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EN
The article discusses the situation of Christians in the Middle East (Syria and Lebanon).
PL
Artykuł omawia sytuację chrześcijan na Bliskim Wschodzie (Syria i Liban).
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Prezydent w systemie konstytucyjnym Syrii

94%
EN
The article presents the political position of the President in Syria and analyzes powers of the head of state from the 1930 Constitution to including this issue in the 2012 Constitution. The study covers issues regarding the method of choosing the head of state and the competences in the area of executive, legislative and judicial power which determine the position of the President within the state system. It is argued that the strong political position of the Syrian President is related to the violation of the principle of separation of powers, enormous influence of the army on political life and a lack of democratic experience. The strong position of the President was manifested in the 1973 Constitution, when Hafiz al-Assad was the President. This continues to this day despite the adoption of the new Constitution in 2012.
EN
Russia’s “assertiveness” in defending its interests, be it in Ukraine or Syria, should not come as a surprise because this mood is perceived by the Kremlin as a necessary tool in a world in which many states turn to military might to forward their vital interests. Through his actions, President Putin wants to convince both external actors as well as his own population that the reckless ignorance of Russia’s vast interests will only lead to more chaos. The sudden emergence of the Islamic State in the summer of 2014 gave Russia the perfect pretext for a military intervention that could be presented to both the international and home public under the banner of “joining the anti-IS alliance.” In so doing, Russia wanted to create the impression that there was no rift between itself and the West. Russia’s “gambit” in Syria brought immediate propaganda results for President Putin—domestic public support for him skyrocketed once again as it did after the triumphant seizure of Crimea.
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Recent UNHCR data show that nearly 3 million Syrian refugees have fled to Turkey, where they are not recognised as refugees. Turkey has, however, adopted a new law to offer Syrians temporary protection, which means a residence permit, access to education, health care and employment, but also an opportunity to acquire Turkish citizenship on certain conditions. This text focuses on the current regulations for the protection of Syrian refugees in Turkey, outlining the legal status of refugees and examining the impact of their influx on the Turkish policy towards asylum-seekers from non-European countries.
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Arab Nationalism in Syria

94%
EN
Syria is one of many countries in the Middle East diverse in terms of religion, nationality, and ethnicity. Internal divisions emerged when Syria reclaimed independence in 1946, but the differences inside Syrian society have become a taboo. One of the reasons for that was Arab nationalism, which claimed that they were all Arabs. The Syrian authorities managed to maintain the appearance of national homogeneity owing to these claims. This article aims to show the uniqueness of Arab nationalism, which is not characteristic of one country but of numerous states sharing a common past, language, and their citizens belonging to the family of the Arab nation. As a case study for Syria, this article analyses the basic concepts relevant to the subject (nationalism, the nation from the perspective of Islam, and Arab thought), the roots of pan-Arabism in Syria and its presence in the public and legal space. It also attempts to demonstrate that Arab nationalism helped the Syrian authorities (represented by the Alawite minority) blur national, ethnic, and religious differences and thus preserve the unity of society and state.
EN
The aim of this article is to analyze so-called Kurdish problem in three countries with important Kurdish minority – Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Roots of the Kurdish issue are very old, we could found them in the mid-nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire. Now between 25 and 35 millions Kurds lives in the Middle East. Article starts with description of the Kurdish population’s (around 15 millions) fate in Turkey – they faced violent opression, but especially under rule of AKP party, also got some degree of recognition. Kurds in Iraq were subjugate to the Arabization process under Baath Party Rule, but then established autonomy in the northern part of country. Situation of Syrian Kurds was partly o shot of the Turkish and Iraqis politics. Last chapter is devoted to the new phenomenom of Sallafist jihadism (Jabhat al-Nusra, Islamic State in Iraq and Syria), which gives Kurds in Iraq and Syria new.
