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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 6
493 – 501
EN
The problem of tolerance in Thomas Aquinas is approached in the article as rooted in the virtue of patience. A patience (patientia) as conceived in Christianity is related to hope and preceded by belief. According to Aquinas, this interconnection of patience and hope enables humans conducted by loving their neighbours to tolerate, in certain situations, the evils inflicted by the others. A particular act of patience depends on the practical wisdom (prudentia) which involves setting oneself the right objective and considering the conditions of the deed in question. However, according to Aquinas there is no possibility to choose intolerance against the virtue of patience if one follows the correct reason. Therefore, even an explicitly non-religious person is capable of tolerance, if his or her choice is in accordance with the gift of natural reason.
EN
Avicebron deserves the appelation 'a giant of circumstances in existential metaphysics' because he neither proposed to hold a distinction between essence and existence, nor did he try to abolish it. In this sense his teaching was impoprtant but adventitious for the history of some philosophical ideas. Avicebron made an important contribution to the creation of a new theory. His original and controversial thought was frequently discussed by Franciscan theologians of Paris and seemed to be of interest to Thomas Aquinas. The inventive aspect of his thought consisted in the proposal to challenge the idea that potentiality is indistibnguishable from matter, or, in more concrete terms, that potentiality was to be identified with bodies. Avicebron put forward that potentiality can also reside in angels and in rational spirits. However, this assumption in turn led him, along with a number of his followers, to the belief that there existed various kinds of non-corporeal matter. This specific assertion drew attention of Thomas Aquinas who observed that the concept of potentiality is wider than the concept of matter, and, consequently, some form of potentiality may have nothing to do with matter at all. Furthermore this proposal was complemented in Aquinas with two theses - first, that, as can be found in Avicenna, existence is different from essense, and secondly, that, as had been upheld by Aristotle, actuality is different from potentiality. By combining these three beliefs Thomas Aquinas could formulate a thought which proved fundamental for the entire Christian philosophy that God as the essence of being by possessing full being wheras other things exist only by participation in him. In this way Avicebron helped in the formulation of the most important metaphysical thesis of Thomas Aquinas.
EN
Following the lead of Thomas Aquinas and taking phenomenological analyses as his starting point the author undertakes to analyze conscience as a specific form of cognition, a source of knowledge about something. He contends that conscience is an axiological awareness that one's own or somebody else's action is recognized and placed within his/her own internal cognitive horizon. This recognition consists in making use of the first norm of action (synderesis) and by observing other principles of moral knowledge that are honored by the conscionable man for whatever reasons. Recognition of an action by conscience proceeds only vaguely when the subject initially realizes no more than he/she or somebody else has done something. Subsequently the character of the action becomes clearer when the 'beam of intention' attaches to it. In this phase the action is identified as either good or bad, and it elicits a response from the evaluating subject. Thus conscience assesses an action adequately if the action is honestly recognized in its complete structure, if it is placed in the horizon of unabridged moral knowledge of the evaluating subject who holds this knowledge as valid and retains it enduringly.
EN
The article presents five transcendental attributes of real existence of being: distinction (aliquid), reality (res), unity (unum), truth (verum) and the good (bonum). These attributes serve as a platform on which first principles of cognition can be rested that underlie the essential claims of metaphysics. These principles can be enumerated as non-contradiction, identity, essentiality and sufficient reason. Whenever any one of them was recognized as a first principle, it began to strongly influence the philosophical construction that was built upon it and shaped its relation to the real world. In the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas a similar role was assigned to transcendental attributes which referred to God and and his relation to the created world. God was the cause of existence of being (causa efficiens), the cause of individuation (causa exemplaris) and the cause determining the purpose of being (causa finalis).
