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DOES THE CONCEIVABILITY OF ZOMBIES ENTAIL THEIR POSSIBILITY?

100%
Polcyn K.
Organon F. medzinárodný časopis pre analytickú filozofiu
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2020
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vol. 27
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issue 3
395 – 410
EN
According to the two-dimensional argument against materialism, developed by David Chalmers, the conceivability of zombies entails primary possibility, and the primary possibility of zombies entails further secondary possibility. I argue that the move from the conceivability to primary possibility of zombies is unjustified. Zombies are primarily impossible despite being conceivable if the corresponding phenomenal and microphysical concepts have coinciding primary intensions (refer to the same properties in all possible worlds considered as actual) despite being distinct concepts. But there is no good reason to think that phenomenal and microphysical concepts cannot have coinciding primary intensions despite being distinct concepts. As I argue, this conclusion follows from reflection on special cognitive features of phenomenal concepts.
2

O MENEJ RADIKÁLNOM PRÍSTUPE K VÝZNAMU, ESENCIÁM A MODALITÁM

86%
Schmidt M.
Filozofia (Philosophy)
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2018
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vol. 73
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issue 8
606 – 619
EN
M. Duží, B. Jespersen and P. Materna rejected a revolution in analytic philosophy brought about by S. Kripke and H. Putnam. The revolution championed new views on meaning, modalities and essences based on extensional essentialism, semantic externalism, and metaphysical necessity. Duží, Jespersen and Materna offer an opposite approach: semantic internalism, priority of logical necessity, and essentialism related only to concepts. Despite their disagreements, both sides prefer modal monism based on one fundamental source of modality. The aim of the paper is to show that modal monism is not adequate and should be replaced by a dualistic view as it is found, for instance, in two-dimensional semantics. Two-dimensional semantics enables Duží, Jespersen and Materna to maintain their views but avoid problems that stem from their rationalistic modal monism.
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