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People's Republic of Poland in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 1956-1970

100%
Skobelski R.
Kwartalnik Historyczny
|
2007
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vol. 114
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issue 3
49-90
EN
People’s Republic of Poland in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 1956-1970 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON) was established in 1949 upon the initiative of Stalin and comprised a successive step towards the formation of the Eastern bloc. The Council, which generally speaking, served Soviet interests, consolidated the Soviet economic model in dependent countries and made it easier for the Kremlin to control and influence the shape and trends of their economies. During the first years of the existence of COMECON, Poland was forced to assume the role of a supplier of fuel and raw material not only for her eastern neighbour but also for the GDR and Czechoslovakia. The breakthrough caused by the Twentieth Convention of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the ”Polish October” events partially changed this highly unfavourable situation. The new Polish authorities, especially Gomułka, attached great hope to COMECON. The leader of the Polish United Workers’ Party went on the assumption that it would suffice to better organise the work performed by the Council for it to become an efficient motor force for economic progress. Hence the considerable activity pursued by Warsaw in initiating various changes within the Council and pertaining to, i.e. the structure of the COMECON apparatus. The Council was, however, unable to create longer-term conditions suitable for accelerating the economic growth of its member states. The reason lay in limitations stemming from the character of the centrally planned economies of the socialist countries. The prime obstacle for cooperation within COMECON was the chaotic currency/financial system. On the other hand, the strategy of a mutual synchronization of economic plans as well as efforts aimed at production specialisation and coordination merely rendered indelible the negative economic tendency prevalent among the Council countries, affecting the autocratisation and bureaucratisation of the economic administration and increasing the technological backwardness. All these factors were accompanied by the contradictory interests of the member states and the stand represented by the Soviet Union for whom COMECON possessed not only economic but predominantly political significance. The Kremlin treated the Council as yet another instrument for maintaining the cohesion of the Eastern bloc and for providing additional chances for the economic dependence of the members states and the exploitation of their economies.
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Artist Run Initiatives (ARI) – cechy ogólne i analiza wybranych przykładów historycznych w Czechosłowacji i Republice Czeskiej

100%
Pospiszyl T.
Sztuka i Dokumentacja
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2012
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issue 7
38-43
EN
The essay questions the position of artist run initiatives in the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, particularly in Czechoslovakia and the Czech Republic, during the communist regime and compares them to similar institutions working today. The general thesis is that the self-organised activities of artists under a totalitarian state or in the times of economical crisis lead to similar strategies. Therefore the history of unofficial art in the former Soviet Bloc cannot be understood as shaped exclusively by the conditions of the communist state. In general terms it is similar to the artist run initiatives or theoretical models elsewhere, for example the Temporary Autonomous Zones by Hakim Bey or different independent art institutions in Western Europe or USA. Artist run initiatives are often physically attached to certain places which influences their mission and their activities. The alternative to the official institutional system creates parallel community, formed by different art groups, galleries or by a whole community that shares similar interests, vocabulary and values. Sometimes – and especially in Eastern Europe – creating a social network is more important that art production or the establishment of theoretical framework. Art is often a mere pretext for a desired social activity that cannot be fulfilled in another way. The traditional values of art criticism are not sufficient here. The works clearly have not only an aesthetic value, but also an ethical one.
3
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Kultury powojenne. Sztuka i komunizm w Krakowie i Lipsku

58%
Kunakhovich K.
Pamięć i Sprawiedliwość
|
2015
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issue 1(25)
163-184
EN
Postwar Cultures: Art and Communism in Krakow and Leipzig On the morning of January 19, 1945, Dr. Bolesław Drobner arrived as the first representative of Poland’ s postwar government, charged with a special mission: to resurrect the city’ s arts scene and build a new, democratic culture. Six months later a music teacher named Rudolf Hartig took up his new post in Leipzig’ s bullet-riddled City Hall. Hartig was a lifelong communist who took over the city’ s Culture Department after the Nazi collapse. Drobner and Hartig became local agents in a transnational project that spanned Eastern Europe: the search for a distinctive socialist culture. This paper investigates what they did at the city level in the first half-decade after World War II. For the East European regimes that came to power after WWII, culture was not a form of entertainment but a tool of governance. Both Drobner and Hartig viewed art as a foundation of the postwar order, capable of bridging social divisions, eradicating fascist residues, and promoting a Marxist worldview. At the same time, the two officials could not simply impose their vision from above: they also had to contend with Soviet advisors and local artists, two groups that had their own notions of what art should look like. The struggle for socialist culture thus reflected broader struggles over political and social control in Eastern Europe. This paper compares cultural reconstruction in Krakow and Leipzig, two of EasternEurope’s major cities. Looking at them side by side allows us to assess the role Soviet officials played in local affairs and to refine our notion of Sovietization. The postwar program of socialist culture was not just a Soviet imposition but rather had deep native roots. Lacking concrete models or instructions, both Drobner and Hartig relied on prewar conventions, national traditions, and even fascist practice. They pursued policies that seemed to uphold the status quo and therefore provoked little opposition – even from those who opposed leftist parties. Yet these policies also expanded the authority of the state, paving the way for a radical restructuring of the cultural sphere in the years 1949/50. It was widely accepted principles like democratization that enabled the Stalinization of Polish and German culture. The policies that Drobner and Hartig developed proved to have a lasting impact on the Soviet Bloc: they prepared the ground for the Stalinist system, but also preserved local traditions that reemerged when that system collapsed.
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