Filo-Sofija
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2012
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vol. 12
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issue 3(18)
103-124
EN
In spite of the apparent opposition to Plato, Aristotle accepted a lot from the thought of his master. The intuition, which plays the key role in the system of Plato, was understood by Aristotle in terms of how we grasp the middle term of syllogism. It is not, therefore, the intuition of being, but the reasoning, departing from the experience (nature’s “intention”), which is the way of the cognition of the ultimate. The teleology of being, which Plato was so keen on finding, was found by Aristotle in the physical world as a counterpart of motion. Alas, Aristotle lost sight of what is most valuable in Plato: the sense of being that transgresses the categories. According to Thomas, being is what is the most perfect in things; so, consequently, what is the proper effect of the Ultimate Cause, and what is Its primary aim. It is better to be, i.e. to exist. Each thing craves for being. Being, however, is, in the Dionysius’ sense, a problem; it might guide us to God, but veil Him before us as well. It is a perfection, but not the Perfection itself, Plato was right at this point.
EN
The entire cognition of the human being is based on the concept of being (ens). Being is grasped by the intellect as its first concept. Every subsequent cognition consists of a development of what have been implicitly given in the concept of being. The article aims at explaining the basic structure of thinking; how exactly the concepts are divided. According to Aquinas, being non¬ being are grasped by the intellect as its first concepts; because of them the intellect is able to grasp the meaning of division and the concept of the One (unum) as the negation of the division. The concept of the One is a condition for understanding the multitude; an understanding of the multitude is a necessary condition for comprehension of the being as a thing – as something. The clue for understanding the entire cognitive process is obviously the concept of non¬ being and as such is being treated in the article.
EN
The definition of the truth as:'veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus' is not only a description of the truthfulness but it also defines a certain order ('ordo') of acquiring or contemplating truth. The novelty of Thomas's interpretation is largely to be found in the fact that he unwaveringly views truth in a metaphysical perspective, as a relation of things to some sort of intellect. The relation is epitomized in juxtaposing 'res' and 'intellectus'. By establishing this connection in general terms, he could encompass a broad range of learning or perceiving subject, from a human intellect to God's mind. At the same time, he took a stand in a lively discussion on the nature of truth, which developed in the 13th century, and chose a positon which was comparable to Aristotle's rather than Augustine's, Avicenna's or Anselm's.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2024
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vol. 79
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issue 3
319 – 333
EN
My aim in this paper is to investigate what enables human flourishing from a Thomistic perspective by considering Aquinas’ natural inclinations. I will argue that human beings flourish in different ways, depending on their practices. However, not every practice contributes to human flourishing, but only those that are consistent with human nature, which agents grasp through their natural inclinations. To support this argument, I will critically analyse MacIntyre’s account, referring mainly to his latest work (2016). MacIntyre has the merit of highlighting the role of practices in human flourishing by considering the narrative dimension in the agents’ lives, but he fails to recognize the properly metaphysical framework of human nature, that would be provided by the proper consideration of natural inclinations.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2007
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vol. 62
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issue 3
203-222
EN
The analysis of the text of St. Thomas Aquinas shows, that he was influenced by the Aristotelian notion of succession of the souls. It means that the human embryo is infused at the moment of conception, first with vegetative soul, then with the sensitive souls, and finally with a rational soul. When Aquinas' metaphysical views are considered in accordance with the contemporary biology, the theory of simultaneous animation, i.e. the infusion of the soul by God at the moment of conception, seems to be the best justified theory. Aquinas' description of a woman as mas occasionatus was also influenced by Aristotle's biology: the women are generated as men not in respect of particular nature, but only in respect of the universal nature. That is why, in comparison with men, Aquinas attributes a lower dignity to the women. Such an evaluation of women was not based on the metaphysical principles used for the explanation of the human beings, but it was the result of the influence of Aristotelian biology. When one uses the contemporary biological data in accordance with Aquinas' fundamental metaphysical principles, gender equality in human nature between men and women is convincingly justifiable.
EN
Is human freedom only an illusion and we are determined by all kinds of facts that exclude our freedom? According to some thinkers, the results of Benjamin Libet’s experiments seem to prove this. More effectively than any arguments of science, the existence of free human actions can be questioned by philosophical theses, above all by various doctrines of determinism. In an interdisciplinary dialogue, we will try to answer some postulates of the natural and human sciences with the arguments of Thomas Aquinas, according to which human will is ordered to the general good, which is what determines it. However, every particular good is limited and not good from some point of view. That is why our choice of a specific good is not determined. Reason frees our will from the necessity of always following some individual good, and keeps it open to the complete and universal good.
