Full-text resources of CEJSH and other databases are now available in the new Library of Science.
Visit https://bibliotekanauki.pl

Results found: 7

first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last

Search results

Search:
in the keywords:  Sextus Empiricus
help Sort By:

help Limit search:
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
1
Content available remote

Why Sextus? The Pros logikous as Reliable Source for Gorgias’ Peri tou me ontos

100%
Giombini S.
Studia Philosophica Wratislaviensia
|
2019
|
vol. 14
|
issue 1
83-96
EN
Two versions of Peri tou mē ontos (ptmo) by Gorgias, related by an Anonymous Author (MXG) and by Sextus Empiricus (SE), have been alternatively accredited by scholars according to their disposition to seek a doctrine or a rhetorical- communicational dimension respectively with the first tendency prevailing. Comparing the ptmo to the rest of Gorgiasʼ works, we verify and clearly demonstrate how SE manages to convey a precise modus argumentandi. In effect, SE shows Gorgias’ demonstrative reasoning as employing: (1) the application of demonstrandum and quod erat demonstrandum typical of Gorgiasʼ speeches, reinforced by a substantial and abundant use of verbs of explanation and demonstration, especially in comparison to the rest of the same Against the Logicians’ section. Otherwise, MXG reduces this lexicon to the more generic phēmi; (2) the continuous employment of the reductio ad absurdum, like in all of Gorgias’ works; (3) a very refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (§67, similar to the one seen in Pal. 25). In addition, MXG is accurate in the discussion of some arguments (as in the third kephalaion), however, presents as an overcorrected interpreter, more interested in questioning Gorgias than reporting his original text, also directly referring to Zeno, Melissus, and Leucippus. The context of the ptmo in SE’s work the structure presented leads us to believe that SE had the text or at least an accurate summary of the ptmo different from MXG. The aims of this paper are: (1) to demonstrate that SE shows well the Gorgianic demonstrative reasoning and, for this specific reason, he is reliable and valuable resource for us; (2) to hypothesise that SE’s version is based on and independent (as yet unknown) source.
2
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Following Sextus: Demonstrative Argument in Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos

100%
Giombini S.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2018
|
vol. 9
|
issue 1
13-29
EN
The two extant versions of Gorgias’ Peri tou mē ontos (PTMO) have been preserved by an anonymous author (MXG) and by Sextus Empiricus (S.E.). Both versions have been differently interpreted by scholars who examine either the doctrine or the rhetorical-communicational dimen­sion (the first option being dominant). When comparing the PTMO with the rest of Gorgias’ works, the present paper aims to demonstrate that S.E. offers a more precise account of Gorgias’ modus argumentandi. Thus, S.E. shows the following, typical features of Gorgias’ demonstra­tive reasoning: 1) application of demonstrandum and quod erat demon­strandum, 2) continuous employment of reductio ad absurdum and 3) a refined formulation of the principle of non-contradiction (similar to the one in Pal. 25). The MXG, on the other hand, is accurate in the discussion of particular arguments (e.g. the third kephalaion), but presents an interpreter who is more interested in questioning Gorgias rather than doing justice to his thought. Hence, this article concludes that it was S.E., who had the text or at least a relatively accurate summa­ry of the PTMO.
3
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Philosophy and Ataraxia in Sextus Empiricus

100%
Massie P.
Peitho. Examina Antiqua
|
2013
|
vol. 4
|
issue 1
211-234
EN
This essay addresses two interconnected questions: (a) In what sense is Skepticism a philosophy? (b) How can ataraxia emerge out of epochē? Skepticism is a practice that articulates three moments: equipollence, epochē (suspension of judgment), and ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) and Sextus’ account of how one can move through these moments demonstrates the its philosophical nature. However, to clarify the transition from epochē to ataraxia Sextus offers only one clue: the story of Apelles. If this story is paradigmatic, it is also ambiguous since the transition from epochē to ataraxia can neither be causal nor inferential. Apelles achieves his goal purely by chance. Contrary to a common interpretation, this doesn’t mean that the Skeptic abandons the inquiry (just as Apelles doesn’t abandon painting). Lastly, the essay argues that Skepticism is not only the practice of a certain dialectical method but also a practice upon oneself. The Skeptic must learn to dissociate herself from the thoughts she entertains. Sustained inquiry can coexist with ataraxia because the Skeptic has discovered that her consciousness is distinct from its intentional content now bracketed by epochē. To free ourselves from our attachment to dogmatic beliefs is to opens up a space of self-detachment.  
4