EN
Since the beginning of the conflict in Syria, the Russian Federation has had a role of great importance. Even it is considered sometimes controversial, given that the Russian Federation at the beginning of the conflict has blocked some drafts of resolutions to the conflict preventing, especially that Western powers acted in Syria. Later, with the worsening of the conflict added to the migratory crisis and the establishment of the Islamic state in Syria, the Russian government decides to act incisively in Syria to slow down migration and grounded in the narrative of the "war on terror ". Thus, it can be questioned whether this attempt to bring the narrative of "war on terror" seemed an experiment to test a coalition with the US, with a view to approach history of these two actors previously under the umbrella of terrorism, or even a movement of Russian foreign policy to show that the post-Cold War moment no longer exists, and that this is not a time to see Russia as a defeated country anymore, but a US nemesis.
EN
Over the years, the Middle East has played a diverse role in Soviet and later Russian foreign policy. During the period of rivalry between the USSR and the US, it was an important area of confrontation. After its end, the Russian Federation became immersed in crisis and lost interest in the region. The Middle East again appeared in the Kremlin’s geostrategic thinking after the Arab Spring which the Russian authorities perceived as fuelled and directed by the West, especially the US. The consequences of these social upheavals in the form of the overthrow of the Libyan leader or the explicit aspirations of the West to remove Bashar al-Assad from power, led Vladimir Putin to take action. This article is an attempt to interpret Russian actions in Syria, including its military involvement, through the prism of the Kremlin’s neo-superpower policy.
Scripta Judaica Cracoviensia
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2012
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vol. 10
37–69 Kraków 2012
EN
A previous paper on the titulus Tiburtinus re-opened the debate concerning the notorious ignotus, then generally thought to be P. Sulpicius Quirinius (cos. 12 BC), suggesting instead that he might be identified with C. Sentius Saturninus (cos. 19 BC). This suggestion was subsequently challenged in favour of L. Calpurnius Piso (cos. 15 BC), who had originally been argued by Sir Ronald Syme. Since the identification of the consular concerned is significant for Augustan prosopography and for the history of Asia, among other provinces such as Syria and Germany, a detailed and wide-ranging restatement of the case for Saturninus is made here. Piso (unlike Quirinius) is really a non-starter, and it is surprising that he would have been supported by formidable Syme. The rex of the titulus could not have been Rhescuporis I or Rhoemetalces I. The iterum would not have referred to the second legateship of Piso (presumably that of Syria) given Piso’s early career. The binas, referring to two public thanksgivings, does not inspire confidence in Piso receiving a second supplicatio. Piso the Pontifex is not attested as proconsul of Asia, nor is he attested as governor of Syria, and the reconstruction of the fasti of this province is much more reasonable than previously thought. By contrast, all points in Saturninus career can be successfully compared with the information in the titulus. Origins of the Sentii from an area near Tibur is a bonus, if dispensable. Saturninus could not have been proconsul of Africa at the time inferred from Tertullian (29 BC), and hence Asia is open for him in c. 14/13 BC. His office in Syria (c. 12–8 BC) is well-attested, as it is that in Germany (c. AD 3–6). He was awarded ornamenta triumphalia in the company of Tiberius, after ‘two’ victories and no doubt supplicationes binas. Finally, a flexible understanding of the word iterum can accommodate also the meanings ‘for another time’ and ‘twice’, either of which can work with the career of Saturninus. As for deprived Quirinius, among various problems, no two thanksgivings can be conceived for a war such as that of the Homonadenses, and, most condemningly, a reference to his important office under Gaius will never have been omitted in the titulus.
EN
The article presents a phenomenon accompanying the conflict in Syria, involving the production and use of homemade weapons. Based on publications as well as multimedia materials published on the Internet the authors describe homemade weapons. The advantages and disadvantages of their use in tactical operations were identified in the form of conclusions.
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2014
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vol. 29
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issue 3
71-85
EN
Struggling to survive and experiencing a financial catastrophe, the Christian population in Syria had to handle carefully its relations both with the regime and the rebel forces, as the longstanding ties of several churches with the regime have put the communities in a situation where they cannot stand idle and wait. As Syria represents a battle ground, both literally and figuratively, for the eventual outcome of the Arab Uprising, this paper will examine the position that Christians hold in the country, in the light of the dilemmas they face in times of crisis.
