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EN
In the 250s and 240s continental Greece found itself in a particularly complicated situation. The growth of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, as well as Sparta’s awoken ambitions, presented the Ptolemies with favorable conditions to actively pursue efforts to weaken the Macedonian influence there. Initially, the partner of the Ptolemies became the Achaean League. In this way, the Ptolemaic fleet gained important footholds, including both Corinthian ports, Kenchreai in the Saronic Gulf and Lechaion in the Corinthian Gulf. This strengthened the position of the Lagids at sea, and it was the islands on the Aegean Sea and the coasts of Asia Minor that were in the centre of the Ptolemies’ interest. However, the Aetolian League could continue to be seen as one of their possible partners in Greek politics. We should not exaggerate the Achaean-Aetolian conflict. After the death of Antigonus Gonatas in 239, the two conflicted federations were joined by an alliance. It cannot be excluded that Sparta also cooperated with the coalition, and the king of Egypt could have been a convenient link in this cooperation. There is no information whatsoever to suggest an Egyptian initiative to form the coalition. After the defeat of the Egyptian fleet at Andros in ca. 245, the position of the Lagids in the Aegean Sea was not as strong as it had once been. This was all the more reason for Ptolemies to closely observe the Aetolians’ intense activity on the Aegean Sea. The Ptolemies and Aetolians concluded symmachia. Ultimately, however, alliances were reversed: Aratus pushed the Achaean League towards a coalition with Macedonia, but earlier, having learned about the Achaean-Macedonian negotiations, Ptolemy decided to cancel his financial support for the Achaeans and hand it over to Sparta. It is very likely that the situation in the whole Aegean region (especially the expedition of Antigonus Doson to Caria in 227) played a role in changing the Ptolemies’ policy. The contacts which the Aetolian League established in the region were all the more reason for Ptolemy III to choose Cleomenes and the Aetolians at the expense of the Achaean League. At that time, the beginning of closer relations between the Aetolians and the Attalids could also be observed. It cannot be ruled out that the Ptolemaic diplomacy was a mediator, since up until then the Aetolians had no common interests with Pergamum. For the Lagids, on the other hand, the Attalids were a force worth supporting against the Seleucids, just as the Aetolians were a valuable partner in the rivalry against Macedonia.
EN
In the 250s and 240s continental Greece found itself in a particularly complicated situation. The growth of the Aetolian and Achaean Leagues, as well as Sparta’s awoken ambitions, presented the Ptolemies with favorable conditions to actively pursue efforts to weaken the Macedonian influence there. Initially, the partner of the Ptolemies became the Achaean League. In this way, the Ptolemaic fleet gained important footholds, including both Corinthian ports, Kenchreai in the Saronic Gulf and Lechaion in the Corinthian Gulf. This strengthened the position of the Lagids at sea, and it was the islands on the Aegean Sea and the coasts of Asia Minor that were in the centre of the Ptolemies’ interest. However, the Aetolian League could continue to be seen as one of their possible partners in Greek politics. We should not exaggerate the Achaean-Aetolian conflict. After the death of Antigonus Gonatas in 239, the two conflicted federations were joined by an alliance. It cannot be excluded that Sparta also cooperated with the coalition, and the king of Egypt could have been a convenient link in this cooperation. There is no information whatsoever to suggest an Egyptian initiative to form the coalition. After the defeat of the Egyptian fleet at Andros in ca. 245, the position of the Lagids in the Aegean Sea was not as strong as it had once been. This was all the more reason for Ptolemies to closely observe the Aetolians’ intense activity on the Aegean Sea. The Ptolemies and Aetolians concluded symmachia. Ultimately, however, alliances were reversed: Aratus pushed the Achaean League towards a coalition with Macedonia, but earlier, having learned about the Achaean-Macedonian negotiations, Ptolemy decided to cancel his financial support for the Achaeans and hand it over to Sparta. It is very likely that the situation in the whole Aegean region (especially the expedition of Antigonus Doson to Caria in 227) played a role in changing the Ptolemies’ policy. The contacts which the Aetolian League established in the region were all the more reason for Ptolemy III to choose Cleomenes and the Aetolians at the expense of the Achaean League. At that time, the beginning of closer relations between the Aetolians and the Attalids could also be observed. It cannot be ruled out that the Ptolemaic diplomacy was a mediator, since up until then the Aetolians had no common interests with Pergamum. For the Lagids, on the other hand, the Attalids were a force worth supporting against the Seleucids, just as the Aetolians were a valuable partner in the rivalry against Macedonia.
EN
An explanation is put forward regarding what Philodemus the Epicurean could have read in Diogenes the Cynic’s Republic to make the enforcing of males one of his proposals. Diogenes, in propria persona or through a mouthpiece in this dialogue, may have adduced the example of sexual coercion that the Spartan constitution exerted on all the youngsters of the city. The Cynic probably held the same point of view on the issue in the Republic and in his tragedy Chrysippus.
