothingness.
Ethics in Progress
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2013
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vol. 4
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issue 2
46-53
EN
The goal of my paper is to consider how one chooses one’s own action. First, I will try to understand how both his past and his environment can condition someone's action. According to Sartre, we can act without being determined by our past which is always separated from us. It will be important to understand how such a process is possible. Is man completely free to act? Then I will raise the question of our reasons for acting in order to show that reasons do not pre-exist in the world. Motives are always motives for an agent who gives them meaning. They never condition the action completely. By his project, the agent reveals some reasons to act and these reasons have a value only in relation to the project adopted by the agent. Therefore, we can say that everyone is condemned to be free.
EN
Do the various ascriptions of “violence,” e.g., to rape, logical reasoning, racist legislation, unqualified statements, institutions of class and/or gender inequity, etc., mean something identically the same, something analogous, or equivocal and context-bound? This paper argues for both an analogous sense as well as an exemplary essence and finds support in Aristotle’s theory of anger as, as Sokolowski has put it, a form of moral annihilation, culminating in a level of rage that crosses a threshold. Here we adopt Sartre’s analysis of the “threshold of violence” as indicating a basic “existential” possibility wherein persons may and do adopt a posture of anti-god. This has considerable symmetry with the mythic and theological figure in the Abrahamic religions who is called “Lucifer.” This personage, at a unique timeless moment, found himself empowered to assume the right to exercise an infinite will-act which tolerated no superior normative perspective. I argue that this mythic stance is a live option for persons. Further, modern day nation-state military preparedness, where nuclear weaponry is a major tool of foreign policy, is a way of putting on ice and holding in reserve, but button ready, the onto-logical madness of the Luciferian moment.
EN
The problem sketched here in a non-conformist phenomenological manner concerns the transition from the theory of the self-sufficient individual to the theories of the social character of human being, and to the theoretical possibility to control the social asym-metries opposing to its fulfilment.
EN
The article is scientific review a collection of articles "Sartre. L'Être et le néant. Nouvelles lectures "published in France in 2015. The authors set to analyze and interpret the selected threads of Sartre's conceptions developed in his work "Being and Nothingness". In my review i summarize selected articles, and I pose the question about the new reading of "Being and Nothingness".
PL
Tekst jest recenzją naukową zbioru artykułów "Sartre. L’Être et le néant. Nouvelles lectures" opublikowanych we Francji w 2015 roku. Autorzy zbioru analizują i interpretują wybrane wątki myśli Sartre'a rozwinięte w jego dziele "Byt i nicość". W mojej recenzji streszczam wybrane artykuły oraz zastanawiam się, na ile teksty stanowią tytułowe nowe odczytanie "Bytu i nicości".
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PL
Na przykładzie twórczości trzech autorów: Jeana-Paula Sartre’a, Emila Ciorana i Fernanda Pessoi, autor artykułu udowadnia, że nuda jest jednym z najważniejszych wyznaczników modernizmu, powielając cechę przy¬pisywaną samej tej epoce, prądowi lub zespołowi nurtów, jaką jest nieo-kreśloność. W artykule przedstawiona zostaje swoista „fenomenologia nudy”, którą można wyprowadzić z pisarstwa powyższych autorów, wska¬zująca na „pograniczność” nudy – jest ona bowiem doświadczeniem prze¬biegającym na styku fizjologii i woli, skutkującym odczuciem nadmiaru istnienia, bezsensu egzystencji, absurdu świata. Nuda działa na podmiot destrukcyjnie – rozbija jego tożsamość, podważa jego substancjalność, ujawnia tkwiącą w nim wewnętrzną inność. Jako zjawisko charakterystycz¬ne dla modernizmu porównana zostaje z anomią i nihilizmem, wespół z którymi stanowi specyficzną „triadę nowoczesną” – zbiór niezbywalnych doświadczeń, z którymi każdy modernista musiał się zmierzyć. W ostat¬niej części artykułu udowodniona zostaje teza, że nuda stanowi specyficzną dekonstrukcję podmiotu: działającą w samych trzewiach egzystencji „pod¬stawę” zarówno inicjującą budowanie tożsamości, jak i uniemożliwiającą skuteczne zakończenie tego procesu.
