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Coleman versus Collins: Dva odlišné přístupy k teorii jednání v americké sociologii

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Subrt J.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2007
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vol. 16/29
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issue 2
61-76
EN
The article confronts James Coleman's and Randall Collins's approaches towards action theory: reviews both their similarities (based on the importance of micro-sociological perspective for understanding social macro-level) and differences (their attitude towards the assumed rational nature of human action). Coleman supports the homo oeconomicus thesis and understands actors as beings, which make rational decisions and direct their actions on the basis of costs and gains calculations. Collins, on the other hand, emphasizes the extra-rational factors of emotions and routine. By putting up these approaches against each other two ideal type constructions arise, which are particular intellectual modes yet cannot comprehend social reality in its full complexity.
2
Content available remote

Jak nepočítat jednání: agency in medias res, morálně uzavřený svět a teorie jednání

100%
Hajek M.
Teorie vědy (Theory of Science)
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2007
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vol. 16/29
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issue 2
77-91
EN
The text is inspired by the article of Steve Fuller named Making Agency Count (Fuller 1994) where Fuller introduced the concept of agency in medias res in order to treat agency as a kind of social 'scarce good'. The author's aim is to show that while Fuller claim seems plausible in the light of the agency negotiation in the legal determination of patents, the fetal medicine or the fetal tissue research, there are nevertheless several problems in its implications. First, if we consider moral action as an example of agency, an altruistic actor, in order to not consume much from the stock of available agency, would resign from a moral action, or, in extreme case, would act immorally to provide more space for moral action. Second, agency is always connected to multiple meanings therefore what is considered as agency by one actor, could be considered as non-agency by another one. Agency can be multiplied by diversification of attributed meanings, what is not the case of economic goods. In concluding the article he makes a hypothesis that there is an interesting kind of agency (quasi-agency), which is produced by a social protection. Children, animals, fetuses are claimed to be actors but, in fact, this action magnify temporarily mainly the agency of claimants than those objects of protection.
3

POZNÁMKY K HABERMASOVÝM VÝCHODISKÁM KOMUNIKAČNEJ TEÓRIE KONANIA

88%
Sedová T.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2012
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vol. 67
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issue 9
743 – 750
EN
The paper deals with J. Habermas’ communication theory which is a synthesis of the Anglo-Saxon linguistic philosophy (Austin, Searle, Grice) and the continental philosophical tradition (Weber, Kohlberg, Apel). The stress is put on the re-articulation of Weberian motifs (rationality, rationalization) and the so called validity claim of the intelligibility of speech, truth, correctness and authenticity.
4

CONFLICTING ASPECTS OF HUGH McCANN’S THEORY OF ACTION

88%
Cicic D.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2011
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vol. 66
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issue 9
918 – 927
EN
The paper focuses on two aspects of Hugh McCann’s theory of action and shows that they stand in conflict. The first of them is McCann’s defense of the claim that all overt actions are grounded in special kinds of mental action – volitions (from the Gilbert Ryle’s famous ‘dilemma’ argument). The second aspect is his answer to the problem of causal deviance. The paper shows that the same element that makes his theory immune to Ryle’s argument limits its strength in dealing with the problem of causal deviance. In conclusion it appears that the only version of volitionism that can be defended is its understanding which restricts the scope of human action to mental activity.
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