EN
The aim of this article is to revive the opinion that the Four Hundred sent only two embassies to Sparta. The author suggests that the first embassy is mentioned in THUC. VIII,71,3, 86,9 and 90,1, that it was sent to Sparta in early July 411, but its members were arrested in Argos while on their way from Sparta to Athens. This chronology corresponds with the contemporary events on Samos.
EN
Military Science Fiction as a sub-genre of SF literature has gained a major acclaim throughout the years, especially after the II World War. It mainly deals with predictions such as: how modern warfare will look like in the future, what body upgrading systems, weapons and armour will it involve etc. Gordor R. Dickson – a silent giant of this sub-genre, unappreciated during his lifetime – proposed in his works a different vision of future warfare – innovative but traditional at the same time, intelligent and cunning. This article aims at presenting Dickson’s vision of future warfare and how innovative and different his ideas were in comparison to other military SF writers.
PL
Gatunek literacki military Science Fiction został doceniony i zyskał sławę głównie po II Wojnie Światowej. Zajmuje się on przewidywaniem jak w przyszłości wyglądać będzie sposób prowadzenia wojen, jak zostanie ulepszone ludzkie ciało, broń czy jakie rodzaje zbroi czy kombinezonów będą w użyciu etc. Gordon R. Dickson – niedoceniony za życia wielki autor military SF – pokazał w swoich utworach zupełnie inny styl prowadzenia konfliktów zbrojnych – innowacyjny ale i tradycyjny zarazem, oparty na inteligencji i przebiegłości. Ten artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie jego pomysłów na to jak będą w przyszłości wyglądać konflikty zbrojne i różnic między nim a innymi pisarzami military SF.
EN
The defeat of the Hellenes in the Peloponnesian war in the 5th century B. C. happened a number of centuries after a deathly silence following the Trojan War and so called dark ages (lasting three centuries) as well as after popular stories on heroes of Mycenae and after poetic (Homer) times of storytelling. Those stories created an idea organizing a new world of archaic Greeks. The Peloponnesian events closed – in a way again – the certain order; this time it was the order of democrats characterized by the hubris of aristocracy (Athens) and the order of oligarchs characterized by the arrogance of democrats (Sparta). While the Trojan war prepared the fall of king Agamemnon, the Athens’ war prepared the king’s come back, this time the Macedonian one, who – craving for the fame of an Achaean hero -followed the path of a Mycenae ruler. Finally, the Peloponnesian war did not bring success of some Greek poleis or the whole Greece. Results of this war are expressed by a conclusion on the common Peloponnesian failure. It was a clash of interests of oligarchic order with democracy. What is important, a serious conflict arose: populist (majority) democracy against law and justice. This conflict was possible due to the lack of any institution of a public arbiter or moral authority, which could prevent a fall of moderation as an essential (sine qua non) feature of democracy (Solon). There is no democracy without moderation and self-resistance.
PL
Klęska Hellenów w wojnie peloponeskiej V w. p.n.e nastąpiła po wielu wiekach od zaistnienia martwej ciszy po wojnie trojańskiej i po trwających później trzy stulecia tzw. wiekach ciemnych oraz opowieściach ludowych o mykeńskich herosach, po poetyckich (Homer) czasach opowieści, które zbudowały ideę organizującą nowy świat Hellenów. Wydarzenia peloponeskie zamknęły – niejako ponownie – pewien ład; tym razem był to porządek demokratów cechujących się pychą arystokratów (Ateny) i porządek oligarchów o bucie demokratów (Sparta). Ale też, o ile wojna pod Troją przygotowała upadek króla (Agamemnon), to wojna pod Atenami przygotowała powrót króla, tym razem Macedońskiego, który złakniony pysznej sławy bohatera achajskiego, podążył drogą mykeńskiego władcy. Wojna peloponeska ostatecznie nie skończyła się sukcesem jakichś sprawiedliwych poleis greckich czy całej Grecji. Rezultaty owej wojny wyraża myśl mówiąca o powszechnej klęsce peloponeskiej. Walczyły między sobą interesy ustroju oligarchicznego i demokratycznego. Co jednak niezwykle ważne, pojawił się poważny konflikt: demokracja populistyczna (większościowa) przeciw prawu i sprawiedliwości. Ów konflikt okazał się możliwy z powodu braku jakiejś instytucji publicznego arbitra czy moralnego autorytetu, które zapobiegłyby upadkowi umiarkowania, będącego konstytutywną (sine qua non) cechą demokracji (Solon). Bez umiarkowania nie ma demokracji.
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