EN
The text focuses on a comparison of the concept of prudence from the points of view of Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham, detailing four various insights into the core of prudence. The first concerns the position of the virtue of prudence within the framework of ethics; the second deals with the role of will and the intellect in regard to virtue; the third describes the principles of prudence; and the fourth is dedicated to relations between an exterior and interior act of virtue. On the basis of the comparison, we discover that the understanding of prudence has changed radically along with the transformation of the relations among reason, will and natural inclinations. While prudence, according to Aquinas, illuminates us the ways to properly pursue the good of our natural inclinations, Ockham does not associate prudence and virtue with the idea of inclination at all. This change also had an impact on the perception of an exterior act of virtue. An interior act is crucial for both authors, but while Aquinas sees an exterior act as the apex of prudence, Ockham is not convinced about the importance of reaching it. In the case of Ockham’s ethical theory, there is a distinct shift from the ethics of virtue towards the incoming modern formalism and individualism.
XX
The paper deals with Thomas Aquinas’s (1225–1274) theory of predication. Aquinas’s numerous works contain passages devoted to the issue of how predication works, usually in various theological or philosophical contexts. Assuming Aquinas’s account of predication was sufficiently uniform in relation to essential and accidental predications, there are several distinct interpretative models of predication possible in relation to the texts. They differ in ascribing different semantic roles to the copula. The first model sees the copula as expressing inherence of a form expressed by the predicate term in the entity denoted by the subject term. The second model interprets the copula as designating identity. The third model incorporates inherence with the fact that Aquinas combines predicative and existential functions of the copula. I argue that the identity model is closest to what Aquinas has in mind when speaking about predication as opposed to extensional truth conditions.
13
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Hodnocení suicidality v biblicko-křesťanské tradici

88%
Studia theologica
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2008
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vol. 10
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issue 2
1-14
EN
The paper reflects the classification of suicide in the context of the biblical-Christian tradition. It shows that the ultimate condemnation of suicide does not occur in the Bible. It presents the condemnation/denunciation of suicide by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Finally it deals with ecclesiastic-Christian praxis towards suicide, where taboo and pre-Christian elements are quoted. But recently there has been an evident tendency to a more differentiated and humane attitude towards the classification of suicide or more precisely those who commit it and their environment.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2014
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vol. 69
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issue 9
765 – 776
EN
Thomas Aquinas advocates a noticeably anti-dualistic anthropological position, which forces him to explain human beings as metaphysically complex beings. This would be impossible on the physical level alone. However, the problem of the essence of material forms is still elaborated insufficiently. As to my knowledge, there are still two questions, which have not been properly answered: (a) How should be the matter in the essence of particular beings comprehended; b) how it is possible to combine the existence of an indivisible soul with its being the very basis of intellect and the form of the body. The paper unveils Aquinas’s differentiated approach to these questions in order to suggest a new interpretation of the essence of material beings. Rendered in a wider context of Thomas’s psychology, it would comply with following requirements: a) historical-philosophical coherence, by which we mean primarily a meaningful categorization of the elaborated concept into the historical philosophical framework; b) metaphysical coherence and c) philosophical-psychological coherence.
EN
The article analyses the problem of exceptional situations which induce a conflict between major moral interdictions, on the one hand, and a responsibility concerning circumstances, on the other hand. Three main strategies that resolve this conflict are: 1) reclassification of action, 2) taking into account circumstances of action that permit to violate ethical norms, 3) making distinction between an active action and an action of nonintervention. Having evaluated this strategies, the author proposes and argues for an alternative solution based on the scholastic doctrine of double effect which makes distinction between the direct result of action which the agent strives for and the indirect result which is provoked but not aimed by the agent.
