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EN
It is usually assumed that what Kant called the Copernican Revolution in philosophy marks his most important achievement and constitites the essence of his transcendental turn. The author shows, however, that not only had Kant several predecessors in his highlighting the role of the cognising subject but also that the new epistemic perspective that endows the subject with the power to gain objectively valid knowledge was already present in Kant's precritical writings, which means that the idea did not belong specifically to his transcendental philosophy. These observations lead the author to believe that the more important achievement than the Copernican Revolution was the proposal of the synthetic unity of apperception. It was more important, as the subject in Kant's philosophy is an entity that produces a uniform picture of the world while remaing itself completely invisible and unaccountable for its contribution. The elusive manner of its operation and the consistent, uniform and interpersonally compatible effect of its work are more characteristic of Kant's transcendental philosophy than the claim that the active role of the subject guarantees epistemic validity of its findings.
EN
The paper discusses some problems concerning transcendental arguments. The author reconstructs the main aspects of transcendental arguments, their functions (as anti-skeptical strategies) and their structure. What is crucial in this respect is that transcendental arguments are not modus ponens reasoning but synthetic a priori statements and forms of 'situated thought'. In this sense there is a connection between the idea of 'situated thought' and some of Husserl's conceptions from the 'Logical Investigations'. The author discusses also this problem in reference to Searle's transcendental defense of external realism.
Filo-Sofija
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2009
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vol. 9
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issue 9
83-98
EN
The concept of intellectual intuition was one of main objects of Kant’s critique of classic metaphysics (represented by such philosophers as Christian Wolff or Alexander Gotllieb Baumgarten). After being denied by Critique of pure reason, the concept of intellectual intuition comes back in the philosophy of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (and other German idealists), who builds the whole conception of the science of knowledge on it. Is Fichte’s understanding of intellectual intuition the same as Kant’s? And if not, can we assume that Fichte’s science can be regarded as fully compatible with Kant’s transcendental philosophy?
EN
The philosophical turn towards the subject made by Descartes initiated a large and multi-branch current of the philosophy of the subject. The followers of Descartes' method described their projects from the perspective of a reflective paradigm of philosophizing. The research into human reflectiveness and the phenomenon of self-cognition from the critical perspective of transcendentalism led Jacob F. Fries to present his philosophy in a new way of argumentation, which is described in the author's essay.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2013
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vol. 68
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issue 9
779 – 789
EN
In the paper the anticipation of the transcendental function of art and artistic production in the phenomenological system of Edmund Husserl is under scrutiny. Despite the strong links between art and Husserl’s phenomenology, explicitly Husserl himself never considered art as having philosophical significance for his system. Thus I start by describing the way in which the “principle of art” closes up another transcendental system – that of Immanuel Kant. Then the author proceeds to show the close parallels between Kant’s reasoning in transcendental deduction and Husserl’s genetic analyses. He continues by analysing the possible reasons why Husserl has not applied the “principle of art” in the way Kant did and then he looks for possible places of application of this principle in Husserl’s phenomenology. Finally the author shows how Husserl actually prepared the ground for such application for the further generation of phenomenologists.
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