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Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2006
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vol. 61
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issue 9
743-751
EN
The paper is an attempt to shed a light upon the Ludwig Wittgenstein's philosophical development from its early to its late periods. In the author's view the Wittgenstein's philosophy can relatively sharply be divided into two periods with 1930 as a boundary line. He picks out some main events occurring around this line, which can be seen as the milestones on Wittgensteins' road from 'Tractatus' to his new philosophy. This philosophy stands in many points in the opposition to his Tractarian philosophical opinions and principles. Nevertheless, there are many points concerning his view of the role of the philosophy, which these two periods have in common. This enables us to understand Wittgenstein's philosophical conversion much better - the change is more visible against an unchanging background.
EN
This paper surveys a new approach to interpretation of Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus – the resolute reading. The proponents of the resolute interpretation (especially Cora Diamond and James F. Conant) have argued that the central point of Tractatus is § 6.54. The reading of the section should be resolute, which means that the sentences in Tractatus are simply nonsense. Thus the Tractatus’ aim is not a theory or doctrine of aspects of reality, language or their relation. On the other hand, the main point of the text should be elucidation of the reader’s points. The paper analyses two assumptions in the resolute reading and submits criticism of them. The basis of the criticism is to verify the validity of resolute reading’s assumptions by reference to Notebooks, Prototractatus, correspondence and some manuscripts and typescripts from the Tractatus period in Wittgenstein’s thinking.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2021
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vol. 76
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issue 7
531 – 541
EN
In 1919, when his Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus), was finished but still unpublished, Wittgenstein sent the manuscript to Frege, and, as a consequence of that, they exchanged several fairly polemic letters in 1919 – 1920. Only Frege’s letters were preserved. The letters are highly compressed in content, and offer an interesting insight in how, mostly critically, one of the authors of whom Wittgenstein held highest esteem, thought about the content, style, and organisation of the manuscript. At the same time, we can get some impression from Frege’s letters how Wittgenstein reacted to his initial letter addressing the Tractatus, and how the subsequent exchange went. In this paper, I offer several observations concerning their exchange, and I compare it to the parallel exchange on the same matter between Wittgenstein and Russell.
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