PL
Artykuł omawia szereg aspektów wyprawy Romana III Argyrosa do Syrii, w tym jej cele i trasę. Autor utrzymuje, że celem Romana nie było zastąpienie Mirdāsydów w Aleppo Manṣūrem Ibn Lu’lu’, ale zaanektowanie tego miasta i wsparcie plemienia Ṭayyi’ w Palestynie, wykorzystanie problemów Fāṭymidów do podbicia Syrii. Twierdzi, że to, iż Bizantyńczycy ponieśli porażkę, nim dotarli na ziemie Fāṭymidów, przyczyniło się do późniejszej poprawy relacji między dwoma imperiami. Poza tym proponuje rozwiązanie problemu osoby Ibn Dūqsa.
EN
The paper discusses various aspects of Romanos III Argyros’ expedition in Syria, such as its objectives and route. It is argued that Romanos’ goal was to not just replace the Mirdāsids with Manṣūr Ibn Lu’lu’ in Aleppo, but to annex the city and then lend his support to the Ṭayyi’ in Palestine, thus profiting from Fāṭimid problems and eventually conquering Syria. The defeat of the Byzantines before they reached Fāṭimid territory allowed for the later amelioration of relations with Fāṭimids. A solution to the issue surrounding the personality of Ibn Dūqs is also presented.
EN
The Arab Spring has been a subject of many scientific researches. In this one we are trying to analyze this political phenomenon, how it could influence other regions as Turkey and Russian. It is known that Russian Federation is the only European country where the ethnic composition contains more than 20 millions of Muslims. Compared with the other European countries, the position of Russian Federation towards the Arab Spring is unique and it raises many questions. By analyzing the Russian position in contrast to the Turkish, towards the Syrian revolution, we are trying to answer the following questions: How can the Arab Spring affect the international position of Turkey and wayTurkish neo-ottoman foreign policy is threatening Russian national security? What are the threats brought on by increased influence of political Islam to the role of future Russian internal governance? What is the motivation behind a tilted attitude of Turkey and Russian puritanical position towards the Syrian revolution and what are the goals that each trying to achieve? What Russia is in exchange for the resignation of its strategic interests in Syrian? What are the prospects for the development of the situation in Syria?
PL
Arabska Wiosna a jest tematem różnych monografii naukowych. W artykule tym autor analizuje ją jako zjawisko polityczny, które oddziaływuje na takie kraje, jak Rosja i Turcja. W porównaniu z innymi krajami europejskimi stanowisko Rosji wobec Wiosny Arabskiej jest inne, ze względu na swą strukturę etniczno- religijną, ponieważ Rosję zamieszkuje ponad 20 mln muzułmanów. Porównując Rosję i Turcję do wydarzeń w Syrii, autor próbuje udzielić odpowiedzi na następujące pytania: W jaki sposób Arabska Wiosna oddziaływuje na pozycję Turcji na arenie międzynarodowej? Dlaczego polityka zagraniczna Turcji (neo-otomańska) stanowi zagrożenie dla rosyjskiego bezpieczeństwa narodowego? W jaki sposób wpływy islamu politycznego mogą oddziaływać na ład wewnętrzny Rosji? Jakie cele próbuje osiągnąć Turcja i Rosja poprzez swoje stanowisko wobec Syrii? Czego Rosja oczekuje w zamian za rezygnację ze swego stanowiska wobec Syrii? Jakie są dalsze perspektywy rozwoju sytuacji w Syrii?
Facta Simonidis
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2015
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vol. 8
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issue 1
121-137
EN
In the Syrian conflict Russia from the beginning used to have a clear position and also clearly emphasized opposition to the moves of the United States and Europe. The Russian position is motivated by a specific vision of a world order in which the use of force without the approval of the UN Security Council is rejected as well as any outside interference in the affairs of sovereign states. Syrian conflict is treated by the Russian authorities as an event that shapes the new law and international order. Possible solution to the Syrian problem, which would be antagonistic to the Russian position, would lead to the loss of Russian influence in this region of the world and cause the decrease of Russia’s prestige in the international arena. Russia perceives the Arab Spring as a revolution which could be dominated by extremist forces, which, moreover, also raises some concerns in the West. Russians fear that the Syrian conflict could become even more radical and spread to other countries in the region. Russian foreign policy during the events of the autumn of 2013 was clearly aimed at refusing any concessions concerning possible intervention in Syria.
