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1

FACTORS OF TAX EVASION: THE CASE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC

100%
Josková K., Finardi S., Arltová M.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
|
2023
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vol. 71
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issue 10
596 – 617
EN
The main goal of this paper is to estimate factors of tax evasion in the Czech Republic. Among other things, tax evasion reduces state revenues which fact leads to a decrease in the quantity and quality of publicly provided goods and services. Therefore it is necessary to ensure that taxpayers comply with their tax obligations. Firstly, we use the monetary method (cash/deposit ratio) to estimate the size of tax evasion in absolute and relative terms. According to our estimates, the extent of tax evasion in the Czech Republic was almost 3.6 percent of GDP in 2021. Secondly, we use multi-variate time series co-integration analysis models to analyse the economic, tax, and institutional determinants of tax evasion in the Czech Republic. The factors negatively associated with tax evasion include tax overpayments, VAT revenue, and implementation of tax measures introduced in 2020. The positive impact has GDP, PIT revenue, CIT revenue, inflation, monetary freedom, Gross National Savings, trade freedom, PIT rate, unemployment, and average wage.
2

WHAT ARE EFFECTIVE MEASURES AGAINST VAT EVASION? EVIDENCE FROM THE CZECH REPUBLIC

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Artlová M., Pavel J., Tepperová J., Zídková H.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
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2020
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vol. 68
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issue 2
147 – 167
EN
VAT is one of the most important tax revenues of the European states, yet it suffers from excessive tax evasion. Carousel frauds that abuse the current VAT treatment of cross-border supplies of goods in the EU represent the most serious type of VAT evasion. Almost all EU Member States have implemented anti-fraud measures. This paper discusses the effectiveness of such measures as introduced in the Czech Republic. The analysis of quarterly time series of VAT revenues from 1999 to 2016 showed that from all the anti-fraud measures, tightening of the rules for unreliable payers introduced at the beginning of 2013 proves in our models to be the most robust. A significant, positive effect has also been identified for the adoption of the reverse charge mechanism on scrap and emission allowances, as well as for the implementation of the VAT control statement. On the other hand, our analysis did not confirm that the so-called protective orders do increase VAT revenues. The total annual increase in tax collected as a result of implementing the above-mentioned measures was according to the model around CZK 51 billion by the end of 2015. This is 14.5% of the total annual VAT revenues.
3

THE EFFECT OF TAX RATES AND CORRUPTION ON TAX RECEIPTS. A COMPARISON OF THE OECD COUNTRIES, 2000-2004 (Az adoratak es a korrupcio hatasa az adobevetelekre. Az OECD-orszagok osszehasonlitasa, 2000-2004)

100%
Laczko M.
Kozgazdasagi Szemle (Economic Review)
|
2009
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vol. 56
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issue 6
526-545
EN
The study examines the combined effect of tax rates (with special attention to tax rates on work) and level of corruption on the GDP-proportionate tax receipts of 27 OECD countries, based on annual data for 2000-2004. A graphic representation of the combined interaction of the tax wedge and the level of corruption produces a Laffer-type curve. The article shows that this relation is the resultant of several distinguishable effects: one is the direct effect in a positive direction of the tax rates, another the effect in a negative direction of the level of corruption, and a third the effect in a negative direction on tax receipts of the interaction between tax rates and high corruption. The last expresses that the marginal effect of the tax wedge depends on the level of corruption. The relations derived are valid in the long term. The article also includes calculations of the possible shortfall of tax receipts in the examined countries that can be attributed to corruption and to the combined effect of high corruption and tax rate. The relative values of the resulting tax-receipt shortfalls can also provide information for a league-table of countries according to the size of their black economy. In terms of these indicators, Hungary is among the leading OECD countries.
4

WHAT CAUSES THE VAT GAP?

