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1
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Analysis of the voting method used in the European Central Bank

100%
SOSNOWSKA H.
Operations Research and Decisions
|
2013
|
vol. 23
|
issue 1
75-86
EN
Game theoreticians usually deal with standard voting methods such as plurality voting or approval voting. In reality however, some complicated non-standard voting methods are used. In this paper the voting method and rotation scheme have been presented used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB), as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. We present game theoretical approaches for analyzing this method and different methods of computing the Shapley value for games connected with voting under such rotation schemes.
2
Content available remote

Banzhaf value for games analyzing voting with rotation

100%
SOSNOWSKA H.
Operations Research and Decisions
|
2014
|
vol. 24
|
issue 4
75-88
EN
The voting procedure has been presented with rotation scheme used by the Governing Council of the European Central Bank as it enlarges to accommodate new members of the economic and monetary union. The main game theoretical approaches have been presented elsewhere. That paper considered the Shapley value computed in accordance with these approaches. The Banzhaf value has been analysed and the results compared with the results for the Shapley value.
3

Equitable Distribution in a Three Players Problem

100%
Szopa M.
Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric
|
2014
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vol. 37
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issue 1
239-252
EN
Jazz band is a 3 player superadditive game in characteristic function form. Three players have to divide the payoff they can get, while being in a grand coalition, provided their individual and duo coalitions payoffs are known. Assumptions of individual and collective rationality lead to the notion of the core of the game. We discuss offers that cannot readily be refused [OCRR] as the solutions of the game in case of an empty core, when duo coalitions are the best options but only for two out of three players. The experiment shows that even in case of an empty core the most probable results are three-way coalitions and the share of the weakest player usually exceeds his OCRR. The Shapley value is introduced and its fairness is discussed as it lies at the side of the core while, on the other hand, the nucleolus lies exactly at the center of the core. We conclude that, in spite of that, the Shapley value is the best candidate for a fair sharing solution of the jazz band game and other similar games as, opposite to the other values, it is dependent both on individual and duo coalitions payoffs.
4
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A decision making support system in logistics cooperation using a modified VIKOR method under an intuituinistic fuzzy environment

51%
Tatarczak A.
LogForum
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2020
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vol. 16
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issue 2
251-260
EN
Background: This paper proposes a novel hybrid group decision making methodology to solve a coalition-formation problem for cooperative replenishment with multiple firms to achieve operational efficiency. We consider a case of horizontal cooperation between firms, and we investigate the profitability of horizontal cooperation when designing collaborative contracts. Methods: This study presents the application of a hybrid approach for group decision support for the coalition -formation problem. Multi-criteria decision making (MCDM) and intuitionistic fuzzy set (IFS) theory have been integrated to provide group decision support under consensus achievement. In addition, this study employs the entropy method to identify the weights of the decision makers. Results: The proposed integrated approach has been further studied through an illustrative example. The decision procedure used here is simply structured so that it may easily be implemented with a computer. Conclusions: This research may be beneficial to decision makers, researchers and organizations in helping them to understand project based evaluation in order to design and plan better horizontal cooperation.
PL
Wstęp: W artykule zaproponowano nową metodologię podejmowania decyzji dotyczących tworzenia koalicji między wieloma firmami w celu osiągnięcia wydajności operacyjnej. Rozważany jest przypadek horyzontalnej współpracy między firmami, a następnie badana jest opłacalność współpracy horyzontalnej przy projektowaniu umów o współpracę. Metody: W pracy przedstawiono zastosowanie podejścia hybrydowego do wspomagania decyzji grupowych w przypadku problemu koalicji. Zintegrowano wielokryterialne podejmowanie decyzji (MCDM) i intuicyjną teorię zbiorów rozmytych (IFS), aby zapewnić grupowe wsparcie decyzji przy osiągnięciu konsensusu. Ponadto zastosowano metodę entropii do identyfikacji wag osób podejmujących decyzje. Wyniki: Proponowane zintegrowane podejście zostało poddane dalszej analizie za pomocą przykładu. Zastosowana tutaj procedura decyzyjna ma prostą strukturę, dzięki czemu można ją łatwo wdrożyć za pomocą komputera. Wnioski: Badania te mogą być korzystne dla decydentów, badaczy i organizacji, pomagając im zaprojektować i zaplanować współpracę horyzontalną.
5
Content available remote

A Framework to Support Coalition Formation in the Fourth Party Logistics Supply Chain Coalition

51%
Tatarczak A.
Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Oeconomica
|
2018
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vol. 5
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issue 338
195-212
PL
Operator logistyczny 4PL (Fourth Party Logistics Provider) oferuje nowe i innowacyjne rozwiązania, mające na celu obniżenie kosztów, udostępnienie usług i usprawnienia w zarządzaniu złożonymi łańcuchami dostaw. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie najlepszych warunków do współpracy między wyspecjalizowanymi podmiotami zajmującymi się zarządzaniem łańcuchem dostaw – operatorami 4PL. Rozważania dotyczące czynników wpływających na tworzenie koalicji przez ope­ratorów 4PL, a także konkluzje z zakresu trwałości współpracy stały się podstawą do zaprojektowania dwustopniowej procedury, zbudowanej w oparciu o pojęcia z teorii gier. Celem przedstawionej procedury jest wybór metody alokacji kosztów/zysków przez koalicjantów. Analizy przeprowadzono na podstawie danych pochodzących z literatury.
EN
The growing diversity of programmes concerning the solutions associated with the fourth party supply chain operations, the increasing pressure to optimise all resources and capabilities, as well as the continually increasing integration of different types of technologies are the driving force in the establishment of fourth party logistics supply chain coalition. Choosing the most rational and practical cost allocation mechanism in the fourth party logistics supply chain coalition, with the aim of reducing the overall operating costs, is the main condition ensuring companies’ motivation to participate in collaboration. This paper addresses the concepts from the game theory combined with multi‑criteria problems in order to introduce a realisable profit distribution mechanism, with the potential to establish practical collaborations among companies. The aim is to achieve the best conditions for collaboration. Case studies are used to demonstrate the utility of the framework.
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