PL
W sprawie konfliktu syryjskiego Rosja od samego początku przyjmowała bardzo jednoznaczne stanowisko i wyraźnie akcentowała sprzeciw wobec posunięć Stanów Zjednoczonych i Europy. Rosyjskie stanowisko jest motywowane specyficzną wizją porządku światowego, w którym odrzuca się użycie siły bez zgody Rady Bezpieczeństwa ONZ oraz jakąkolwiek ingerencję zewnętrzną w sprawy suwerennych państw. Konflikt syryjski, przez rosyjskie władze, jest traktowany jako wydarzenie, które kształtuje nowy ład i porządek międzynarodowy. Ewentualne rozwiązanie problemu Syrii, które byłoby sprzeczne ze stanowiskiem Rosji wiązałoby się z utratą rosyjskich wpływów w tym regionie świata i powodowałoby spadek prestiżu Rosji na arenie międzynarodowej. Rosja postrzega również całość Arabskiej Wiosny jako rewolucję, która mogłaby być zdominowana przez siły ekstremistów, co zresztą budzi pewne obawy również na Zachodzie. Rosjanie obawiają się, że konflikt syryjski mógłby się jeszcze bardziej zradykalizować i rozprzestrzenić na inne państwa regionu. Rosyjska polityka zagraniczna w trakcie wydarzeń z jesieni 2013 r. ewidentnie nie była nastawiona na jakiekolwiek ustępstwa w sprawie ewentualnej interwencji w Syrii.
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Russia Versus the West

84%
EN
Both Russian authorities and Russian society have a sense of harm associated with the position of Russia in the world. They do not agree with the dominant role of the West. To a large extent it is associated with a sense of Russian pride. The consequence of this situation is the growing confrontation between the Russian Federation and the West. Currently, the theatre of confrontation is i.a. the conflict in the east of Ukraine and the war in Syria. The intensification of military tension is also observed, the confirmation of which is the violation of the airspace of NATO members. The author of this article undertook research effort associated with the determination of the fields of confrontation between Russia and the West.
PL
Zarówno rosyjskie władze jak i rosyjskie społeczeństwo mają poczucie krzywdy związane z pozycją Rosji w świecie. Nie godzą się z dominującą rolą Zachodu. W dużej mierze jest to związane z poczuciem rosyjskiej dumy. Konsekwencją tego stanu rzeczy jest wzmagająca się konfrontacja na linii Rosja-Zachód. Obecnie teatr owej konfrontacji to m.in. konflikt na wschodzie Ukrainy oraz wojna w Syrii. Obserwowana jest również intensyfikacja militarnego napięcia, której potwierdzeniem jest naruszanie przestrzeni powietrznej członków NATO. Autorzy niniejszego artykułu podjęli wysiłek badawczy związany z określeniem pól konfrontacji między Rosją i Zachodem.
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84%
EN
The War In Syria has caused massive migration movements to Europe In 2015. European Union Has defined the situation as the threat not as a challenge. Neither European Union, neither Poland have manager to Deal with this challenge. In such a context one needs to post the question: is oland ready for multiculturalism and is it ready to function well in globalized, diverse world of 21st century. The crisis in Syria has also questioned maturity of EU as social community. It appears, that facing Syrian crisis, Europe and Poland especially demonstrated lack of understanding, consciousness and sense of community, with those searching for asylums.
