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EN
The article considers the evolution of the basic epistemological mechanism of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, the (phenomenological) reduction, in its main variants (the Cartesian way, the way through intentional psychology, the way through ontology). These are further radicalized into the primordial reduction and the reduction to the living present. An analysis of the key assumptions and results of Husserl’s reduction makes it possible to conclude that the most radical, far-reaching version of the reduction (to the living present) may exhaust the philosophical potential of intentional phenomenology. What is left in the area of transcendental philosophy (the philosophy which moves beyond the attitude of “natural objectivism”) are phenomenological positions that resign from the concept of intentionality as the crux of (phenomenological) cognition: Heidegger’s and Henry’s standpoints allow for a critical examination of Husserl’s philosophy from a new perspective, while at the same time opening new vistas for transcendentalism. These positions make it possible to note the limits of Husserl’s method and show that a different kind of reduction is possible.
EN
Movements never emerge spontaneously; rather, they are formed cautiously, framed artistically, faceted systemically, bred by the curious brains constantly and patronized with the powerful determination perpetually. The momentum of the movements depends upon the devotional vigour of their mobilizers, the intellectual fertility of their founders and their appeal to the followers. Judging on that criteria, a study is being carried out with the aim of enlightening the readers and researchers with the factors of vitality that gave a spur to the nourishment of transcendentalism that saw its adolescence on the Fruit lands of New England during the early years of nineteenth century and in the years to come transformed into a global movement.
EN
The main problem of the paper is to what extent the political can become a subject of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. Its starting point is Ludwig Landgrebe's thesis that if phenomenology is to be a transcendental philosophy, it is - consistently thought out to an end - a transcendental theory of history. Referring to this thesis, the author poses the question: would the meaning of phenomenological transcendentalism not be consistently thought out to an end only if phenomenology proved its capacity as a transcendental theory of the political? In order to answer this critical question Landgrebe's thesis is interpreted from the perspective of Klaus Held's project of a 'phenomenology of the political world'. The author of this paper analyses the categorial relationship between both projects and poses two questions in this context: To what extent the problem of the political falls within the scope of phenomenology as a transcendental theory of history and how far the phenomenology of the political world can be understood as a transcendental theory of the political.
EN
Traces of Kant's main ideas can be found in hand written notes that he used to prepare before delivering his lectures. It is clear from these pages how Kant reached the conclusion that reason acting on its own could not establish epistemologically valid results and that cognitively valid findings must be confirmed by experience. A non-verifiable proposition does not refer to anything, Kant believed. Having made these observations the author focuses on discrepancies between some of Kant's essential premises., e.g. the discrepancy between status and functions of the intellect and senses, or between a priori truths and transcendentalism. Following Kant the author argues that without direct insight pure reason is empty and cannot serve as a fundamental cognising faculty. Less clear is the status, unity and functions of self-consciousness (the self or the subject). The unity of the subject emerges as a result of the application of categories (synthesis) and is not a raw datum. This makes several contentions of Kant doubtful. The author believes that Kant drew his inspiration for the development of the tables of categories from the Emile by Rousseau. In conclusion the author says that the main achievement of Kant is to be found in the showing that the self, truth and objective validity of cognising are intimately connected and inseparable.
EN
The papar reconstructs in general outline philosophical transcendentalism which was first formulated in the critical writings of Kant, then further developed in his theory of knowledge, and finally made conceptually more precise in the works of Fichte. These two philosophers, Kant and Fichte, are not discussed here as concrete thinkers or authors but as participants and representatives of sense making events and processes which have developed and unfolded in their texts and treatises. Two different though related questions are submitted to close scrutiny. First, what has happened with the Kantian idea of transcendentalism, how has it modified the previous configuration of questions, problems and concepts connected with the philosophical theory of human knowledge? And secondly, why did Fichte's 'Wissenschaftslehre', and not some previously written philosophical work, manage to lay bare theoretical consequences of that event, and why this work rather than any other has showed the way for the future course of the ensuing process of thought.
EN
The paper focuses on the relationship between Kant's transcendental philosophy and the 20th century hermeneutics. It is true that the vigorous development of mainstream transcendentalism is due to such great figures in German classical philosophy as Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. At the same time, however, one of Kant's students, J.G. Herder, pointed to some shortcomings in Kant's philosophy, and created an alternative philosophical project by referring to historical, cultural and bodily underpinnings of the human existence. In Herder's view, human condition is determined by practical life interests and by communicative (language) structures. These insights have been further developed by Nietzsche and Dilthey, and after some time by Heidegger with his fundamental ontology and by Gadamer with his philosophical hermeneutics. These two philosophers built their views on the contribution that had been made by Dilthey. It is interesting to note that each of the three followers of Kant have relied on his philosophy in a different way - Dilthey to create an epistemological perspective, Heidegger an ontological one and Gadamer a multifaceted perspective that combines communication, life practice and ethics. These influences are quite widespread. The three philosophers profess an activistic conception of reason, initially discussed and developed by Kant. They also endorse the idea of an a priori conceptual scheme that precedes cognition and understanding of the world. But the ahistorical interpretation of reason characteristically detectable in the network of logical categories is replaced by the concept of protostructure of understanding with the constitutive role of language as a medium of human being-in-the-world. These developments explain how the hermeneutic project has facilitated the transition from Kantian transcendentalism to the linguistic turn.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2010
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vol. 65
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issue 2
139-149
EN
The paper offers an examination of Patocka's attempt to clear a difficulty of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology and to develop a 'non-subjective' conception of the phenomenology. The author gives a thorough analysis of two fundamental writtings, compiled by Patocka in Germany in 1970-1971. The aim of the paper is to follow Patocka's way of gradually developing his idea in various articles, mainly in his lecture 'Plato and Europe'
EN
The author investigates the possibility to present Freudean psychoanalysis as a form of transcendentalism. More specifically, he examines the relationship between Freud's belief that something alien can exist in the subject - this strange element is called the unconscious - and Kantian concept of the synthetic unity of apperception. The starting point of the analysis is an interpretation of Freud offered by Ricoeur. By introducing the language of transcendental philosophy to the reading of Freud, Ricoeur has succeeded in putting to the side the question of the subjective preconditions for the emergence of meaning. Subsequently the author turns to a Heideggerian reading of Kant which offers a model justification for the view that makes the unity of 'I think' a fundamental precondition predicated by variety of aspects and identified by temporal existence. Finally he proceeds to confront the temporal condition of subjectivity with the extratemporal character of the unconscious, and refers to the critique of the metaphysical conception of time levelled by Derrida against Heideggerian metaphysics of the 'Dasein'. In the end, what initially may have seemed a paradoxical reading of Freud - namely that the unconscious springs from the most primitive intuitions of animism but at the same time is a continuation of Kant's philosophy - is borne out by his analysis.
