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Is there a Metaphysical Proof of God's Existence?

100%
Moskal P.
Forum Philosophicum
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2008
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vol. 13
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issue 2
167-175
EN
What determines whether the procedures for proving the affirmative statement of God's existence may be called a proof? Certainly, it is necessary that all premises be true and that a reliable inference schemata be applied. One premise appears to be the most critical in the theistic argument. This premise is the principle of sufficient reason. I hold the view that the principle of sufficient reason cannot be found among the premises of any metaphysical explanation of reality, so I suggest that the terms “proof” and “argument” not be used. Instead, we could speak of ways of acquiring discursive knowledge of God and ways of indirect substantiation of God's existence.
2
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Skeptical Theism, Moral Skepticism, and Divine Deception

100%
Seigal J.
Forum Philosophicum
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2010
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vol. 15
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issue 2
251-274
EN
Skeptical theism—a strategy for dealing with so-called “evidential arguments from evil”—is often held to lead to moral skepticism. In this paper I look at some of the responses open to the skeptical theist to the contention that her position leads to moral skepticism, and argue that they are ultimately unsuccessful, since they leave the skeptical theist with no grounds for ruling out the possibility of maximal divine deception. I then go on to argue that the situation is particularly bleak for the skeptical theist, since the most prominent ways of dealing with this pervasive type of skepticism are not available to her. Furthermore, since this pervasive type of skepticism entails moral skepticism, it follows that moral skepticism will after all have found a way in “through the back door.” In order to solidify my case, I go on to outline and deal with three potential objections.
3
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The Many Ways God Is: Ontological Pluralism and Traditional Christian Theism

86%
Mcleod-Harrison M.
Forum Philosophicum
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2009
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vol. 14
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issue 2
259-276
EN
Traditional Christianity holds that God is a singular way, not dependent on the conceptual machinations of humans. I argue that God can be plural ways, different in different human conceptual schemes, all the while holding to traditional Christianity. In short, I provide a framework for an ontological pluralism that extends not just to the world being various ways but to God being various ways.
4

Natural Nonbelief as a Necessary Means to a Life of Choiceworthy Meaning

72%
Vandergriff K.
Open Theology
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2016
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vol. 2
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issue 1
EN
Many have thought that certain types and distributions of apparent nonresistant nonbelief in the world are among the best reasons to think naturalism is more probable than theism. Jason Marsh has argued that one specific type of nonresistant nonbelief, called natural nonbelief in early humans, supports naturalism over theism. However, I will argue that it is epistemically possible that God has a morallysufficient reason for permitting natural nonbelief in early humans. First, according to Axiarchism, God’s goal for physical reality is to intentionally structure it so that a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value will be realized. Second, since theism entails Axiarchism, and it is far from clear on our total available evidence that eliminating the possibility of natural nonbelief would have led to a choiceworthy degree of moral, intellectual, and aesthetic value being realized for early humans, the degree to which natural nonbelief supports naturalism over theism is softened.
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