The authoress describes the practical reality of counselling in relation to educational counselling. The analysis of this reality constitutes the source of the proposed changes. The authoress believes that counselling under school's jurisdiction (the educational counselling) is not being reformed in accordance with social requirements and development of science. Excessive formalism, schematism of structural-functional activities dominated by diagnosis cause the collapse of institutional counselling's authority, where the main goal of counsellors' activity becomes to create expert opinions whenever schools need them. The specific character of the counsellor's work with a child introduces certain restrictions on applying general solutions in the area of counselling, yet it does not exempt us from searching for and implementing new forms and ways of assistance directed at a child and his or her family. The necessity of a change poses a challenge for educational counselling, in which advice-giving and diagnostic labelling performed for the sake of creating expert opinions should be replaced with actions that are supportive, therapeutic and, most importantly, take into account needs of counselees, not the school's expectations.
The paper argues against the interpretations of Wittgenstein’s philosophy by Conant, Diamond, and Crary presented in The New Wittgenstein. Such interpretations are based on the concept of mere (or plain) nonsense and try out a strategy of translating Wittgenstein’s work into the idiom of therapeutic philosophy. In my argumentation, I show that it is impossible to effectively interpret Tractatus in the way proposed by Conant, Diamond and Crary. This fact has consequences for the concept of mere nonsense. If Tractatus is mere nonsense and means nothing, it is impossible to use the Tractatus method to identify logical object like problem or philosophical problem and finally identify mere nonsense. If philosophy as a therapy is to cure philosophical problems, then we must have a criterion that allows us to identify such problems as philosophical problems and, consequently, the entire therapy as a philosophical therapy. The concept of mere nonsense does not provide such a criterion. Without such a criterion, the therapy proposed by mentioned authors is a therapy with the use of any tool directed against anything. If we reduce understanding of the author’s understanding only and not of his work, there is no reason why this activity should be described as philosophical. My argumentation shows that the consequences of the methodology derived from The New Wittgenstein’s basic postulates, will be always confusing and will usually lead to contradictions, arbitrariness, or lack of connection with interpreted text.
The purpose of this study was to analyze the correlation between an alcoholic’s quality of life and the results of therapy which were defined as the ability to maintain abstinence for one year. The Life Satisfaction Questionnaire FLZ by Fahrenberg and others, and the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) by Watson and others were applied in this study. The study was conducted at the beginning and end of therapy, one year after subjects started maintaining abstinence, with one group (n = 64) sustaining their abstinence and the second group (n = 81) relapsing into drinking. Results indicate that at the beginning of treatment the group`s levels of life satisfaction and affect did not differ. When therapy ended, people maintaining abstinence were characterized by higher levels of overall satisfaction with life and satisfaction with health, leisure, and friends. Throughout the treatment, patients who remained abstinent experienced significant increases in several dimensions of life satisfaction, overall satisfaction, and positive affects. These were not observed among patients who relapsed into drinking.
The main aim of this study is to point out the specific relationship between Alcibiades and Socratesʼ educational art in Platoʼs dialogues (especially Alcibiades I. and Symposium) and in Aeschinesʼ fragments. The contribution postulates the hypothesis that an essential precondition for Socratesʼ education to the virtue (to the aretê) is an erotic reciprocity, which manifests itself through the sight (opsis) from the eyes to the eyes of erastês and erômenos. For this reason, we are trying to answer the question: How is Socrates the philosopher educated by arrogant Alcibiades?
Following paper offers a new interpretation of the fragments from Aeschinesʼ dialogue Telauges. The introduction briefly evaluates the literary sources of Aeschinesʼ fragments and problems related to their authorship and authenticity. In the first part we scrutinize ancient testimonies about general philosophical and rhetorical features of Aeschinesʼ dialogues. In the next parts we interpret all extant fragments from the dialogue Telauges and identify its putative Pythagorean background. We propose that the main theme of the dialogue was the question of the care of the self, articulated on the background of philosopherʼs material welfare and philanthropy. We conclude that Telauges probably reflected the consequences that chanced upon the first generation of Socratics immediately after Socratesʼ trial and that Aeschinesʼ Socratica stands in the middle between Platonism and Cynicism.
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