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Zídková H., Pavel J.
Ekonomický časopis (Journal of Economics)
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2016
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vol. 64
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issue 9
811 – 826
EN
This paper is focused on the possible factors influencing the value added tax (VAT) gap. The VAT gap is an estimate of unpaid VAT in the economy calculated as the difference between the theoretical VAT liability and VAT actually paid into the state budget. It is often expressed in relative terms as a percentage of unpaid VAT from the theoretical VAT that would be collected if all taxpayers report and pay VAT in full. The high value of this indicator may imply problems with tax evasion and inefficiency within the tax system. The article summarises the existing studies quantifying the VAT gap and seeking to identify the relationship between the VAT gap or VAT revenues and various economic, tax and social factors present in individual countries. The panel regression and pooled regression models were used in this paper to identify the statistically significant variables that have an impact on the VAT gap. From 21 variables, only four factors proved to be statistically significant. The analysis revealed that the increase in the ratio of VAT revenues to GDP causes a reduction in the VAT gap. Further findings were that if the standard VAT rate and the difference between the standard and reduced VAT rate are increasing, the VAT gap grows. Finally, the control variable – share of household consumption in GDP is increasing the VAT gap.
5
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THE INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYER UTILITY FUNCTION WITH TAX OPTIMIZATION AND FISCAL FRAUD ENVIRONMENT (Funkcja indywidualnej uzytecznosci podatnika z uwzglednieniem optymalizacji i oszustw podatkowych)

100%
Pankiewicz P.
Finansowy Kwartalnik Internetowy e-Finanse
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2011
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vol. 7
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issue 3
52-58
EN
In this paper I examine a taxpayer utility function determined by the extended set of variables - i.e. consumption, labor and tax-evasion propensity. This constitutes the main framework for the analysis of taxpayer's decision making process under assumption that in the economy there exist two main reduction methods: a) access to tax optimization techniques, which may decrease effective tax burden and are fully compliant with binding laws, but generate transactional costs and 2) possibility of fiscal fraud - in particular tax evasion, as the alternative method of reducing tax due, which has no direct transactional costs, but involves tax litigation risk.
6

DILEMMAS OF ENTERPRISES LEAVING THE HIDDEN ECONOMY. CASE STUDY. MESSENGER SERVICE PROVIDERS IN BUDAPEST, 2006-2008 (A rejtett gazdasagbol valo kilepes dilemmai. Esettanulmany. Budapesti futarszolgalatok 2006-2008)

88%
Fazekas M.
Szociologiai Szemle (Sociological Review)
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2009
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vol. 19
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issue 4
87-108
EN
Some of the enterprises providing messenger services in Budapest radically decreased their involvement in the hidden economy in the summer 2006, which provides a unique opportunity to study the combined effect of two specific government measures: increasing the expected costs of hidden economic activities and tax amnesty. Furthermore, it could be explored how the two initiatives interact with the crucial variables defining involvement in hidden economy, and which additional impacts for the whole market emanate from the legalization of a small number of market players. Through interviews with CEOs of major companies on the market and a few of their employees, the study focuses on the following: from which motivations, according to what conditions and based on which strategies did the enterprises change their tax paying behavior? Furthermore, the success and downsides of such strategies were also examined. According to the results, the key ingredients for changing the involvement in the hidden economy are: the moral costs of the CEO stemming from illegal taxpaying practices (tax morale) and the subjective appraisal of costs and benefits of operating in the hidden economy. Nevertheless, these factors can only lead to alterations in the degree of tax evasion if the financial situation, market position of the enterprise, and its relation towards customers and employees can provide a solid basis for covering the additional costs of fulfilling all legal obligations. These factors, in turn, determine the slices of the extra costs each involved actor has to bear. The main findings suggest, firstly, that governments can successfully fight hidden economy by decreasing the administrative burden of enterprises, clear communication of regulatory intentions, and lowering the expected net benefits of involvement in the grey economy. Secondly, improving the public opinion on government and tax morale both motivate economic actors to reveal their hidden economic activity. Lastly, tax amnesties entail relatively low long-run costs in an economic environment where tax compliance is not the prevalent norm. However, these factors can only lead to a permanently lower proportion of hidden economy if they are able to motivate a sufficiently high proportion of economic actors of a given market to leave the hidden economy.
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