PL
Wojna w Syrii spowodowała w 2015 roku masowe migracje uchodźców do Europy, co zostało potraktowane jako narastający problem, a nie wyzwanie. Polska temu wyzwaniu nie sprostała i nie przyjęła żadnych uchodźców. W tym kontekście warto się zastanowić nad tym, czy Polska w ogóle jest gotowa do funkcjonowania we współczesnym zróżnicowanym świecie. Co można zrobić, by tę gotowość podnieść? Kryzys syryjski zakwestionował także dojrzałość Unii Europejskiej jako wspólnoty społecznej i obnażył fakt, że przyświecająca idei stworzenia Unii motywacja oparta na wspólnocie interesów, jest za słaba dla tworzenia kulturowej jedności1. W dobie kryzysy syryjskiego, okazuje się, że tożsamość europejska jest nadal krucha.
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84%
PL
„Państwo islamskie” to organizacja terrorystyczna, która przez kilka lat okupowała i administrowała rozległym terytorium, zamieszkanym przez kilka milionów ludzi. Było tak, chociaż wolę jej zwalczania wyrażały wszystkie znaczące siły polityczne świata. Przetrwanie w tak niekorzystnych okolicznościach zapewnił „Państwu islamskiemu” bardzo wydajny system ekonomiczny, oparty w największej mierze na rabunku dokonywanym na firmach, instytucjach i ludności podbitych terytoriów, dochodach uzyskiwanych ze sprzedaży surowców (głównie ropy naftowej i gazu ziemnego), handlu ludźmi, a także obiektami zabytkowymi pozyskiwanymi z muzeów i stanowisk archeologicznych. Niewielki udział w budżecie ISIS mają wpłaty od bogatych sponsorów z Kataru i Arabii Saudyjskiej
EN
The "Islamic state" is a terrorist organization that has occupied and administered a vast territory, inhabited by several million people for several years. This was so, though all the major political forces of the world declared the necessity of eliminating it from the international scene. Survival of the “Islamic state” in such unfavorable conditions was possible thanks to the creation of a very efficient economic system, based largely on the robbery of corporations, institutions and populations of conquered territories, income from the sale of raw materials (mainly crude oil and natural gas), human trafficking, as well as the historical objects from museums and archeological sites. A small share of the ISIS budget is donated by wealthy sponsors from Qatar and Saudi Arabia.
PL
Obecna polityka syryjska stanowi swoisty paradoks. Z jednej strony – rządzący reżim basistowski z prezydentem Baszszarem al-Asadem głosi jedność narodową zbudowaną na rzekomym sekularyzmie. Z drugiej strony – ten sam reżim, kierując się swoim interesem, powiększa podziały między poszczególnymi grupami etniczno-religijnymi. Dzisiejsza Syria zdaje się być rozdarta między dwa pozornie wykluczające się zjawiska – sekularyzm i sektarianizm. Aby rozwiązać ten paradoks, autorzy poddali analizie ramowania prezydenckie przemówienia od wybuchu konfliktu w 2011 roku. Udowodnili, iż Al-Asad przeczy faktom, zręcznie konstruując dyskurs desektarianizacyjny przy jednoczesnym pogłębianiu sektarianizmu. W ten sposób prezydent wzmacnia legitymizację swoich rządów, jak również zwiększa szanse na przetrwanie. Syryjski reżim oficjalnie zwalcza sektarianizm, lecz de facto go podsyca. Jest to więc szczególny przypadek desektarianizacji jako sektarianizacji.
EN
Contemporary Syrian politics is a paradox. On the one hand, the ruling Baath regime led by President Bashar al-Assad claims national unity and co-existence based on alleged secularism. On the other hand, the same regime foments existing sectarian strife for its benefit. Today’s Syria seems to be torn between two seemingly opposite realities – secularism and sectarianism. To solve this puzzle, the authors conducted the frame analysis of the presidential speeches since the eruption of conflict in 2011. They have proved that Assad has denied the facts, skilfully constructing desectarianisation discourse, while deepening the sectarian divisions. By doing so, he increases the legitimisation of his rule as well as chances for survival. The Syrian regime has entrenched the sectarian practices which it theoretically stands against. It is a unique case of de-sectarianisation as sectarianisation.
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