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Sun Tzu's "The Art of War" and Implications for Leadership: Theoretical Discussion

100%
Dimovski V., Marič M., Uhan M., Đurica N., Ferjan M.
Organizacija
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2012
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vol. 45
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issue 4
151-158
EN
We present a study of the Art of War from a leadership perspective, one in which we make a closer connection to the context of general organization and management. The Art of War written by Sun Tzu is one of those books that could be classified in the genre of pop-culture. Although its content used to be considered as a carefully protected state secret in the past, it is now available to everyone. Its use has in the past century of moved from warfare also to other areas of human activity. Strategic advices that it contains can be used in many more areas than just the conduct in the times of war. In fact, the success in wars, as well as in business, of course, depends on leadership, which is why we identify the positive and negative attributes of a leader in relation to strategic leadership. People are those who fight in battles and are also those who win them; and the most important person in every battle is the general. Historically, a number of successful military commanders ascribe the credit for their victories to Sun Tzu's principles. In addition, this wisdom is now being examined and used by senior executives from all around the world, especially in Asia, because it can be utilized in many business and political situations. The Chinese classic "The Art of War" is still considered as one of the most influential and important works on strategy, why a discussion on theoretical and practical implications of Sun Tzu's strategic leadership theory in a global environment is also included.
2
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Tao of Security. A Study of Far-Eastern Security Culture Genesis

100%
Grabińska T., Piwowarski J.
Security Dimensions: International & National Studies
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2017
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vol. 22(22)
30-54
EN
The work contains an analysis of security culture phenomenon from the perspective of Sun Tzu. The idea here is to build the entire universe and a placed-in man, as an area in which operate the impact from the energy of macrocosm. It is the same – corresponding to the body of the universe – with microcosm – the body of a human being immersed in the interaction energy of the endless universe. This concept, combining with the ideas of Confucianism and Buddhism, which here are not broadly discussed, has practical application for over two thousand years in the deliberations on the various areas of human activity. The principles of building and applying of strategies and tactics are to some extent determined by the rhythm of the endless universe cosmic energy – chi (qi). Prevention of risks in an effective way by competent governance in time of peace, and a skilful command in war, comes down to an agile mediation between “Heaven” and “Earth” to use the rhythm of cosmic harmony in the ranks of subordinates.
3
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Bitwy pod Fredericksburgiem i Gettysburgiem w świetle Sztuki Wojny Sun Tzu

71%
Mazurak Z.
Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska, sectio F – Historia
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2014
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vol. 69
EN
What do the Civil War battles of Fredericksburg and Gettysburg have to do with the Art of War, the military strategy treatise written by ancient Chinese general Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 BC)? Very much, in fact. The Art of War’s timeless advice and principles can explain the results of battles and entire wars in every historical period, including the 19th century. The unorthodox way of war advocated therein allowed Sun Tzu, the commander of the army of Wu, to defeat a much larger army of the neighboring state of Chu, but due to a lack of English translation until 1910 was unknown to the English-speaking world, including Generals Ambrose Burnside and Robert Lee, who, ignorant of its sage advice, made catastrophic blunders at Fredericksburg and Gettysburg, respectively. Burnside attempted a rapid crossing of the Rappahannock river at Fredericksburg, but pontoon bridges did not arrive in time, so the element of surprise was lost, and even when they did, he hesitated to cross until December 1862 when Confederates had already dug themselves in at Marye’s Heights; he sent his men like swarming ants towards the Confederate trenches on the heights, losing thousands of them. Lee evidently didn’t learn from his enemy’s mistakes and repeated them at Gettysburg in July 1863. Although no river crossing was involved, Lee wrongly abandoned his original plan to capture Harrisburg and Camp Curtin (which would have been a huge prestigeous blow to President Lincoln and might have encouraged a European recognition of the Confederacy) and, upon hearing that Union divisions were at Gettysburg, he moved his entire army there. At Gettysburg, he first issued unclear orders to subordinate Gen. Richard Ewell, then, the next day, clarified these by ordering multiple suicidal assaults on fortified Union positions on Cemetery Ridge. Sun Tzu counseled against attacking an enemy’s strong positions and especially against charging uphill to attack. He also stressed the importance of clarity of orders and of not trying the same type of attack over and over again. As Burnside’s and Lee’s examples show, generals who ignore Sun Tzu’s advice do so at their own peril.
PL
Można zadać pytanie, co bitwy wojny secesyjnej pod Gettysburgiem i Fredericksburgiem mają wspólnego z traktatem strategii wojskowej napisanym przez starożytnego chińskiego generała Sun Tzu (ca. 544 – ca. 496 p.n.e.). Okazuje się, że bardzo dużo. Dzieło to zawiera ponadczasowe porady, dzięki którym można wyjaśnić wyniki bitew i wojen w każdym okresie historycznym, łącznie z XIX w. Ze względu na brak tłumaczenia na język angielski do 1910 r. traktat ten był nieznany dla świata zachodniego, w tym dla generałów Ambrose’a Burnside’a i Roberta Lee. Dowódcy ci, nie znając jego porad, doświadczyli katastrofalnych porażek militarnych. Burnside próbował szybkiego przekraczania rzeki Rappahannock pod Fredericksburgiem, ponieważ we właściwym czasie nie zostały dostarczone dla armii mosty pontonowe. Zamiar się nie powiódł i element zaskoczenia został utracony. Generał Lee niewiele się nauczył na błędach przeciwnika i powtórzył je pod Gettysburgiem w lipcu 1863 r.
4