EN
Using the writings of Jean-Paul Sartre, Emil Cioran, and Ferdinand Pessoa as examples, the author proves that boredom is one of the most important signs of modernism. It duplicates a feature ascribed to modern¬ist movements or groups of movements, and to the era itself – indetermi¬nacy. The author presents a kind of “phenomenology of boredom” that can be derived from the works of these three writers and points out its “bordering” status: It is an experience that takes place at the meeting point of physiology and will, causing a feeling of the excess of existence, the senselessness of being, or the absurdity of the world. Boredom acts on the subject destructively, fragmenting its identity, undermining its substantial¬ity, and bringing to light its internal otherness. As a phenomenon specific to modernism, it can be compared with anomy and nihilism, with which it produces a “modern triad” – a set of unavoidable modern experiences. The last part of the article proves that boredom is also a kind of deconstruc¬tion of the subject: a visceral “foundation” of existence that both initiates the construction of identity and prevents the successful completion of this process.
EN
The ten-year duration of the new century, moving away from the end of the twentieth century, inspire to reflection on the impact of modern thought on the shape of the life of modern societies. It pressing for the question, important from the standpoint of philosophy, if the ordinary mind reflects the knowledge, manifested in the way that they live in the community? In short, the issue will be about human self-understanding as it is developed through anthropological reflection of contemporary life and its shape. In my essay I’m trying to show the consequences of the new approach of understanding of the concept of the body, which was developed in the twentieth century. This approach is reflected in the ethical kind of demands. For this purpose, I use both Nietzsche’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Sartre’s concept of bodiness and reflections on the future of humanity developed by Arendt. My conclusion is that the desubstantialisation of the body is associated with the ethical postulate of concern for the world.
EN
The ten-year duration of the new century, moving away from the end of the twentieth century, inspire to reflection on the impact of modern thought on the shape of the life of modern societies. It pressing for the question, important from the standpoint of philosophy, if the ordinary mind reflects the knowledge, manifested in the way that they live in the community? In short, the issue will be about human self-understanding as it is developed through anthropological reflection of contemporary life and its shape. In my essay I’m trying to show the consequences of the new approach of understanding of the concept of the body, which was developed in the twentieth century. This approach is reflected in the ethical kind of demands. For this purpose, I use both Nietzsche’s, Merleau-Ponty’s and Sartre’s concept of bodiness and reflections on the future of humanity developed by Arendt. My conclusion is that the desubstantialisation of the body is associated with the ethical postulate of concern for the world.
EN
This paper is an attempt to identify the sources of contemporary culture. The author argues that at its bottom we can find a form of antihuman thinking. Such thinking derives from the perspective of „the death of a man”, his indefinite being, but also from the perspective of the modern cogito, the absolutized subject who becomes a special kind of foundation, the ultimate subject of reality. In the first part of the paper, the author describes in detail the contemporary understanding of human being, according to which man as a thinking, cognizing, self-aware, and rational subject assigns himself the role of a modern sovereign, a Demiurge, the only legislator and architect of a new, truly human world. In accordance with the meaning of the word „subject”, man thus becomes the „ultimate foundation” of reality. In the second part of the paper, however, the author argues that the absolutization of the subject, which assigns him more and more powers, leads to his undermining and negation. Taking into account the views of philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Foucault, and Derrida, he shows that the negation of the Cartesian cogito, or the „death” of a specific vision of man as a subject, leads to the thought that man becomes an indefinite being. In the third part of the paper, the author explains that both modern and post-modern thinking are influenced by antihuman thinking, which in both cases results in an unrealistic view of human beings. The author speaks of the „antihumanism of Lord and master”, and „antihumanism of the loosened up” and argues that these are the bedrock of modern humanism.Lastly, the author shows that the understanding of the role of the subject during the last centuries was built on a very simple opposition - everything or nothing. Since it is not true that the subject is completely rational, transparent, and that he is an autonomous master of himself, he must disappear, he must be forgotten. Hence, the idea of „man’s death”. In this context, taking into account the intuition of the French philosopher Chantal Delsol, the author attempts to break out the aporia between a modern, absolute, and self-sufficient subject, and a postmodern subject that does not actually exist. The author expresses the need for a realistic view of man as the only way to establish a truly humanistic culture. ------------- Received: 08/11/2019. Reviewed: 14/12/2019. Accepted: 11/01/2020
