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SMRŤ ČLOVEKA Z AXIOLOGICKEJ PERSPEKTÍVY. MYŠLIENKOVÉ EXPERIMENTY

100%
Čáp J.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
|
2015
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vol. 70
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issue 2
94 – 106
EN
The analysis draws on Nagel´s deprivation theory and Feldman´s theory of possible worlds. These are supplemented with a specific context of feeling happy or suffering in the face of death as well as various forms of believing in life after death. Six logically possible answers have been tested via thought experiments which showed that the question of whether death means good, evil or is indifferent to a man cannot be in general answered from the first person perspective. The answer always depends on the particular context, i. e. on the man’s beliefs and hopes. Thus the article offers one possible axiological perspective from which death can be viewed in the context of dying with dignity, committing suicide or carrying out euthanasia.
2

HOW TO RECONSTRUCT A THOUGHT EXPERIMENT

75%
Picha M.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
|
2011
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vol. 18
|
issue 2
154-188
EN
The paper is a contribution to the debate on the epistemic-logical status of the thought experiments. The author deals with the epistemological uniqueness of experiments in the sense of their irreducibility to other sources of justification. In particular, he criticizes an influential argument for the irreducibility of thought experiments to general arguments. First, he introduces the radical empiricist theory of eliminativism, which considers thought experiments to be rhetorically modified arguments, uninteresting from the epistemological point of view. Second, the author presents objections to the theory, focusing on the critique of eliminativism by Tamar Szabo Gendler based on the reconstruction of Galileo's famous Pisa experiment. He shows that her reconstruction is simplistic and that a more elaborate reconstruction is needed for an appropriate assessment of the epistemic power of general argument. He proposes such a reconstruction and demonstrates that the general version of the Pisa experiment is epistemically equal to the particular one. Thus, from an epistemological perspective, Galileo's thought experiment is reducible to a straightforward argument without particular premises.
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