Clausewitz versus Sun Zi. Spór o polityczne i strategiczne realia współczesnej wojny.

63%
winczewski d.
Rocznik Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego
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2019
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vol. 13
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issue 2
EN
The article is an attempt to answer the question about the character of contemporary war by outlining a counterpoint between the strategic thought of the two most valued classics of military thought - Sun Tzu and Carl von Clausewitz. The author analyses interpretations of contemporary armed conflicts, which preach the obsolescence of Clausewitz's strategic thought and the transition to a postmodern paradigm based on Sun Tzu theses. The article argues with this approach, defending the legitimacy of the elements of political and military strategy used in past conflicts based on the Clausewitzian paradigm, as well as the universality of the Prussian general's theses on the philosophical nature of war.
PL
Artykuł stanowi próbę odpowiedzi na pytanie o charakter współczesnej wojny poprzez zarysowanie kontrapunktu między myślą strategiczną dwóch najwyżej cenionych klasyków myśli wojskowej – Sun Zi i Carla von Clausewitza. Autor analizuje interpretacje współczesnych konfliktów zbrojnych, które głoszą przestarzałość myśli strategicznej Clausewitza i przejście do postnowoczesnego paradygmatu opartego na tezach Sun Zi. Artykuł polemizuje z takim ujęciem broniąc zasadności wykorzystywanych w minionych konfliktach elementów strategii politycznej i wojskowej opartej o paradygmat clausewitzowski, a także uniwersalności tez pruskiego generała na temat filozoficznej natury wojny.
5
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Future soldiers in contemporary science fiction: the victory of complete harmony of body and mind on the example of Gordon R. Dickson`s Mercenaries – Dorsai

63%
Samulak-Piłat M.
Facta Simonidis
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2012
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issue 5
65-82
EN
Military Science Fiction as a sub-genre of SF literature has gained a major acclaim throughout the years, especially after the II World War. It mainly deals with predictions such as: how modern warfare will look like in the future, what body upgrading systems, weapons and armour will it involve etc. Gordor R. Dickson – a silent giant of this sub-genre, unappreciated during his lifetime – proposed in his works a different vision of future warfare – innovative but traditional at the same time, intelligent and cunning. This article aims at presenting Dickson’s vision of future warfare and how innovative and different his ideas were in comparison to other military SF writers.
PL
Gatunek literacki military Science Fiction został doceniony i zyskał sławę głównie po II Wojnie Światowej. Zajmuje się on przewidywaniem jak w przyszłości wyglądać będzie sposób prowadzenia wojen, jak zostanie ulepszone ludzkie ciało, broń czy jakie rodzaje zbroi czy kombinezonów będą w użyciu etc. Gordon R. Dickson – niedoceniony za życia wielki autor military SF – pokazał w swoich utworach zupełnie inny styl prowadzenia konfliktów zbrojnych – innowacyjny ale i tradycyjny zarazem, oparty na inteligencji i przebiegłości. Ten artykuł ma na celu przedstawienie jego pomysłów na to jak będą w przyszłości wyglądać konflikty zbrojne i różnic między nim a innymi pisarzami military SF.
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