PL
Artykuł jest próbą ukazania źródeł współczesnej kultury. Autor stawia w nim tezę, że u jej podstaw znajduje się dziś myślenie w gruncie rzeczy antyhumanistyczne – myślenie spod znaku „śmierci człowieka”, jego bytowej nieokreśloności, ale również spod znaku nowożytnego cogito, podmiotu zabsolutyzowanego, który staje się szczególnego rodzaju fundamentem, ostatecznym podłożem rzeczywistości. W pierwszej części autor przedstawia specyfikę nowożytnego rozumienia bytu ludzkiego, zgodnie z którą człowiek – jako podmiot myślący, poznający, samoświadomy, racjonalny – przypisuje sobie rolę nowożytnego suwerena, Demiurga, jedynego ustawodawcy i architekta nowego, prawdziwie ludzkiego świata. W ten sposób – zgodnie ze znaczeniem słowa „podmiot” – człowiek staje się „ostatecznym podłożem” rzeczywistości. Dalej autor wykazuje, że absolutyzowanie podmiotu, przypisywanie mu coraz to większych kompetencji, doprowadza ostatecznie do jego podważenia i zanegowania. Odwołując się do koncepcji takich filozofów jak Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre, Foucault, Derrida twierdzi, że negacja kartezjańskiego cogito, „śmierć” pewnej określonej wizji człowieka jako podmiotu rodzi myślenie, zgodnie z którym człowiek staje się bytowo nieokreślony.Zarówno nowoczesne jak i ponowoczesne spojrzenie zostały w pewien sposób naznaczone myśleniem antyhumanistycznym. W jednym i drugim przypadku mamy bowiem do czynienia z nierealistycznym spojrzeniem na człowieka. Autor mówi o „antyhumanizmie pana i władcy” oraz „antyhumanizmie zluzowanego” i wskazuje, że właśnie one stanowią swego rodzaju podglebie współczesnego humanizmu. W punkcie ostatnim pokazano, że sposób rozumienia roli podmiotu na przestrzeni ostatnich kilku wieków, został zbudowany na niezwykle prostej opozycji – wszystko albo nic. Ponieważ nieprawdą jest, że podmiot jest dla siebie całkowicie racjonalny, przejrzysty, że jest autonomicznym panem samego siebie, musi zniknąć, trzeba o nim zapomnieć, stąd idea „śmierci człowieka”. W tym kontekście, odwołując się do intuicji francuskiej profesor filozofii Chantal Delsol, autor przedstawia próbę wyjścia z aporii między nowoczesnym podmiotem absolutnym, samowystarczalnym, a ponowoczesnym podmiotem, którego właściwie nie ma. Wskazuje na konieczność realistycznego spojrzenia na człowieka, gdyż tylko na takim spojrzeniu można zbudować prawdziwie humanistyczną kulturę. ------------- Zgłoszono: 08/11/2019. Zrecenzowano: 14/12/2019. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 11/01/2020
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XX
W artykule autor dowodzi, że u podstaw etyki Osho leżą indywidualizm i subiektywizm. Wraz z autonomicznym podmiotem, to znaczy człowiekiem postrzeganym jako twórca wartości, stanowią one najważniejsze źródła moralności tej koncepcji. Ponadto kluczową rolę odgrywają tutaj pojęta w sposób bliski Sartre’owi wolność, a także odpowiedzialność, świadomość i samorealizacja.
EN
The author of this article argues that individualism and subjectivism form the basis of Osho’s ethics. Along with the independent subject, the person perceived as the creator of values, they constitute the most important sources of morality in this conception. Furthermore, the key role is played here by freedom, close to the one understood by Sartre, as well as responsibility, awareness and self-fulfillment.
EN
In Being and Nothingness Sartre develops a phenomenology of the ‘lived body’ that aims both to acknowledge the necessity that consciousness be embodied, and to accommodate the central phenomenological consequences of this embodiment, without compromising the radical freedom of the for-itself. Aim of this paper is exploration of the question of the relation between two different subjects in J.P. Sartre’s phenomenology. The relation between me and the other is based on a constant conflict, according to Sartre it has not cognitive but existential character. I would explore one of the basic concepts of Sartre theory, namely “le regard”, (the look). Looking at someone, meeting one’s eyes is always a kind of astonishement, shocking in its radicality. Can I know the Other without degrading or objectifying him? Can the Other know me? Can I look at the Other without the risk of reducing him/her to être-en-soi? I would show that the experience of desire (especially sexual one) and affection is bound up with the clash of interpersonal perspectives involved in our transactions with the Other as well as with the question of freedom. In the case of infatuation, in Sartre’s view, it is considered as an invitation to bad faith. Sartre offers a rethinking and critique of basic philosophical positions concerning the concept of perception presented by Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. He holds that desire and distance inform the concept of “life”. Levinas identified a similar structure in Descartes’s notion of the infinite. By mentioning Lacan and Merleau Ponty conceptions I would try to elaborate and extend the formal structure of desire and distance by drawing on motifs as yet unexplored in the French phenomenological tradition, especially the notions of “lived-body” which is prominent in the later Husserl but also appear in non-phenomenological thinkers such as Bergson.
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