Natural Theology, Philosophical Theology and Illustrative Argumentation

72%
Shokhin V. K.
Open Theology
|
2016
|
vol. 2
|
issue 1
EN
I will attempt to define what we understand as “narrative argumentation” or “narrative arguments” through an appeal to a discussion of intercultural rational theology. In this context I offer a distinction between two concepts, which are considered usually as synonymous. Philosophical theology is regarded from the historical point of view as the whole repertoire of attempts at rational justification of the faith in God along with analysis of His attributes and actions within different religious traditions (both ancient and modern, Western and Eastern), whereas Natural Theology is regarded as a philosophical preparation for the theology of Revelation in traditional Christianity. Varieties of the teleological argument, which have been developed in the history of thought as the argument from analogy, i.e., from vivid examples aiming at persuasion of an opponent and audience in the dialectical controversy, are classified into two species of short-cut illustrative examples and the species of full-fledged theological parables, i.e., narratives in the strict sense. I conclude this discussion with an invitation to investigate other main theological arguments from a similar point of view.
5
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Sextus Empiricus on Xenophanes of Colophon’s scepticism

58%
Śpiewak S., Śpiewak S.
Przegląd Filozoficzny. Nowa Seria
|
2020
|
issue 3
6
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Fonti umanistiche nel pensiero di Christian Francken

58%
Biagioni M.
Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce
|
2017
|
vol. 61
PL
Radykalny reformator Christian Francken (1552–1610?) pozostawał pod ogromnym wpływem Pietra Pomponazziego, a później Sekstusa Empiryka. Znacznie mniej istotny był wpływ neoplatonizmu. Jego wczesne teologiczne i filozoficzne teksty, od Breve colloquium Iesuiticum (1579) do Praecipuarum enumeratio causarum (1584), czerpały przede wszystkim z prac Pomponazziego. Wpływ Sekstusa Empiryka stał się fundamentalny około 1587 r., kiedy Francken zaczął pracę nad dziełem Disputatio de incertitudine religionis Christianae, w którym ujawnił zdecydowanie sceptyczną postawę, graniczącą z niewiarą. The radical reformer Christian Francken (1552–1610?) was deeply influenced by Pietro Pomponazzi and, later, by Sextus Empiricus. Much less important was the influence of Neoplatonism. Pomponazzi’s works were the main sources in his early theological and philosophical writings from the Breve colloquium Iesuiticum (1579) to the Praecipuarum enumeratio causarum (1584). The influence of Sextus Empiricus became crucial from around 1587, when Francken began writing the Disputatio de incertitudine religionis Christianae, where he exhibited a sharp skeptical attitude that led him not far from unbelief.
7
Publication available in full text mode
Content available

Umiarkowana obrona sceptycyzmu

51%
Walicki J.
Internetowy Magazyn Filozoficzny Hybris
|
2021
|
vol. 52
|
issue 1
1-29
EN
The article is an attempt to present a credibility of the philosophical skepticism and its intrinsic connection to wisdom. In the paper I explain basic presupposition of the tradition and then revise them within the framework a few modern skeptical clues (rhetorical nature of all argumentation, L. Wittgenstein's language games, hermeneutic concept of knowledge). Taking into considerations widespread accusations against the philosophical skepticism, I reveal their limitations, doing it in a reference to Sextus Empiricus' original remarks. In the last section of the paper I present the skeptical tradition as a certain way of being, which has some significant moral qualities.
PL
Artykuł stanowi próbę ukazania wiarygodności filozofii sceptycznej oraz jej ścisłego związku z mądrością. Objaśniam w nim podstawowe założenia sceptycyzmu, które staram się następnie zrewidować w kontekście kilku nowoczesnych „tropów sceptycznych” (retoryczny charakter wszelkiej argumentacji, gry językowe L. Wittgensteina, hermeneutyczna koncepcja wiedzy). Uwzględniając najczęściej spotykane zarzuty w stosunku do filozofii sceptycznej, objaśniam ich ograniczenia, powołując się na uwagi Sekstusa Empiryka. W ostatniej części artykułu ukazuję sceptycyzm jako pewien sposób bycia, który posiada istotne walory moralne.
first rewind previous Page / 1 next fast forward last
JavaScript is turned off in your web browser. Turn it on to take full advantage of this site, then refresh the page.