EN
The article presents two main philosophical approaches to the problem of intersubjectivity. The first, which may be called ethical transcendentalism, has to do with metaphysical problems involving the origin and the very possibility of the experience of another self. The second approach refers to issues related to the epistemological dimension. Corresponding to these contexts we find two senses of intersubjectivity. The article analyses these two approaches and points out the difficulties involved in applying the concept of intersubjectivity as construed in ethical transcendentalism to the empirical self. 
EN
It is said that transcendental phenomenology faces an unavoidable aporia, according to which it is perfectly justified to accept the claim that the transcendental ego constitutes the sense of all external being, including other subjects, as well as the claim that other subjects constitute the sense of all external objects, since they are a community of transcendental egos. The essence of the aporia is that it is impossible to accept both of these claims if one accepts the conceptual schema of transcendental phenomenology. In the article, I present an interpretation of transcendental phenomenology which allows one to avoid such consequences. Firstly, the static theory of intersubjectivity presented in Ideas of Pure Phenomenology and Carthesian Meditations is reconstructed and analyzed. Attention is devoted to the issues of phenomenological reduction and constitution of sense. Afterwards, it is argued that one should distinguish two kinds of constitutive processes: one understood as an activity of the sole transcendental ego (self), and the second one as an activity of the community of transcendental egos. It is claimed that both processes are mutually connected. Moreover, it seems that the second kind of constitution is metaphysically prior then the former one. This claim will allow one to overcome solipsistic interpretations of transcendental phenomenology and to overcome the aporia presented.
Kwartalnik Filozoficzny
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2009
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vol. 37
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issue 1
61-75
EN
The subject of this article is Levinas's interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology and the influence of the latter on the philosophy of Levinas himself. By discovering the intentionality of consciousness, Husserl de facto discovered the transitiveness (la transitivité) of thinking and existence and therefore revolutionized the understanding of transcendentalism. This interpretation has an essential influence on the idea of immanence and transcendence in Levinas' philosophy, according to whom the sphere of immanence is the human universum, while transcendence, or the exterior (l'exteriorité) is radical otherism from this universum, and it can only be detected as a trace. The authoress also points out the analogies between Levinas' understanding of Husserl and the interpretations of his philosophy (especially intentionality) by Polish phenomenologists belonging to Roman Ingarden's post-war school in Krakow (Jan Szewczyk, Józef Tischner).
EN
The aim of the theory of experience presented in the 'Phenomenology of Perception' was to overcome the traditional difficulties of empiricism and intellectualism by showing their common ground, primordial perception. The starting point made it possible to take into account the genesis of these contrary positions. The analysis of world experienced by a bodily subject led to the conditions of existence of a free and conscious subject and, correlatively, its experienced world. The intentionality of the body proper proved to be so constitutive for conscious being in the world that the consequences of its disintegration, as examples of pathology and experiments had shown, meant breaking up the unity of the experienced and inter-subjective world, as well as of the conscious subject. The intentionality of the body gained the status of a basis of experience, a source and criterion of every type of knowledge. The body proper as capacity of sensing, perceiving, pointing, speaking, expressing, etc. took the place of transcendental consciousness. Merleau-Ponty dismissed the cogito. The author calls this 'transcendentalism a rebours'. But in some fragments of the 'Phenomenology of Perception' Merleau-Ponty did not take for granted the primacy of the intentionality of the body. His next works would confirm this change. The relationship between man and the world is not given along with the nature of the body. It is only one aspect of human existence. Language, history, and culture permeate the level of perception from the very beginning and determine the process of becoming a free and conscious subject. In the 'Phenomenology of Perception' there are, then, two motives, that of primordial perceiving as the guarantee of all sense and that of giving sense with no basis in a ready pattern. The article shows examples of the relationship between perception and cognition and between the subject of perception and the conscious subject, illustrating how the two motives are interwoven.
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EN
This article treats of an issue of Kant's metaphysics of perception as a specific sphere where concept of sense perception within transcendental philosophy seems to be rooted into a wider context of metaphysical presuppositions. The text is an epitome of a few Kant's aporias which appear when he does not notice a metaphysical background which constitutes basic relation between subject and object in sense perception.
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