EN
Thomas Aquinas undertook to examine various definitions of truth in 'Quaestiones disputate', 'De veritate', q.1, a.1; 'Scriptum super I Librum Sententiarum', dist.19, q.5, a.1; 'Summa theologiae', I, q.16, a. 1,2. In these writings Thomas relied on four formulations of truth that were used in his time, namely (i) a definition by Isaac Israeli in 'Liber de definitionibus', par.26, and the formula of the principle of the excluded middle found in Aristotle's 'Metaphysics', IV, 7; (ii) a definition by Avicenna in 'Metaphysics', I, 8; (iii) a definition given by Saint Anselm in his 'De veritate', 11; and (iv) a definition proposed by Saint Augustine in 'Soliloquia', II, 5. After analyzing and comparing them all, the Angelic Doctor adopted the well known definition: 'veritas est aqaequatio rei et intellectus'. It is interesting to note that before this formula won common acceptance, no single definition of truth had been universally recognized either in philosophy or theology. Moreover, as some pronouncements of Albert the Great indicate, it had not been common to assume that truth consists in the agreement between an intellectual judgment of a state of affairs and the state of affairs itself. Consequently, it seems right to claim that the classical concept of truth can be traced as far back as Thomas Aquinas.
17
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Aposteriorní modální důkazy Boží existence

88%
Studia theologica
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2006
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vol. 8
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issue 2
91-97
EN
The article is an analysis of the logic of a posteriori modal proofs of the divine existence. A certain general principle of modal proofs is being identified: namely, the inference to some stronger modal ontological status (of the divine being) either seen to ground a weaker modal-existential status or to be incompatible with it. The aforementioned stronger status guarantees the actual existence of such a divine being. The Third Way of St. Thomas Aquinas is used as a departure point for such a general analysis. The general principle of inference is then applied to other proofs; namely, the one found in the works of J. D. Scotus.
EN
An interpretation which Thomas Aquinas has offered as a solution of the problem of 'cognitive apprehesions' (conceptiones) of the human intellect bears clear marks of an Epicurean-Stoic understanding of 'prolepseis' and 'ennoiai' insofar as it underscores a specific innate character of 'conceptiones communes' and 'conceptiones universales' as evidenced by their anticipatory function. Some conceptiones are what we call today propositions, very much like Augustine's 'notiones' or Epicurean-Stoic 'prolepseis', or 'katalepseis'. Such concepts cannot be found in Aristotle who, moreover, did not have terms with which he could identify 'cognitive apprehesions'. He discusses concepts as a separate topic in the context of the origin and nature of the universals (katholou), and regards propositions which are not distinguished from sentences (logos) as either affirmations (kataphasis) or negations (apophasis). Aquinas took over from Aristotle the idea that all human knowledge originates in the experience of being, and from Stoics and Epicureans the conception of the anticipatory nature of human cognitive concepts. He merged these two traditions with the help of Augustinian conception of illumination, a theory of 'conceptiones universales' and a theory of transcendental concepts and first principles which he called 'conceptiones communes'.
19
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Svědomí jakožto kritérium správného jednání

75%
Studia theologica
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2006
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vol. 8
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issue 4
55-65
EN
St. Thomas Aquinas' definition of the conscience is well known. Nevertheless, from one point of view it is surprising. According to him, it is the same human reason which (designated as practical reason) can consider one and the same thing as being good and (designated as conscience) bad at the same time. To understand his conception of the conscience, it is necessary to look into the historical background. St. Thomas developed his conception of conscience explicitly in relationship with the Augustinian tradition of higher and lower reason, with Aristotle's explication of an incontinent man and with the contemporary discussion on synderesis; and he connected it implicitly with the problem of 'two wills' from the Augustinian tradition and with the question of man's possibilities to act rightly. The article aims to explain the content of Aquinas' conception of the conscience on the basis of its historical background.
20
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Problém vedeckosti teológie u Jána Dunsa Scota

75%
Studia theologica
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2007
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vol. 9
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issue 1
68-80
EN
In the light of Aristotle's criteria for scientific knowledge, Duns Scotus maintains theology is not a science, but a specific and independent (autonomous) type of knowledge that is neither subordinated to any other type of knowledge, nor makes any other type of knowledge subordinated to itself. At the same time, Scotus modifies Aristotle's understanding of science: certainty and evidence are not based upon the necessity of a subject, but rather upon the perfection of knowing mind. Even though 'our theology' is not a science, it has more dignity compared to other sciences, since it offers 'more', i.e. it offers knowledge aiming at making man more perfect. At the same time, it demonstrates the fact that the goal of man is not theory, but rather practice in the sense of love.
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